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f o r e w o r d
We live in the Information Age, which is marked by an explosion in the amount of information that exists, as well as rapid advances in the tools for its collection, management, analysis and 
communication . People working on food safety, like those in many fields, now face an abundance 
of information generated by diverse institutions and individuals for a wide range of purposes . This 
presents both opportunities and challenges .
The great opportunity lies in the fact that food safety in the United States can be improved if those 
working to reduce foodborne illness–in government, industry, academia and the consumer com-
munity–are informed by the best available science, data and analysis . The difficult challenge is to be 
sure the information generated is what these diverse practitioners really need and to provide timely 
access to the information in a useful form .
Meeting this information challenge is crucial, because ensuring food safety is, at its core, a matter 
of collecting and making good use of information to identify, understand and prevent food safety 
problems .
This report addresses today’s food safety information challenge by recommending ways to improve 
the functioning of what we have termed the “food safety information infrastructure” (FSII), which 
encompasses the many public and private institutions, programs and processes through which infor-
mation is collected, made accessible, and actively shared to ensure food safety .
The project from which this report emanates was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
which has long worked to improve how information is generated and used to help meet public health 
objectives . With the Foundation’s support, we were able to convene, in a series of four workshops, 
a wide range of food safety experts from federal, state and local governments, the food industry, 
academia and the consumer community to discuss information needs and ways to better meet them . 
In workshop presentations and discussions, other in-person meetings and interviews, telecon-
ferences, email conversations and comments on our drafts, a large community of individuals helped 
us understand current food safety information practices and the constraints under which individuals 
and institutions operate in collecting and sharing information .
Participants in the project also offered many ideas for how to overcome these constraints and specific 
suggestions for improving the generation and flow of information across the food safety system . We 
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base many of our conclusions and recommendations in this report on their input . We emphasize, 
however, that, although we tried to include as many perspectives as possible in our project, we could 
not capture them all . In addition, while the recommendations spelled out in Section Five of the 
report draw heavily on the input we received throughout the project and are intended to address the 
expressed needs of the community, we, alone, are responsible and fairly accountable for their specific 
content .
One of the first things we learned from the food safety community is that the FSII in the United States 
is even more multi-faceted and complex than we thought at the outset of the project, and significantly 
improving it will be more difficult than we initially thought . While technical issues abound, we found 
that improving the FSII is primarily a matter of redefining roles and relationships among its many 
participants and creating incentives and mechanisms for agencies and individuals to collaborate more 
closely and to act on their common interest in improving the food safety system as a whole . Our rec-
ommendations focus largely on these matters . 
Improving the FSII will certainly not be easy, but the time is right to tackle it . We hope our report will 
contribute to progress by increasing understanding of the central role of information in ensuring food 
safety and stimulating discussion of both constraints and opportunities for improvement in how we 
meet our food safety information needs .
We will continue to welcome any and all comments on this report and ideas for improving the nation’s 
food safety information infrastructure .
Michael R . Taylor
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School of Public Health and Health Services
The George Washington University
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e x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y
Introduction
Ensuring the safety of the food supply is centrally important to the public’s health and underpins the success of the nation’s trillion dollar food and agriculture industries . Food safety is also one 
of our most dynamic public health challenges due to changing technologies and consumer practices 
and the globalizing food supply . 
Over the last two decades, food safety experts and practitioners have made great progress in under-
standing food safety as a “farm-to-table” challenge that requires science-based efforts all across the 
food system to prevent foodborne illness . And, today, policymakers are considering how to enhance 
the government’s role in ensuring food safety and better harness the capacity and primary duty of the 
food industry to make food safe .
For all actors in the food safety system—public and private—the effectiveness of what they do depends 
on the quality of the information they have on potential hazards and how to minimize them . Thus, 
any effort to improve the food safety system must address how a wide range of institutions and indi-
viduals meet their information needs . 
In this context, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded a project under the auspices of the 
university-based Food Safety Research Consortium to examine and make recommendations for 
improving the nation’s “food safety information infrastructure” (FSII), defined to encompass all 
public and private institutions, programs and processes through which information is collected, made 
accessible and actively shared to ensure food safety . Through the project, a diverse collection of food 
safety experts and stakeholders came together for a series of workshops to discuss information needs 
and ways to better meet them .
This report and its recommendations are based largely on those workshop discussions, though the 
authors alone are responsible for the content of the report . Our hope is this report will provide the 
basis for further dialogue and actions to improve the use of information to ensure food safety .
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Vision for the Food Safety Information Infrastructure
The food safety system and, in turn, the FSII, are comprised of many thousands of institutions and 
individuals at all levels of government, throughout the food industry and academia, in the public 
health and consumer communities, and, increasingly, in the international community, all of which are 
involved in collecting and using food safety information . They connect to and depend on each other 
in many ways, but operate, for the most part, independently . 
The FSII is, therefore, best understood as a highly dispersed and decentralized network, rather than 
an integrated and managed system . The decentralized nature of the FSII has strengths that should be 
preserved, but it also complicates coordination in the collection of specific research or test data and 
other types of information, as well as the sharing of information, required for the success of a science-
based, farm-to-table food safety system . 
Thus, to better meet the information needs of all participants in the food safety system, we envision an 
FSII that, through the better coordinated and connected efforts of many public and private parties, gen-
erates useful and timely information and makes it readily accessible to those who need it. It is a system 
characterized by information not only being generated and used well within organizations but also 
flowing among organizations to enhance the overall effectiveness of the food safety system .
Based on our workshop discussions, we believe an FSII functioning in these ways would improve the 
contribution that participants all across the food system can make to ensuring food safety . 
Today’s Food Safety Information Infrastructure
The complexity and decentralization of today’s FSII mean that initiatives to improve it face serious 
challenges . Nevertheless, a number of recent efforts suggest that progress is not only possible but 
already underway . 
Challenges
Achieving the vision of an improved FSII is made difficult by the following realities of the food safety 
system and the FSII: 
Many Information Types•	 , ranging from data on human disease rates and food contamination to 
information on the availability and cost of preventive measures and food safety practices in industry 
and among consumers .
Many Information Sources and Scientific Disciplines•	 , including government research and reg-
ulatory agencies, food companies and academic researchers and disciplines including veterinary 
medicine, epidemiology, food science, microbiology, risk analysis and economics .
Many Organizations and Actors•	 , including:
•  Multiple agencies of the U .S . Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U .S . Centers for Disease 




•  Departments of health, agriculture and the environment and public health laboratories across the 
50 states;
•  Nearly 3,000 local health departments and retail inspection agencies;
•  Millions of agricultural producers, hundreds of thousands of food processors, retailers and res-
taurants, and dozens of associations representing various segments of the food and agriculture 
industries;
•  A wide range of government and university-based food safety researchers; 
•  Consumer representatives and organized victims of foodborne illness; and
•  Overseas actors, including food producers, foreign regulators and international organizations .
Complexity of Information Needs•	 , for addressing both immediate problems, such as outbreak 
response and forward-looking analytical needs, such as microbial risk analysis .
Recent Progress
Today’s understanding of food safety as a farm-to-table “system” challenge requiring science-based, 
preventive solutions has resulted in greatly expanded and, in some cases, more sophisticated infor-
mation collection efforts by government and industry . These include:
Improved foodborne illness surveillance and outbreak identification and reporting by CDC and •	
state and local agencies, including increased use of electronic reporting systems, standardization of 
laboratory methods and ongoing efforts to improve coordination of outbreak response;
More extensive food safety research, collection of contamination data and marshaling of other •	
information for risk analysis by regulatory agencies; 
Rapid expansion of microbial testing and scientific validation of control measures by the food •	
industry; and
Increasing use of modern information technology and the Internet to compile information and •	
make it accessible .
Constraints on Success
Despite recent progress, our analysis of the current FSII and discussions at the project workshops 
revealed important constraints on achieving the vision of better coordinated generation and wider 
dissemination and sharing of food safety information . Fundamentally, the FSII is constrained by the 
fact it is comprised of thousands of institutions collecting data for their own purposes, in accordance 
with long-established practices, and without adequate incentive to change those practices and incur 
the inevitable added costs .
The resulting reality of the FSII presents a number of specific constraints that should be addressed .
Lack of Mechanisms for Planning and Coordinating Information Collection
Government food safety research is, at best, loosely coordinated and not sufficiently accountable to •	
government regulators, policy makers and industry food safety managers .
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The management of food safety epidemiology is highly decentralized, mostly reactive to outbreaks, •	
and not planned in close collaboration with government policy makers and industry food safety 
managers who can devise prevention strategies .
Food contamination data are collected by many government agencies, food companies and •	
researchers without coordination or concern for how the data might be aggregated or compared . 
Institutional Obstacles to Information Sharing
Government agencies generally lack a mandate and resources to collaborate on collecting or sharing •	
information . 
Government agencies at all levels operate under legal constraints on information gathering and •	
sharing, including privacy laws, protections against disclosing confidential business information 
and such federal measures as the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) and the Information Quality 
Act (IQA) .
Government agencies and others that collect information typically have a sense of ownership that •	
can hinder information sharing .
The food industry has competitive, liability and other business reasons to be reticent about sharing •	
information . 
Academic publishing traditions result in large amounts of publicly funded research data not being •	
accessible readily, or at all, to others who might find it useful .
Technical Constraints on Information Sharing
The lack of standardized approaches to data collection—such as sampling protocols, sample col-•	
lection methods and laboratory test methods—make it difficult and often impossible to compare or 
aggregate data from diverse sources .
The incompatibility of diverse information systems and data formats complicates and sometimes •	
prevents the meaningful compilation and sharing of otherwise similar data .
Recommendations
Our workshop discussions identified many specific issues and problems that stakeholders believe must 
be addressed to get the most value from existing food safety information and improve future infor-
mation collection . We found, however, that most of the problems in the FSII are systemic in nature, 
meaning they are grounded in how the vast network of players in our decentralized food safety system 
see their roles, what their incentives are to act in particular ways and the obstacles that exist to acting 
differently . We believe that lasting solutions must respect and address these institutional realities and 
include mechanisms that facilitate diverse institutions working together in new ways . 
Our recommendations thus include establishing a national FSII policy and program . This would 
provide both “top-down” leadership to catalyze change in the government’s approach to food safety 
information and “bottom-up” mechanisms for devising and implementing change . We also rec-
ommend actions and initiatives that respond directly to specific concerns and opportunities for 
improvement that we heard in the workshops . Some of these recommendations are broad cross-
cutting initiatives that directly impact many institutions in the system, while others are more sharply 
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focused . We emphasize that the costs of implementing any of these recommendations may be sig-
nificant and that how these costs are covered over the long term is an important consideration .
Our recommendations call for a major philosophical and practical shift in the current food safety 
system . Any such major change to a longstanding government program is inherently difficult to 
achieve and sustain . Launching the recommended transformation of the FSII will thus require high-
level commitment, leadership and action from the Congress and the White House to provide the 
needed direction and resources . The sustainability of change will depend ultimately, however, on the 
program’s success in meeting the information needs of food safety practitioners and stakeholders, 
including those in government, industry, academia and the consumer community . 
Finally, our recommendations address the FSII from a broad public health perspective and with par-
ticular attention to how the many actors in the U .S . food safety system can better collaborate to reduce 
the well-documented burden of foodborne illness in the United States . We focus largely, therefore, on 
institutional roles, relationships and policies affecting the collection and sharing of food safety infor-
mation . We ground the report as much as possible in the substance and science of food safety, but it is 
beyond our scope to address, for example, the need to improve the internal data management systems 
of government agencies or such important technical issues as how to improve the scientific quality of 
the data various parties generate .
We address the international dimension of food safety to the extent our recommendations for 
improving information collection, access and sharing relate as much to information about imported 
foods as about foods produced domestically . This project has not, however, examined the important 
question of how U .S .-based institutions might better interact with foreign companies and governments 
and international organizations . That question richly deserves its own study .
FSII National Policy and Program 
Leadership from the federal government is critical to achieving our vision for the FSII’s role in ensuring 
food safety, but no federal agency is charged with providing it . We thus recommend that the federal 
government, via legislation or executive order, make it the duty of all federal food safety agencies, 
whether involved in regulation, surveillance, or research, to:
Foster coordinated approaches to collecting food safety information among federal, state and local •	
agencies;
Consider the larger needs of the food safety system in planning information collection; and•	
Maximize access to and active sharing of food safety information among government agencies and •	
with the private sector . 
We recommend the federal government create two mechanisms for implementing this new FSII 
policy: the FSII Council and the FSII Stakeholder Forum . We also recommend a series of priority 
actions be addressed as part of the national program, listed in Box ES .1 .
FSII Council
The FSII Council would be an intergovernmental body housed in the U .S . Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) and composed of the senior food safety official from the key federal 
agencies, centers and offices and at least an equal number of representatives of state and local food 
safety agencies . The Council should have a line item in the HHS budget with an initial authorization 
in the range of $25 million to fund its own base activities and catalyze initiatives to improve the FSII .
The primary responsibility of the Council would be to convene, coordinate and otherwise provide 
needed support to agencies in fulfilling their new responsibilities under the national FSII policy . 
Specific duties would include:
Seeking regular input on information needs from all participants in the food safety system; 1 . 
Prioritizing, planning and coordinating implementation of actions to improve the collection and 2 . 
flow of food safety information;
Identifying any legislative or policy changes required to carry out needed actions; 3 . 
Estimating costs and benefits associated with needed actions; and4 . 
Reporting annually to Congress and public regarding food safety information needs, progress in 5 . 
improving the FSII and key obstacles .
Box ES.1—Priority Actions of the FSII National Program
Participants in our project workshops made a number of suggestions for improving government 
practices related to information access. We recommend that Congress (or the president) direct 
the FSII Council, in consultation with the Stakeholder Forum, to consider and prioritize the fol-
lowing possible actions:
 1.  Prompt reporting and deeper access to CDC’s outbreak and surveillance data, including 
online public access to national outbreak data collected via eFORS;
 2.  Treating FoodNet data as a public resource and making it promptly available and user-
friendly to all interested parties in the public and private sectors, limited only by appropri-
ate protection of patient privacy; 
 3.  Expanding participation in eLEXNET by government laboratories, and possibly non-gov-
ernment laboratories as well, and, eventually, creating a means to make the information 
available online to the public; 
 4.  Creating mechanisms to aggregate, analyze and share among jurisdictions the  inspection, 
enforcement and recall information generated by federal, state and local agencies, includ-
ing harmonized inspection reporting criteria and searchable online databases; state and 
local agencies, including harmonized inspection reporting criteria and searchable online 
databases;
 5.  Clarifying and strengthening protocols for rapid information sharing in outbreak situations 
among public agencies, with the food industry and the public, to ensure timely access to 
information needed to contain outbreaks and prevent future ones;
 6.  Greatly expanding the commissioning of state and local officials by FDA and other agen-
cies to help foster information access and sharing during illness outbreaks, compliance 
investigations and other settings;
 7.  Amending or interpreting the IQA so as not to affect the release of information to other 
public agencies;
 8.  Making fully public information concerning research activities performed or funded by 
federal agencies, in particular USDA’s Agriculture Research Information System (ARIS);
 9.  Standardizing and harmonizing sampling methods and laboratory procedures to enable 
data and results to be compared; and
10. Generally improving public Web access to publicly generated datasets.
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FSII Stakeholder Forum 
While the federal government has both the duty and capacity to catalyze and support improvement in 
the FSII, meaningful progress on most issues will not be possible without the participation of practi-
tioners and experts from all elements of the food safety system . To facilitate this participation, an FSII 
Stakeholder Forum should be established under the auspices of the FSII Council . 
The Forum would play a consultative role, facilitate the exchange of information and promote imple-
mentation of various programs and policies . In its consultative role, the Forum would be a principal 
means by which the Council would gather input on information needs and suggestions for improving 
the FSII . The Forum would facilitate the exchange of information by providing a setting in which 
members of the food safety community could identify common problems and share best practices, 
including advances in information technology that can facilitate data sharing .
The Forum could also serve as a mechanism for implementation of specific initiatives . For example, 
the Forum could facilitate dialogue and collaboration across institutional lines in efforts to standardize 
data collection methods .
Specific Initiatives
With or without the establishment of a new national policy and program to improve the FSII, the fol-
lowing are specific actions that could be taken to better meet the information needs of the food safety 
system . All are spelled out more fully in Section Five of the report .
1. Create a Food Safety Epidemiology User Group 
In collaboration with state and local health officials, CDC should sponsor and lead the creation of 
a Food Safety Epidemiology User Group to ensure that publicly funded food safety epidemiology 
is as demand-driven as possible and of the greatest value feasible to those working to improve food 
safety . The User Group would include participants from throughout the food safety community, 
including those in government regulatory agencies, industry, academia and consumer advocacy . The 
User Group would work to prioritize the data and analytical needs of the food safety community and 
ensure data from publicly funded epidemiology are made accessible in the most timely and useful 
manner possible .
2. Create a “Network of Networks” to Improve the 
Interconnectivity of the Food Safety Web
To increase awareness of food safety information sources and overcome the “stove pipe” effect of 
isolated food safety databases, the food safety community should collaborate to create a “network of 
networks” for food safety information . Such a network would be based on a gateway Web site that 
would include a browseable and searchable directory of food safety databases and other information 
sources across the food safety system . The goal would be to support the diversity of the current FSII 





3. Create a Database for Tracking Research and Data Collection 
The federal government, acting through the proposed FSII Council and Stakeholder Forum or other 
suitable mechanism, should develop and maintain an online and searchable database of past and 
on-going food safety research and data collection and analysis activities, focused on subjects of 
current interest to food safety practitioners . The database should enable interested parties to find out 
what data are being collected across the system and what research is being performed on a particular 
topic of interest, whether the activity is conducted by the federal government, university researchers, 
or others . The database should include research and data collection and analysis activities related to 
particular pathogens, foods or commodities, and interventions–information practitioners could use 
to understand hazards and how to prevent them . The idea is not to duplicate published scientific lit-
erature, but to supplement it with up-to-date information .
4. Conduct Targeted Analyses to Identify Knowledge and Information Gaps 
The federal government, through the FSII Council and Stakeholders Forum or other mechanism, 
should take the lead in conducting or sponsoring targeted analyses and systematic reviews of existing 
information to identify trends in research activities, unnecessary overlap in research and significant 
data gaps . 
5. Initiate Dialogue to Prioritize Information Needs
Building on the research database and analyses outlined above, the federal government should drive 
an ongoing community and dialogue-based process to identify and prioritize the information needs 
of the food safety system . One approach to achieving such a dialogue would be to hold an annual 
research and data conference, bringing together representatives of major funding organizations 
together with representatives of regulatory and public health agencies, private industry, consumers 
and scientists from the research community . This gathering should not be a simple research update, 
but rather a focused and well-facilitated discussion of research and data collection required to solve 
current food safety problems, leading to as much agreement as possible on what needs to be done .
6. Increase Access to Information and Publications 
Resulting from Publicly Funded Food Safety Research 
Data, analysis and other information from publicly funded food safety research, including academic 
research, have potential public health value . They should not be considered the proprietary resource 
of the researcher, but rather should be publicly available on a timely and complete basis, subject to 
some reasonable protection of the researcher’s right to “first publication .”
Achieving this will require efforts by researchers, their funders and the publishers of their work . We 
recommend the following: 
The academic and government research community should use online data repositories to 1 . 
supplement peer-reviewed journal articles as the vehicle for publishing data from food safety 
research .
Government research grants should mandate that all peer-reviewed journal articles made 2 . 
possible by publicly funded research—whether generated by public officials, academic 
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researchers or those in the private sector–be made freely and publicly available online within a 
year of original publication, along with the data utilized within these publications .
Government and other research funders should take steps to ensure that complete data, not just 3 . 
articles, resulting from their investments are made available to others once the research projects 
are completed . 
Journal publishers should work to ensure broader and less costly access to articles and also 4 . 
consider alternatives to current practices that would make research data available earlier and 
more broadly . 
7. Increase Access to Industry-Generated Food Safety Information 
The food industry should work with government and academic researchers to identify specific 
problems whose solutions might be advanced by access to industry-generated food safety data and 
other information and to find workable solutions to make such information available in an appro-
priate form .
Conclusion
There are no panaceas for improving the FSII . Our project workshops and other outreach to the food 
safety community revealed, however, both strong interest in the FSII’s problems and many good ideas 
to help solve them . We hope the recommendations outlined here do justice to both the problem and 
possible solutions and help foster change that puts more and improved information in the hands of 
people who can use it to better ensure the safety of the American food supply .

| 11 |
s e c t i o n  o n e : 
i n t r o d u c t i o n
Background
The last twenty years have been a period of remarkable change and learning in the food safety system . The most fundamental change has been a broadening of our understanding of the food 
safety challenge and the approaches we must take to meet it . 
For most of the 20th century, into the 1980s, the food safety system focused primarily on basic sani-
tation, chemical contaminants and food additives . Most industry and government participants in 
the system could work fairly comfortably and effectively in relative isolation . Companies could focus 
on the conditions in their plants and whether their raw materials and products met applicable limits 
for sanitary quality and chemical residues . Food safety agencies could focus on their traditional 
inspection and enforcement activities . 
Beginning in the late 1980s, things changed . Concerns about seafood safety, followed by outbreaks of 
illness associated with bacteria in ground beef, poultry and produce put the spotlight on the public 
health problem of foodborne illness caused by microbial pathogens, which pose a completely different 
kind of challenge for the food safety system . Pathogens can enter at almost any point on the farm-to-
table continuum; they can grow; and they can be killed . Thus, whether someone gets sick depends on 
a range of interconnected events and behaviors across the system, which, taken together, determine 
whether dangerous levels of an organism will be present at the point of consumption .
As outlined in the 1998 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, Ensuring Safe Food From Production to 
Consumption,1 this expanded understanding of food safety calls for action at points all across the food 
system—at production, processing, transport, retail sale and final consumption—where pathogens 
can enter food and grow or be reduced; and it makes everyone from farmers to consumers important 
participants in a more inter-connected food safety system . Traditional concerns about basic sani-
tation and chemical safety remain very important, but the premium today is on devising integrated, 
farm-to-table strategies for preventing foodborne illness . 




The food safety challenge has been complicated further by the rapid globalization of the food supply, 
with food safety in the United States being affected by events and behaviors overseas that cause 
chemical or microbial contamination of imported produce, seafood and other food items on which 
Americans rely . Recent concerns about terrorist attacks on the food supply have further complicated 
the food safety task and affected almost every party involved in food safety, from firms that must 
protect their supply chains from tampering to emergency responders at all levels of government 
managing outbreak situations . Preventing foodborne illness in the United States thus increasingly 
depends on the actions and interactions of many entities, domestic and foreign, working throughout 
the global food system . 
Each of the many participants in today’s food safety system has a distinct role to play, but they all have 
one thing in common: the effectiveness of what they do depends on information . Up and down the 
line, actors in the system depend on information about potential hazards and how to minimize them, 
and, in the end, every actor is only as good as the information on which they base their actions . This 
broader understanding of food safety permits us—indeed, requires us—to think of the food safety 
system as an information system. 
And, increasingly large volumes of food safety information are being produced every day . This includes 
information generated by practitioners in industry and in government regulatory agencies and 
health departments, as they go about trying to manage today’s more complex food safety problems, 
as well as those whose job it is to produce information for practitioners, such as those involved in 
foodborne illness surveillance at all levels of government and food safety researchers in government 
and academia . 
Defining “Food Safety Information Infrastructure”
In this report, we refer to all these actors and the many public and private institutions, programs and 
processes through which food safety information are collected, made accessible and actively shared 
as the “food safety information infrastructure” (FSII) . Box 1 .1 contains a glossary of terms that helps 




Food Safety Information Infrastructure: The many public and private institutions, programs and 
processes through which data and other information are collected, made accessible and actively 
shared to ensure food safety. 
Food Safety Data: Collections of facts, such as numbers, that are generally the result of some 
measurement.
Food Safety Information: Includes food safety data as well as the broad array of compilations, 
analyses, reports and other information items related to food safety. 
Ensure Food Safety: Includes all activities along the farm-to-table continuum that ensure food 
is safe for consumption. 
Information Collection: Acquisition of information related to food safety, including: activities 
that produce primary information, such as illness surveillance or survey elicitation; activities 
involving the assembly or compilation of information from primary sources, such as creation of 
databases; and analytical activities based on primary or secondary data, such as risk assess-
ments.
Information Access: Making food safety information available passively to the wider food safety 
community, such as by posting on Web sites or publishing in journals 
Information Sharing: Actively sharing food safety information with others, generally for a spe-
cific purpose, such as collaboration on a research study or risk assessment or to solve a specific 
problem.
Our FSII glossary focuses on issues of information access and sharing, because, even with today’s 
proliferation of information, food safety practitioners often lack ready access to the information they 
need to help ensure food safety . In some cases, the information does not exist, or, for lack of resources 
or other reasons, has not been entered into accessible databases . In others instances, the party needing 
information may not know where to find it, or there may be legal, policy, business, bureaucratic or 
technical reasons why the information is not accessible . Regardless, any instance in which practitioners 
cannot obtain the information they need to do their jobs is a missed opportunity to improve food safety . 
The FSII Project and Report: Purpose and Scope
To help take advantage of opportunities to better ensure food safety, this report recommends specific 
improvements in the nation’s food safety information infrastructure . These recommendations stem 
from a project funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to engage the food safety com-
munity in dialogue to identify outstanding food safety information needs and how to fulfill them by 
improving the FSII . The dialogue took place primarily during four workshops that brought together 
a broad cross section of food safety practitioners and experts from federal, state and local agencies, 
the food industry, academia and the consumer community (see Appendix A for workshop agendas 
and participants) . 
One of the important lessons we learned early in the project was that the FSII is far too complex—in 
terms of the number of institutions and interests involved and the depth and difficulty of the issues—
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to address comprehensively in a single project or report . For example, government agencies operate 
many information systems to support their internal program management activities, such as FDA’s 
internal systems for monitoring food imports and the internal data systems public health laboratories 
use to manage their programs . The protection of the food supply from intentional acts of contami-
nation is an important post-9/11 concern . And workshop participants and individuals commenting 
on drafts of this report raised a number of important scientific and technical issues concerning how 
food safety data are collected and analyzed . All of these activities and issues are important and relate 
in some way to the FSII and concerns addressed in this report .
In this report, however, we have chosen to focus on how diverse actors within the U .S . food safety 
system can improve the collection and sharing of food safety information to prevent foodborne illness 
associated with unintentional food contamination . We thus have approached the many issues the 
current FSII raises from this broad public health perspective and with a particular interest in how the 
many institutions and actors in the U .S . food safety system can improve their collaboration to prevent 
the well-documented burden of foodborne illness our country bears every year . 
For this reason, our analysis and recommendations focus to a large degree on institutional roles, 
relationships and policies affecting the collection and sharing of food safety information . We ground 
the report as much as possible in the substance and science of food safety, but it is beyond our scope 
to address the many important technical issues that relate to the FSII, such as ways to improve the 
scientific quality of the data various parties generate . 
We have also chosen not to address fully the international dimension of the FSII . The globalization 
of the food supply and recent wave of food safety problems associated with imported foods and 
ingredients certainly make food safety an international problem . Our recommendations address this 
reality in that our proposed institutional mechanisms, policies and initiatives for improving the FSII 
in the United States relate as much to information about imported foods as about foods produced 
domestically . 
This project has not, however, examined the activities of foreign governments and international food 
safety bodies, such as the United Nations’ Codex Alimentarius Commission, that are increasingly 
relevant to food safety in the United States . Nor have we addressed how U .S .-based institutions might 
better interact with foreign companies, governments and international organizations . These interna-
tional activities and issues richly deserve study but remain outside the scope of this report, primarily 
for practical reasons of time and resources . We also believe the United States has much to do to put 
its own food safety information house in order as the foundation for improving data flows interna-
tionally . 
Our understanding of the FSII benefited enormously from the discussions we witnessed among 
workshop participants, on which the recommendations we make in Section Five of this report are 
largely based . We did not, however, ask the workshop participants to sign on to the recommendations 
and many of the recommendations reflect our own efforts to capture what we learned in the project 
and to convert those lessons into actionable recommendations . Thus, while we believe our recom-
mendations are responsive to the needs and ideas of the community, it is important to reiterate that 
we alone are responsible for their content .
As a prelude to presenting our recommendations in Section Five, we lay out in Sections Two and Three 
a vision for the role information can play in a more effective food safety system and what changes are 
needed to bring this vision to fruition . In Section Four, we analyze constraints under which the FSII 
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currently operates . Like our recommendations, the vision and analysis in these sections draws heavily 
on the workshop discussions, supplemented by our own research and by the emerging consensus on 
the need for a more prevention-oriented, risk-based food safety system . 
The Basis for Progress
One thing is clear: Changing the status quo on food safety information will not be easy . The FSII is an 
extraordinarily complex web of individuals and institutions—encompassing government, industry, 
academia and consumers—all of which play distinct roles in the food safety system and FSII . Their 
natural tendency is to focus on their individual roles, rather than the needs and challenges of the 
whole system . Moreover, when participants try to take advantage of the synergies that can come from 
improving data access and sharing, they incur added costs and often encounter legal, business and 
bureaucratic barriers, several of which we note in Section Three of this report . 
Despite the barriers, however, there are reasons for optimism about the prospects for progress . To 
start, many practitioners in government and industry recognize they need more and better infor-
mation to do their jobs . This stems from the broader understanding of food safety as a “systems” 
problem whose solution requires science-based preventive efforts, and that understanding is coupled 
with the realization that the information needed for such efforts must come from many sources . We 
see emerging demand among stakeholders for improvement in the FSII .
Second, new tools for collecting and managing information make it feasible to collect, manage and 
disseminate in useful forms larger amounts of valuable information than ever before . Efforts to better 
coordinate the collection and sharing of information are more likely than ever to yield value for 
improving food safety . 
Finally, public policy is beginning to recognize the central role of information in implementing the 
modern vision of a science- and risk-based approach to food safety . The FDA Food Protection Plan 
and the White House Import Safety Action Plan, issued together in November 2007, both emphasize 
the role of information in preventing food safety problems . Policy-level awareness is crucial because 
many of the barriers to a better functioning FSII are the product of public policy, or could be remedied 
by it . 
By discerning the demand for change in information practices and forging policies that respond 
wisely to this demand, progress to improve the FSII can be achieved . We hope our recommendations, 
and the dialogue with the community that led up to them, will contribute to that progress .
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s e c t i o n  t w o: 
i n f o r m a t i o n ’s  r o l e  i n  e n s u r i n g  f o o d  s a f e t y
The starting point for developing recommendations to improve the FSII is a clear vision for the food safety system and the role of information in that system, as outlined in this section .
A Modern Vision for the Food Safety System
The IOM’s 1998 Ensuring Safe Food report crystallized a vision for a modern, science- and risk-based 
approach to food safety that had been developing among food safety experts during the 1990s . Today, 
the broad outline of the IOM vision is widely embraced among experts and policymakers alike, as 
reflected in:
A 2003 IOM follow-up report on scientific criteria and standards for food safety;•	 2
Numerous reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO);•	  3,4,5,6 
The Food Safety Strategic Plan issued in 2001 by the Clinton Administration’s Council on Food •	
Safety;7 
The Action Plan for Import Safety and the FDA Food Protection Plan announced by President Bush •	
in November 2007;8,9 
2  Institute of Medicine (IOM) . 2003 . Scientific criteria to ensure safe food . Washington: National Academy Press; May .
3   U .S . General Accounting Office (GAO) . 1997 . Food Safety: Fundamental Changes Needed to Improve Food Safety . GAO/RCED-
97-249R . Washington, DC . September 9 . 
4   U .S . General Accounting Office (GAO) . 2001 . Food Safety and Security—Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe Food . 
GAO-02-47T . Washington, DC . October 10 .
5   U .S . General Accounting Office (GAO) . 2004 . Federal Food Safety and Security System: Fundamental Restructuring is Needed to 
Address Fragmentation and Overlap . GAO-04-588T . Washington, DC . March 30 .
6   U .S . General Accounting Office (GAO) . 2005 . Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should Pursue Opportuni-
ties to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage Resources . GAO-05-213 . Washington, DC . March .
7  President’s Council on Food Safety . 2001 . Food Safety Strategic Plan . Washington, DC . January 19 . 
8   Interagency Working Group on Import Safety . November 2007 . Action Plan for Import Safety: A roadmap for continual im-
provement . Report to the President . Washington, DC . 
9   Food and Drug Administration (FDA) . November 2007 . Food Protection Plan: An integrated strategy for protecting the nation’s 
food supply . U .S . Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC . 
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The directive establishing a national policy for the defense of agriculture and food signed by •	
President Bush in 2004;10 
Recent positions on food safety reform taken by the food industry;•	 11 and 
Reform ideas being advanced by consumer leaders .•	 12
In this widely shared vision, the key functional elements of a modern, science- and risk-based 
approach—one that is effective in ensuring food safety—include:
Taking a farm-to-table approach•	  to preventing food safety problems; 
Using risk analysis•	  to better understand potential hazards, design interventions and prioritize pre-
vention efforts;
Collecting data to support risk analysis•	  through monitoring the food supply for potentially 
harmful contaminants and other hazards, foodborne illness surveillance and food safety research; 
Harnessing the primary role of food producers, processors, retailers and consumers•	  in pre-
venting food safety problems; 
Implementing preventive process control•	 , such as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP), through the food industry; 
Establishing and enforcing science-based food safety standards•	  through government food safety 
agencies;
Integrating food safety efforts•	  among federal, state and local food safety agencies;
Expanding international collaboration •	 with national governments in major export countries and 
international food safety bodies; 
Allocating government food safety efforts and resources in relation to risk•	  and opportunities to 
reduce risk; and 
Observing sound food safety practices•	  at the final preparation and consumption stage through 
well-informed commercial food handlers and consumers .
In this report, we embrace these functional elements and the broader vision they embody as the basis 
for defining the food safety system’s information needs and considering ways these needs can be 
better met . 
Types and Sources of Needed Information
Information Types
Every functional element of a modern, science- and risk-based approach to food safety depends on 
information, which comes in many types and from many sources . The landscape of information 
utilized by participants in the food safety system is vast and complicated; to help describe it, we 
10   Bush, George W . 2004 . Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9: “Defense of United States Agriculture and Food .” January 
30 . Available from: http://www .whitehouse .gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040203-2 .html (last viewed 4/2/2008) .
11   Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) . September 2007 . A Commitment to Consumers to Ensure the Safety of Imported 
Foods: Four Pillars of Public-Private Partnership . Washington, DC . 
12   De Waal, C .S ., and D .W . Plunkett . 2007 . Building a Modern Food Safety System For FDA Regulated Foods . Center for Science 
in the Public Interest (CSPI) White Paper . Washington, DC .
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developed a simple food safety information typology, focusing on the kinds of information generated 
by data collection and analysis . The typology, discussed in Section Three and described in more 
detail in Appendix B, includes a few dozen specific types of information grouped into eight broad 
categories:
Human Health1. , including, but not limited to, disease incidence data, the results of 
epidemiological investigations, clinical information on outcomes and sequelae, and information 
that attributes illnesses to causal pathogens and food vehicles;
Measurements of Contamination2. , including, but not limited to, the prevalence and levels of 
microbial and chemical contamination of animals, plants, foods and the environment;
Indicators of Contamination3. , including, but not limited to, sanitation inspection results, 
analytical data on fecal contamination, inspection reports, animal disposition information and 
recall datasets;
Hazard Identification4. , including, but not limited to, toxicity testing and research on detection 
methods for microbiological and chemical hazards, information on bacterial growth and 
decline in various environments, and microbial subtyping efforts;
Modeling5. , including, but not limited to, predictive microbiology, dose-response modeling, 
exposure assessments, and risk assessments for chemicals, pathogens, toxins or other naturally 
occurring contaminants;
Trade and Industry6. , including, but not limited to information on industrial practices, facility 
registration, product tracebacks, and estimates of intervention efficacy and costs;
Consumers and Workers7. , including, but not limited to, information on consumer and worker 
behavior with respect to food handling and preparation, consumer perceptions of risk, food 
consumption patterns, and demographics; and
Food and Environment8. , including, but not limited to information on food composition and 
other characteristics of food and the environment that influence food safety . 
Information Sources
The modern vision of how to ensure food safety includes not only a wide range of information cat-
egories and types, but also a complex network of participants working in diverse but interdependent 
capacities who are constantly generating, exchanging and using information to improve food safety . 
As illustrated in Figure 2 .1, the participants include those involved directly in the farm-to-table food 
system—such as food producers, processors, retailers and consumers—whose everyday activities 
directly affect food safety . Most of these hands-on participants generate information in the course of 
their work in the food safety system, and all rely upon information generated by others . 
The FSII also includes many other institutions in government, academia and the consumer and 
nonprofit communities that interact with the food system . Their crucial activities include providing 
regulatory oversight, educating consumers, conducting food safety research, responding to and inves-
tigating outbreaks, and performing laboratory analyses on food samples and isolates from animals 
and human cases of illness . Like those working directly in the food system, the institutions and indi-
viduals performing these roles both generate food safety information and are dependent on infor-
mation generated by others . 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While we focus in this report on U .S .-based institutions and activities, the FSII certainly has an inter-
national dimension due to our heavy reliance on imports of seafood, produce and other components 
of the food supply . The resulting reality is that some of the information needed to ensure food safety 
in the United States is generated overseas by foreign participants in the global food system . 
Role of the FSII in Ensuring Food Safety
We have outlined a vision for the food safety system and identified the wide range of information 
types and institutions that comprise the FSII . Now, the questions are: What aspirations do we have 
for how the FSII should function to support the food safety system? And, what value would a well-
functioning FSII have for participants across the system? The answers to these questions are essential 
to framing our recommendations to improve the FSII, and we draw our answers, again, from the 
discussion of information needs at the four project workshops .
Aspirational Goals for the FSII
We propose five aspirational goals for how information should be collected, made accessible and 
shared to help fulfill the vision of a modern, science- and risk-based food safety system:
Foodborne illness surveillance, outbreak investigations and other epidemiology efforts1.  are planned 
collaboratively with stakeholders to produce information that links illnesses with particular 
pathogens, foods and, when possible, root causes of illness outbreaks; such information is 
available on a timely and detailed basis to all in the food safety community who can use it to 
prevent problems .
Public data collection on contamination2.  and other safety-related attributes of the food supply 
is planned and coordinated to produce information that both government and industry need 
to identify and prevent hazards; such information is made available on a timely and complete 
basis . 
Food safety research3.  conducted by government and academia is focused on providing tools that 
food safety practitioners in government and industry can use to devise and implement effective 
prevention strategies; research results are made available on a timely and complete basis .
Data generated by food companies4.  on specific hazards and the effectiveness of interventions are 
made available to those who can use it to ensure food safety, with appropriate protection of the 
particular company’s legitimate business interests . 
Data-sharing mechanisms5.  exist to foster broader awareness of and ready access to existing food 
safety information among participants across the food safety system . 
In short, the key attributes of a well-functioning FSII are, first, that it produces the right information and, 
second, that it provides this information on a timely basis and in a compatible form to people who can 
use it to help ensure food safety . It is a system characterized by information not only being generated 
and used well within an organization, but also by flowing freely between organizations to enhance the 
overall effectiveness of the food safety system .
An FSII functioning in this ideal manner could have benefits for food safety across the entire system 
and major implications for how participants in the system perform . But information yields benefits 
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only to the extent it is used to improve food safety; thus, efforts to improve the FSII should be guided 
by practitioners, who know best how to enhance it through improved data collection and access . 
Potential Value of an Enhanced FSII for Food System Participants 
These examples illustrate how a well-functioning FSII—one that is responsive to the needs of food 
safety practitioners—could benefit participants all across the farm-to-table food system .
Agricultural Producers 
Producers of food animals and crops would have timely access to epidemiological and contami-•	
nation data needed to understand specific hazards associated with the animal feed they use and 
food they produce . 
Public agencies and producers would generate and share information on animal production •	
practices, water quality, wildlife and manure management, and other environmental risk factors to 
inform strategies for minimizing such risks . 
Publicly funded food safety research would be better planned and directed to produce effective •	
on-farm preventive measures for the most significant hazards .
Processors 
HACCP managers would have access to up-to-date epidemiological and contamination data to •	
support hazard analyses and selection of controls for their HACCP plans . 
Companies would have access to current data on the effectiveness of particular interventions and •	
controls, as developed by government and academic researchers and other food companies . 
In outbreak situations, companies would have the information needed to support farm-to-table •	
traceability of their products and effectively manage recalls . 
Retailers 
Food safety managers in grocery stores and restaurant chains would have ready access to contami-•	
nation, traceability and recall information needed to manage and ensure the safety of their supply 
chains .
Information on emerging problems and patterns of violations detected through state and local retail •	
inspection findings and other activities would be available to retail food safety managers, for use in 
evaluating and ensuring the safety of their own operations .
The best, most current information on safe retail handling practices and technologies would be •	
readily available on a timely basis and communicated effectively to commercial food handlers .
Consumers 
Education on safe handling practices would reach consumers more widely and effectively . •	
Consumers would have the information they need to make informed decisions about what to feed •	
their families, based upon knowledge about the risks associated with certain products, specific retail 
or service establishments, and food handling and preparation practices .
In recall situations, consumers would have ready electronic access to recall information tailored to •	
their communities . 
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Consumers and families who experience a foodborne illness would have access to the best available •	
information to receive proper medical care and understand the cause of their illness .
Value and Implications for Other Participants and Functions 
In addition to the value an enhanced FSII would deliver to hands-on participants in the food system, 
it would also support other key food safety functions, such as: 
Standard Setting—Public officials charged with setting regulatory standards would have the infor-
mation they need to target standard setting where it can do the most good, set scientifically defensible 
standards that will be effective in ensuring food safety, and update them as warranted by changing 
conditions and new information . 
Inspection and Enforcement—Federal, state and local officials would have the information they need 
to set inspection and enforcement priorities and deploy their resources where they can have the 
greatest impact in reducing foodborne illness . Inspection findings and other data generated through 
compliance activity would be available to inform both government and industry about emerging 
problems and practices to prevent them .
Research—Academic and private sector researchers working on intervention technologies and pre-
vention strategies would have more complete and timely access to the publicly generated information 
needed to perform their research . 
Conclusion 
While the aspirational goals and potential benefits of an enhanced FSII as outlined in this section 
set a strategic direction that most stakeholders in the food safety system can embrace, the actual 
change process is a challenging one . It requires not only a vision of where we want to go, but a realistic 
appraisal of where we are and what has to change in order to make progress . We turn to those topics 
in the next section of the report . 
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s e c t i o n  t h r e e : 
t o d a y ’s  f s i i—t h e n e e d  f o r  c h a n g e 
Introduction
At the outset of this project, we thought it would be possible to document with reasonable com-
pleteness the institutions and activities that comprise the food safety information infrastructure in 
the United States . We quickly realized, however, that the FSII is far too complex for that . It not only 
involves many different types of information, institutions and information collection activities, but is 
also an extraordinarily decentralized network of participants and activities . 
The complexity and decentralization of the FSII are facts of life that mirror the complexity and decen-
tralization of our federal system of government and our national economy . These basic features will 
not and, to a large extent, should not change . After all, hazards arise and opportunities for prevention 
occur in very specific settings throughout the vast food system, meaning that achieving a safe food 
supply will always depend on the actions of many independent participants, with each generating and 
seeking the information they need to play their particular role in the system . Moreover, many pro-
ductive connections and collaborations have evolved over the years in the complex web of the FSII, 
especially among federal, state and local agencies, that help the food safety system function .
Still, we learned that the complexity and decentralization of the FSII present serious challenges for 
fulfilling our vision of a more effective food safety system—one that takes better advantage of infor-
mation that exists or could be collected to more effectively prevent food safety problems . In fact, we 
find that, due to its complexity and decentralization, the FSII remains largely uncoordinated . It is, in 
many ways, a system of “stove pipes” in which sources of information remain isolated and discon-
nected from one another and insufficiently accessible to their potential users . Participants generally 
lack sufficient incentives and mechanisms to generate and share information in ways that improve the 
food safety system as a whole .
In this section, we highlight features of the FSII that create this need for change . We illustrate the 
challenges posed by the complexity and decentralization of the FSII, the information demands the 
FSII must meet, and some of the constraints under which participants in the FSII work . We also note 
the opportunities for progress suggested by a range of activities already underway to improve the col-
lection and dissemination of food safety information .
section three: today’s fsii—the need for change
| 26 |
Complexity of Food Safety Information 
The complexity of the FSII begins with the many types of information that are required to implement 
a modern, science- and risk-based approach to preventing foodborne illness, as shown in the typology 
of food safety information shown in Table 3 .1 . This table focuses primarily on the kinds of infor-
mation generated by data collection and analysis and is described in further detail in Appendix B . 
While not exhaustive, it illustrates the wide range and multidisciplinary nature of the information a 
modern food safety system requires .
Table 3.1—Categories and Types of Food Safety Information
Human Health Illness Surveillance Attribution  
 Medical/Clinical  Health Valuation  
 Host Factors
Measurements of Contamination Microbial Contamination Other Contamination  
 Chemical Contamination  Contamination of Imports 
Indicators of Contamination Animal Health/Disposition Sanitation and Inspection  
 Recalls and Violations
Hazard Identification Pathogen Subtyping Food Toxicology  
 Pathogen Biology
Modeling Predictive Microbiology Exposure Assessment  
 Hazard Characterization Risk Assessments
Trade and Industry Facilities and Processes  Intervention Costs  
 Food Safety System Management Economic Impacts  
 Traceback International Trade  
 Intervention Efficacy
Consumers and Workers Food Consumption Risk Perception/Communication 
 Consumer & Worker Behavior Population and Demographics
Food and Environment Food Composition & Characteristics Environmental Characteristics
The diversity of information types naturally means that the information comes from diverse sources, 
and most information types have multiple users, adding additional complexity to the FSII . For example, 
most health data is collected by thousands of local and state health departments across the country, 
with CDC providing support and compiling data on a national basis . The data is of significant value, 
however, to government regulators and private sector risk managers to devise effective preventive 
measures targeted at the most significant illnesses, food vehicles and risk factors . 
Similarly, many types of data on contamination of food and the surrounding environment are collected 
by local, state and federal agencies, food producers and processors, and academic researchers—all of 
whom are also potential users of contamination data for understanding the hazards associated with 
particular commodities or production and processing systems, determining changes in prevalence of 
pathogens or chemicals over time, and assessing the effectiveness of interventions .
This same pattern occurs with all of the information categories and types listed in Table 3 .1, with many 
kinds of information coming from many sources and being used by a range of parties for multiple 
purposes .
C O n S
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Institutional Complexity and Decentralization 
Perhaps the most challenging element of complexity in the U .S . food safety system and the FSII is the 
number, diversity and decentralization of institutions that play important roles . Th is point is oft en 
illustrated by noting the many separate federal agencies that work on food safety . But the federal 
role is just the tip of the iceberg, as the food safety system also includes regulators and public health 
offi  cials in all fi ft y states; nearly 3,000 local public health agencies; tens of thousands of food producers, 
processors and retailers; hundreds of food safety researchers and research programs in academia, gov-
ernment and industry; and a number of consumer and nonprofi t organizations . 
All of these “sectors” must be taken into account in understanding and considering how to improve 
the FSII, as each has its own primary orientation and focus . Government agencies at every level are 
responsible for protecting public health and, as shown previously in Figure 2 .1, their broad range 
of activities include, but are not limited to, standard setting, inspection and compliance, outbreak 
response and illness surveillance, consumer education, risk analysis, and food safety research . Firms 
in the food industry, on the other hand, are focused primarily on managing the safety of their own 
operations and supply chains, and on obtaining the information needed to do so . Academic researchers 
seek to improve food safety by advancing knowledge in basic science, as well as through applied 
research intended to respond to the needs of government, industry and the public . Nonprofi t organi-
zations advocate for the interests of consumers and play an important role in educational outreach . 
As illustrated by Figure 3 .1, despite such important diff erences, these sectors have overlapping roles 
and responsibilities and are dependent on one another . Each sector relies upon the others for infor-
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mation it cannot or does not collect on its own, and many food safety problems require collaboration 
between institutions from multiple sectors in order to solve them . All of us are, as consumers, the 
beneficiaries of food safety efforts by these many institutions, but we are also the direct recipients 
of information collected by these sectors, including educational materials on proper food handling 
practices, inspection scores for local restaurants or news about a recent outbreak . 
Such a broad brush description of the FSII does not adequately convey its complexities or interactions . 
For that, it is necessary to break these sectors down and examine them in more depth . For example, the 
federal government includes four primary food safety agencies: FDA, USDA’s Food Safety Inspection 
Service (FSIS), EPA, and CDC .13 State and local governments also perform their food safety functions 
13   These are not the only federal agencies involved in food safety . For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
coordinates the efforts of the core food safety agencies on intentional contamination resulting from food bioterrorism and, 
through its Customs and Border Protection Service, collaborates with FDA and USDA on oversight of food imports . The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) operates a voluntary seafood inspection program to strengthen 
market confidence in seafood safety . The Department of Defense (DOD) even has a food safety research program and other 
programs in place to ensure the safety of food for the military .
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through multiple institutions including public health and agriculture departments, public health lab-
oratories and sanitarians, who may be housed in environmental departments . 
The food industry includes firms along the entire farm-to-table system, including agricultural pro-
ducers of food crops and livestock, food processors and packers, distribution networks, retailers, 
wholesalers, and the food service industry (restaurants and caterers) . Individual firms differ in size 
and complexity, from small family owned businesses to international corporations . This sector also 
includes the trade associations that represent the industry and often generate and serve as conduits 
for food safety information .
Academia includes individuals at universities and other research institutions, larger research programs 
at these institutions, and consortia or collaborations among individuals and universities . Consumer 
and nonprofit organizations are primarily represented by those who advocate for consumers or victims 
of foodborne illness, those who primarily serve consumers through educational outreach, and those 
who seek to improve food safety through research .
Though institutions operate primarily in their own spheres or sectors, they also interact with each 
other to varying degrees as the flow of information among them is critical to their relationships and 
the success of their missions . The simplified diagram in Figure 3 .2 illustrates the major types of insti-
tutions in each of these sectors and suggests, by way of arrows, that information is shared among 
sectors, as well as between institutions within the same sector . 
Of course, this diagram only hints at the institutional complexity of the FSII, its decentralization, 
and the extent of necessary interactions among its participants . The following highlights of key insti-
tutions help complete the picture . 
Federal Government
The responsibility for national leadership on food safety is divided among the FDA, USDA, EPA 
and CDC . Within the FDA, USDA and EPA, there are multiple centers, offices and agencies with 
significant and distinct food safety responsibilities and roles in generating and using food safety infor-
mation . Web site contact information for the major federal agencies, centers and offices can be found 
in Box 3 .1 on page 35 . 
Food and Drug Administration
FDA has by far the broadest and most diverse food safety jurisdiction of any entity in the national 
food safety system and its information needs and data collection activities reflect this breadth and 
diversity . FDA is the one agency that has farm-to-table regulatory authority and responsibility for the 
foods and food safety hazards it regulates domestically, and which oversees the enormous volume of 
imported seafood, produce, food ingredients, and other imported food products on which Americans 
rely . FDA’s total food-related budget, to oversee not only the safety but also the proper labeling of 80 
percent of the U .S . food supply, is about $550 million .
FDA’s central role is to set and enforce standards that ensure the safety of food . These standards can 
address the conditions under which food is produced, such as basic good manufacturing practices 
and HACCP, or the safety of food as affected by potentially hazardous chemicals or microorganisms . 
FDA also provides pre-market oversight of most substances that are added to food intentionally or 
knowingly—such as food and color additives, nutrient formulations in infant formula, and animal 
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drug residues—through programs requiring sponsors to provide FDA much of the information it 
needs to perform its pre-market review . 
FDA’s most pressing food safety challenges today, however, involve unintentional hazards for which 
there are no sponsors to generate or provide the information needed to ensure food safety . These 
include chemicals like dioxins, mercury and lead, and microorganisms like Listeria, Salmonella, and 
E. coli O157:H7 . The burden thus rests on FDA to obtain the information needed to develop and 
set appropriate standards, whether for preventive controls during processing or limits on contami-
nation of the food itself, and to enforce those standards based on deployment of scarce resources for 
inspection and compliance activities . 
As shown in Figure 3 .3, FDA performs its food safety functions, including the gathering of infor-
mation needed to do its job, through five major components: 
Office of the Commissioner—•	 The Associate Commissioner for Foods advises the FDA Commis-
sioner on food safety policy and strategy and is responsible, on behalf of the Commissioner, for 
coordinating agency-wide implementation of FDA’s 2007 Food Protection Plan and FDA’s role in 
the government-wide Action Plan for Import Safety . 
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN)—•	 CFSAN is typically considered the 
“lead” food safety unit of FDA . CFSAN is responsible for developing FDA initiatives to reduce the 
risk of foodborne illness, including standard setting and compliance strategies for domestically 
produced and imported products . CFSAN also has food defense responsibilities and manages most 
of FDA’s pre-market approval programs for substances added purposefully to food .
In these far-reaching capacities, CFSAN must generate or otherwise acquire food safety infor-
mation of essentially every kind presented in Table 3 .1 . Since CFSAN has limited internal research 
capacity and little funding for external research, it depends on other FDA units, federal agencies 
and academia to generate much of the data needed to identify, assess and prevent hazards .
Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM)—•	 CVM regulates pet food and its ingredients, as well as 
animal drugs, feed and feed additives, all of which can affect the safety of meat, milk and eggs . CVM 
is similar to CFSAN in that it is responsible for setting policy and mounting initiatives in its area of 
jurisdiction . Much of its work is done through pre-market approval systems for animal drugs and 
feed additives, but like CFSAN, CVM also must generate data on its own or look to sources other 
than industry sponsors for the wide range of information needed to make risk assessments and set 
policies . 
Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA)—•	 ORA functions primarily as the enforcement arm of FDA 
through a nationwide field force of investigators, compliance officers and laboratories . In this 
capacity, ORA’s routine field activities include inspections through which observations of industry 
practices are made and food samples are collected for compliance testing, both on a “for cause” 
basis and through targeted “compliance programs” designed by CFSAN and ORA . It also generates 
information not related to enforcement that CFSAN and CVM require to set priorities and mount 
prevention efforts . These include surveys such as those underlying the CFSAN Total Diet Study and 
the CFSAN Pesticide Program Residue Monitoring Database . ORA, in partnership with USDA/
FSIS, manages the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), which integrates food testing labo-
ratories at the federal, state and local level to respond to intentional or inadvertent food contami-
nation events . 
ORA is not accountable to CFSAN or CVM, but reports directly to the Commissioner of FDA, so 
CFSAN and CVM can request but cannot require that their information needs and priorities be 
met . Due to the competing priorities of field managers, including many demands outside of food 
safety (such as inspection needs for drugs and medical devices), it is a constant challenge for ORA 
to gather the data needed by CFSAN and CVM .
National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR)—•	 NCTR, based in Jefferson, Arkansas, is a 
world-class toxicological research facility supporting the FDA food safety mission by conducting 
major animal toxicity studies and developing new methods for detecting and assessing the risks of 
foodborne hazards . NCTR reports to a deputy commissioner in the Office of the Commissioner and 
is responsible for responding to the research needs of all the FDA centers, which creates some of the 
same challenges of competing priorities that CFSAN and CVM face in their work with ORA . 
U.S. Department of Agriculture
The primary function of the USDA is to manage programs supporting the nation’s farmers, agri-
cultural economy and rural development, including stewardship of the national forest system . USDA 
is also a major purchaser of food for the government’s National School Lunch Program and, as shown 
in Figure 3 .4, houses at least eight agencies with food safety responsibilities .
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is by far the largest food safety unit within USDA, 
with an annual budget of about $1 billion . FSIS has the very specific, statutorily-defined food safety 
mission to ensure the safety of meat, poultry and processed egg products, primarily through inspection 
and regulatory oversight over the nation’s more than 6,000 meat and poultry slaughter and processing 
establishments .14 FSIS is mandated to visually examine every carcass passing through slaughter plants 
and to inspect all processing plants daily . Unlike FDA, FSIS has no jurisdiction of farms, and it gen-
erally defers to FDA and the states to oversee food safety at retail . 
14   This authority is provided by the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, and the Egg Products In-
spection Act . Full text can be found at: http://www .fsis .usda .gov/regulations_&_policies/Federal_Meat_Inspection_Act/index .
asp (last viewed 3/28/2008)
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Figure 3.3—Primary Food Safety Agencies and Roles within FDA
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Most of the information FSIS generates and uses relate to its in-plant inspection program . FSIS 
performs baseline surveys to determine national incidence rates of pathogens in specific products, 
regularly samples carcasses and raw ground product for particular pathogens (e .g ., Salmonella, 
Campylobacter, E. coli O157:H7), and tests ready-to-eat products for foodborne pathogens (e .g ., Sal-
monella, E. coli O157:H7, Listeria monocytogenes) . FSIS has also generated significant information in 
the form of quantitative microbial risk assessments and other analyses used to support rulemaking 
and priority setting . 
While FSIS collects data, it is not authorized to conduct food safety research (such as to learn about 
the behavior of particular pathogens or develop new intervention technologies) and relies on USDA’s 
Agricultural Research Service for that information . FSIS relies on other agencies for a host of other 
information gathering it needs as well, such as the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) for current information on animal disease . FSIS works with EPA and FDA to test meat and 
poultry products for pesticides, animal drugs and chemical contaminants . FSIS participates in and 
relies upon CDC-managed surveillance systems in order to better detect illnesses, manage recalls and 
understand attribution . FSIS also utilizes information from academic research, consumers, industry 
and other parties in the food safety system . 
The other USDA agencies involved in food safety include: 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)—•	 Though lacking food safety jurisdiction, 
APHIS regulates animal care programs and generates data on animal health which FSIS, FDA and 
industry can use to improve human food safety . Such programs include the National Animal Health 
Surveillance System (NAHSS) and the National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) .
Agricultural•	  Research Service (ARS)—ARS is an in-house USDA research organization that has 
a larger food safety research budget than any other federal agency and is charged with meeting the 
research needs of FSIS, FDA and the private sector .
Cooperative•	  State Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES)—CSREES provides 
funding primarily to land-grant universities for research, education and extension activities related 
to food safety, virtually all of which involve generating and/or disseminating information on food 
safety hazards and means to minimize them .
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)—•	 FNS provides oversight of the National School Lunch 
Program, including related food safety efforts .
Economic•	  Research Service (ERS)—The ERS food safety program is an important source of infor-
mation on the economic costs of foodborne illness, the costs and benefits of efforts to reduce the 
risk of illness, and economic aspects of the food and agriculture sectors of the economy that affect 
food safety, including prospects for innovation to improve food safety .
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)—•	 As purchaser of foods for the National School Lunch 
Program and other federal feeding programs, AMS has established safety-related quality speci-
fications for such commodities as ground beef . In collaboration with FSIS, FDA, CDC and state 
agencies, AMS manages the Microbiological Data Program (MDP) and the Pesticide Data Program 
(PDP), both of which generate important food safety information .
National•	  Agricultural Library (NAL)—Based in ARS, the NAL houses the Food Safety Research 
Information Office (FSRIO), established by Congress in 1997 to serve as a repository of food safety 
information, resources and databases . 
Environmental Protection Agency
EPA’s primary role in food safety is to regulate the safety of pesticide residues in food, but, like FDA 
and USDA, multiple EPA offices are involved in matters related to food safety and generate and/or use 
food safety information: 
Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS)•	 —OPPTS establishes legal limits 
(or “tolerances”) on the amount of particular pesticides permitted to be present in food and, in that 
capacity, makes more decisions related to the safety of chemicals in food than FDA or any other 
federal agency .
Office of Water (OW)—•	 OW sets standards to ensure the safety of water used for drinking and in 
food processing, and bases some of its water pollution standards (such as for mercury) on risks 
associated with the pollutant in fish . OW is also responsible for developing standards for reclaimed 
water, which relate to its use for irrigation . Similarly, EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation (OAR) 
bases its evaluations of air pollutants such as mercury and dioxins in part on food safety risks .
Office of Research and Development (ORD)•	 —ORD sets testing priorities and conducts risk 
assessments related to assuring the safety of pesticides in food, and performs microbial risk 
assessments on waterborne pathogens .
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDC’s primary role in the food safety system involves the generation, compilation and analysis of 
information on the incidence of human illness associated with foodborne pathogens—information 
of critical importance to all participants in the food safety system . CDC works with state and local 
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health officials and food safety regulatory agencies on large outbreak investigations and manages at 
least 20 national or regional surveillance systems that target one or more foodborne pathogens .15 
This large number of systems relates to the structure of organizational responsibilities within CDC, 
but also reflects the generally fragmented nature of surveillance activities and information . CDC’s 
food safety-related work is distributed across several organizations within CDC, but most of it is 
coordinated through the Food Safety Office of the National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and 
Enteric Diseases (NCZVED) within CDC’s new Coordinating Center for Infectious Disease (CCID) . 
The potential contribution of human illness data to ensuring food safety has been greatly enhanced in 
recent years by three new initiatives in which CDC plays a critical role: the Foodborne Diseases Active 
Surveillance Network (FoodNet), PulseNet and OutbreakNet . 
FoodNet—•	 FoodNet is an active surveillance system for foodborne illness that CDC manages in 
collaboration with FDA, FSIS and ten sentinel sites located across the country . 16,17 In addition 
to providing more accurate and complete information on disease burdens and trends, FoodNet 
performs case-control studies and focused follow-up surveys to better understand risk factors for 
illness and to attribute illnesses to foods . 
PulseNet•	 —PulseNet is a national network of federal, state and local laboratories coordinated by 
CDC that uses PFGE (pulsed-field gel electrophoresis) molecular fingerprinting and a shared 
database to promptly recognize and help contain outbreaks of foodborne illness .18 
OutbreakNet•	  and the Electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS)—Out-
breakNet refers to the human network of public health epidemiologists at all levels of government 
who investigate outbreaks of foodborne illness . Data from each outbreak are submitted to CDC by 
state and local health officials using the Electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS) . 
CDC manages the compilation of national data based upon these reported outbreaks .19
CDC manages a number of other programs more broadly related to public health but also relevant for 
food safety . They include, among others:
The Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (TESS), run by CDC’s National Center for Environmental •	
Health (NCEH), collects important data related to exposure to pesticides through food and other 
sources .20 
15   CDC’s 20 surveillance systems include: Botulism Surveillance System, CaliciNet, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance 
System, the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X), the Escherichia coli (E. coli) O157:H7 Outbreak Surveillance System, 
the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System, FoodNet, the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System 
for Enteric Bacteria, the National Giardiasis Surveillance System, the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, the 
National Salmonella Surveillance System, the National Shigella Surveillance System, PulseNet, the Salmonella Enteritidis Out-
break Surveillance System, the Sentinel Counties Study of Viral Hepatitis, the Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithm, the 
Trichinellosis (Trichinosis) Surveillance System, the Typhoid Fever Surveillance System, the Vibrio Surveillance System and the 
Viral Hepatitis Surveillance Program . 
16   The FoodNet sites coincide with CDC Emerging Infections Program (EIP) covering parts of California and Colorado, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon and Tennessee .
17   http://www .cdc .gov/foodnet/index .htm (last viewed 12/27/07) FoodNet documents cases of foodborne illness caused by 
Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Shiga toxin-producing E.Coli (STEC) including E. coli 0157, Listeria, Salmonella, 
Shigella, Vibrio and Yersinia .
18   http://www .cdc .gov/pulsenet/ (last viewed 12/29/07)
19  http://www .cdc .gov/foodborneoutbreaks/outbreak_data .htm (last viewed 1/18/2008)
20   Watson WA, Litovitz TL, Belson MG, Funk Wolkin AB, Patel M, et al . 2005 . “The Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (TESS): 
Risk assessment and real-time toxicovigilance across United States poison centers .” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 
207(2:S1): 604-610 .
The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) runs a number of programs intended to monitor •	
the health of Americans . One important program is NHANES (National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey), which gathers the data behind the What We Eat in America (WWEIA) dietary 
intake survey .21 This data provides the basis for food consumption utilized in risk assessments by 
FSIS, FDA and others .
The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) coordinates local, state, federal, military and interna-•	
tional laboratories to respond to bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and other public health emer-
gencies .22
The Public Health Information Network (PHIN) is an initiative to improve public health infor-•	
mation system interoperability by establishing best practices, promoting standards, defining func-
tional requirements and developing technical specifications .23
21  http://www .cdc .gov/nchs/about/major/nhanes/faqs .htm (last viewed 3/29/2008)
22  http://www .bt .cdc .gov/lrn/ (last viewed 3/28/2008)
23  http://www .cdc .gov/phin/ (last viewed 3/27/2008)
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health officials and food safety regulatory agencies on large outbreak investigations and manages at 
least 20 national or regional surveillance systems that target one or more foodborne pathogens .15 
This large number of systems relates to the structure of organizational responsibilities within CDC, 
but also reflects the generally fragmented nature of surveillance activities and information . CDC’s 
food safety-related work is distributed across several organizations within CDC, but most of it is 
coordinated through the Food Safety Office of the National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and 
Enteric Diseases (NCZVED) within CDC’s new Coordinating Center for Infectious Disease (CCID) . 
The potential contribution of human illness data to ensuring food safety has been greatly enhanced in 
recent years by three new initiatives in which CDC plays a critical role: the Foodborne Diseases Active 
Surveillance Network (FoodNet), PulseNet and OutbreakNet . 
FoodNet—•	 FoodNet is an active surveillance system for foodborne illness that CDC manages in 
collaboration with FDA, FSIS and ten sentinel sites located across the country . 16,17 In addition 
to providing more accurate and complete information on disease burdens and trends, FoodNet 
performs case-control studies and focused follow-up surveys to better understand risk factors for 
illness and to attribute illnesses to foods . 
PulseNet•	 —PulseNet is a national network of federal, state and local laboratories coordinated by 
CDC that uses PFGE (pulsed-field gel electrophoresis) molecular fingerprinting and a shared 
database to promptly recognize and help contain outbreaks of foodborne illness .18 
OutbreakNet•	  and the Electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS)—Out-
breakNet refers to the human network of public health epidemiologists at all levels of government 
who investigate outbreaks of foodborne illness . Data from each outbreak are submitted to CDC by 
state and local health officials using the Electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS) . 
CDC manages the compilation of national data based upon these reported outbreaks .19
CDC manages a number of other programs more broadly related to public health but also relevant for 
food safety . They include, among others:
The Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (TESS), run by CDC’s National Center for Environmental •	
Health (NCEH), collects important data related to exposure to pesticides through food and other 
sources .20 
15   CDC’s 20 surveillance systems include: Botulism Surveillance System, CaliciNet, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance 
System, the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X), the Escherichia coli (E. coli) O157:H7 Outbreak Surveillance System, 
the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System, FoodNet, the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System 
for Enteric Bacteria, the National Giardiasis Surveillance System, the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, the 
National Salmonella Surveillance System, the National Shigella Surveillance System, PulseNet, the Salmonella Enteritidis Out-
break Surveillance System, the Sentinel Counties Study of Viral Hepatitis, the Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithm, the 
Trichinellosis (Trichinosis) Surveillance System, the Typhoid Fever Surveillance System, the Vibrio Surveillance System and the 
Viral Hepatitis Surveillance Program . 
16   The FoodNet sites coincide with CDC Emerging Infections Program (EIP) covering parts of California and Colorado, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon and Tennessee .
17   http://www .cdc .gov/foodnet/index .htm (last viewed 12/27/07) FoodNet documents cases of foodborne illness caused by 
Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Shiga toxin-producing E.Coli (STEC) including E. coli 0157, Listeria, Salmonella, 
Shigella, Vibrio and Yersinia .
18   http://www .cdc .gov/pulsenet/ (last viewed 12/29/07)
19  http://www .cdc .gov/foodborneoutbreaks/outbreak_data .htm (last viewed 1/18/2008)
20   Watson WA, Litovitz TL, Belson MG, Funk Wolkin AB, Patel M, et al . 2005 . “The Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (TESS): 
Risk assessment and real-time toxicovigilance across United States poison centers .” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 
207(2:S1): 604-610 .
Box 3.1—Federal Food Safety Agency Websites
Food and Drug Administration: http://www.fda.gov
 CFSAN http://www.cfsan.fda.gov 
 CVM http://www.fda.gov/cvm/default.html 
 ORA http://www.fda.gov/ora 
 NCTR http://www.fda.gov/nctr 
U.S. Department of Agriculture http://www.usda.gov 
 FSIS http://www.fsis.usda.gov 
 APHIS http://www.aphis.usda.gov 
 ARS http://www.ars.usda.gov 
 CSREES http://www.csrees.usda.gov 
 ERS http://www.ers.usda.gov 
 AMS http://www.ams.usda.gov 
 NAL http://www.nal.usda.gov 
Environmental Protection Agency http://www.epa.gov
 OPPTS http://www.epa.gov/oppts 
 OW http://www.epa.gov/ow 
 ORD http://www.epa.gov/ord/index.htm 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention http://www.cdc.gov 
 NCZVED http://www.cdc.gov/nczved 
 FoodNet http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet 
 PulseNet http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet 
 Outbreak http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks 
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State and Local Government 
As plentiful and important as they are, the federal food safety agencies sit at the top of a much larger 
pyramid of state and local agencies working on food safety (see Figure 3 .5) .24 At the local level alone, 
there are over 3,000 public health agencies, plus state-level departments of health and agriculture (and 
other agencies) in all 50 states, working on the frontline of government food safety oversight .
It is difficult to generalize about the institutional arrangements through which state and local gov-
ernments do their food safety work . At the state level, food safety regulatory functions, including 
setting of policies and enforcement from the farm through retail, may be carried out by departments 
of health, agriculture, environment, business regulation or some combination of these . States may lead 
or partner with local health departments in illness surveillance and outbreak response . In addition, 
state public health and agricultural laboratories play critical roles in testing both clinical and food 
specimens for food safety purposes .
At the local level, public health departments normally carry out restaurant inspections and other local 
food safety activities, though sanitarians and inspectors may also work out of departments of envi-
ronment or environmental health . In some states, local health departments work independently, while 
in others they work under the authority of the state or under a mixed system of state and local control .
State Agencies
State-level agencies perform a wide range of food safety functions addressing both prevention and 
response to food safety problems . All of these functions involve in various ways the generation and/
or transfer of food safety information, including: 
24   NACCHO (National Association of City and County Health Officials) . 2006 . 2005 National Profile of Local Health Depart-
ments . Washington, DC . Available from: http://www .naccho .org/topics/infrastructure/2005Profile .cfm (last viewed 3/29/2008) .





Departments of Health 
Departments of Agriculture
~3,000
Local Public Health Agencies
Lead responsibility, in collaboration with local health departments and sometimes CDC, of many •	
major outbreak investigations .
Frontline responsibility for ongoing foodborne illness surveillance, working both independently •	
and in collaboration with CDC and localities on FoodNet, PulseNet, OutbreakNet and other sur-
veillance initiatives . 
The great majority of all food-related laboratory testing, including testing for pathogens in clinical •	
isolates and chemical and microbial contaminants in food . 
More than 80 percent of all non-retail food establishment inspections, other than in meat and •	
poultry establishments, including the majority of “FDA inspections” conducted by state agencies 
under contract with FDA .
Farm inspections of animal health and other conditions related to food safety, including primary •	
jurisdiction for enforcement of federal pesticide use restrictions, which relate directly to the pos-
sibility of unsafe residues in food .
Food safety education for consumers and commercial participants in the food safety system . •	
Local Agencies
The thousands of local health departments and food inspection agencies across the country tend 
to focus their regulatory functions on retail establishments, but also perform a range of food safety 
functions, including:
First responders and lead investigators on local outbreaks and active involvement with state and •	
federal agencies on larger, multi-jurisdictional outbreaks .
Frontline responsibility for reporting foodborne diseases and other local activities essential to •	
ongoing foodborne illness surveillance . 
Food safety laboratory functions in some jurisdictions .•	
Licensing and virtually all inspections of grocery stores and restaurants to ensure good sanitation •	
and other food safety standards are observed .
Frontline source of food safety information and education for consumers, retailers and food service •	
establishments .
Put simply, state and local agencies are the foundation of the nation’s food safety system, and meeting 
the information needs of the thousands of these health professionals working on food safety should 
be a primary goal of efforts to improve the FSII . 
To further illustrate the diversity and complexity of activity at the state and local levels, we provide in 
Box 3 .2 a list of some of the major professional organizations that represent state and local officials . 
These organizations are also, in their own right, parts of the FSII . In addition to representing state 
agencies and officials at the national level, they provide the means for communication and data 
sharing among states, localities and the federal government . They also gather data on state and local 
activities, provide leadership on issues of data harmonization and standardization, and provide food 
safety information and training for their members . These organizations hold annual meetings, large 
conferences and small workshops that play a key role in information sharing between members . 
Many organizations also represent or engage individuals from other sectors of the food safety system, 
including academic researchers and industry .
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Box 3.2—Major Public Sector Professional Organizations in Food Safety
American Public Health Association (APHA)  http://www.apha.org
Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO)  http://www.afdo.org
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL)  http://www.aphl.org
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO)  http://www.astho.org
Conference for Food Protection (CFP) http://www.foodprotect.org
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE)  http://www.cste.org
International Association for Food Protection (IAFP) http://www.foodprotection.org 
National Association of County & City Health Officials (NACCHO) http://www.naccho.org
National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA) http://www.nasda.org
National Environmental Health Association (NEHA)  http://www.neha.org
Industry 
The U .S . food industry is an enormously complex, $1 .1 trillion economic activity encompassing 2 .1 
million farms, 25,000 food and beverage processors, 33,000 wholesalers, 113,000 food and beverage 
retailers, and 378,000 restaurants or other food service establishments .25 In addition, some 200,000 
foreign food establishments have registered with FDA as potential exporters to the United States . Each 
of these actors has a role to play in food safety and therefore they are all, to widely varying degrees, 
part of the FSII as users and, in some cases, generators of food safety information . 
Agricultural producers and public health officials alike are increasingly aware of the role on-farm 
practices can play in both creating and minimizing food safety risks and, therefore, are increasingly 
seeking information to understand and prevent food safety problems that arise in particular crops or 
animal production settings . 
Food processors, especially those implementing HACCP, have long been in need of information to 
identify the particular hazards that may arise in their operations and to identify, validate and monitor 
controls to minimize those hazards . Processors depend on a wide range of sources for this infor-
mation, from CDC, FDA and FSIS to the scientific literature . In some areas, such as meat and poultry 
processing, companies have also become significant generators of data, as they conduct their own 
microbial and chemical testing of raw materials, in-process materials and finished products, and as 
they verify and validate the effectiveness of their food safety interventions . 
25   Economic Research Service (ERS) . 2007 . U .S . Food Marketing System: Recent Developments, 1997-2006 . United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, ERS Report 42 . Page 2 . Available at http://www .ers .usda .gov/publications/err42/err42 .pdf (last viewed 
1/29/2008)
Box 3.3—Major Trade Associations and Private-Sector Organizations
American Egg Board  http://www.aeb.org 
American Meat Institute  http://www.meatami.com 
Association of Food Industries http://afi.mytradeassociation.org 
Beef Industry Food Safety Council http://www.bifsco.org 
Food Marketing Institute  http://www.fmi.org 
Grocery Manufacturers Association  http://www.gmabrands.com 
International Dairy Foods Association  http://www.idfa.org 
International Dairy-Deli-Bakery Association http://www.iddba.org 
National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors http://www.naw.org 
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association  http://www.beef.org 
National Chicken Council  http://www.nationalchickencouncil.com
National Fisheries Institute  http://www.aboutseafood.com
National Meat Association http://nmaonline.org 
National Pork Board  http://www.pork.org 
National Pork Producers Council  http://www.nppc.org 
National Restaurant Association  http://www.restaurant.org 
National Turkey Federation  http://www.eatturkey.com 
Produce Marketing Association  http://www.pma.com 
United Fresh Produce Association  http://www.unitedfresh.org 
U.S. Poultry and Egg Association  http://www.poultryegg.org 
At the retail level, many companies that operate chains of grocery stores or restaurants actively manage 
their supply chains to ensure the safety of the food they purchase . This requires access to information 
on potential hazards . Companies and their suppliers generate information to verify that applicable 
safety-related purchase specifications are being met .
The industry’s food safety information needs and practices are as diverse as the industry itself . They 
vary based on the foods and commodities involved (such as raw lettuce, ground beef, frozen pizza, 
peanut butter, cereal and ice cream), as well as the sector of the farm-to-table food continuum 
(including growers, animal producers, slaughter operations, value-added food processors, truckers, 
grocery stores and restaurants) . In addition, the major regulatory differences across both of these 
dimensions create different information needs, and the wide range of firm sizes and resources for food 
safety results in differing capacities to meet those needs . 
This diversity is suggested to some extent by the simple listing in Box 3 .3 of some of the many trade 
associations and other organizations serving the food industry . Some of these organizations play 
important roles in disseminating food safety information among their members through publications, 
conferences, training sessions and other means . Each of their Web sites is a source of information on 
sector-specific food safety issues .
Research Community 
The food safety research community includes all federal and some state agencies, the food industry 
and academia . For purposes of this discussion, we must distinguish research from simple data col-
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lection . While the latter includes efforts such as compiling databases on incidence and levels of con-
tamination of specific chemicals or pathogens in foods, food safety research includes efforts to build a 
broader understanding of the nature and origin of potential hazards and how to prevent them .
As discussed earlier, the federal government conducts or sponsors food safety research through CDC, 
FDA, ARS and CSREES, among other agencies . Though it does not maintain an explicit food safety 
research agenda, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds a great deal of basic research relevant 
to food safety, as well as research on dietary supplements, nanotechnology and other food-related 
concerns . In the food industry, some companies conduct or sponsor research of their own and some 
trade associations pool their member companies’ resources to conduct research on issues of concern 
to a particular sector . 
The academic research community is another important part of the picture . There are hundreds of 
public and private universities with research programs on or related to food safety, including at least 
one land-grant university in each state that manages a cooperative extension program that may, itself, 
have offices or laboratories spread throughout the state .26
Food safety research is not only diverse institutionally, it is also truly multidisciplinary . It encompasses 
chemistry, microbiology, pathology, toxicology, genetics and other natural and medical sciences, 
food science, engineering, agriculture, epidemiology and public health, statistics, computer science, 
decision and risk analysis, law, economics and other social sciences . Because academic institutions 
are usually organized by discipline, a single university may have researchers working on separate food 
safety projects in a number of departments, schools or colleges . 
This tendency toward fragmentation of food safety research in the academic community results in 
significant information stove piping, which can result in barriers to interdisciplinary research and 
food safety problem solving . For example, properly addressing produce safety requires input from 
food scientists, plant physiologists, plant pathologists, agronomists, wildlife specialists, environmental 
engineers and many others with relevant expertise .
This fragmentation is compounded by the range and number of funding vehicles for food safety 
research . As mentioned previously, CSREES maintains a number of competitive grant programs in or 
related to food safety, and NIH supports basic research related to it . The National Toxicology Program 
(NTP), an interagency program within HHS that is comprised of key components of NIH, CDC and 
FDA, is a major funding source for toxicology studies . FDA, FSIS and state and local agencies occa-
sionally fund applied projects extramurally, as do firms and the research arms of trade associations . 
Academic researchers increasingly set their research agendas in accordance with an individualized 
“follow the money” strategy and thus the diversity of research funders, each with its own agenda, 
fosters a system of food safety research in which many players act independently from one another .
There are a number of scientific and professional associations and societies that serve the research 
communities and play an important role in information sharing . Many of these associations hold 
annual conferences with scientific presentations, panels and poster sessions that serve as a primary 
vehicle for researchers to share their research findings with colleagues . Many publish scientific journals 
as well . For example, the International Association for Food Protection (IAFP) is comprised of over 
3,000 members from 50 countries, publishes the Journal of Food Protection and Food Protection 
Trends, and holds an annual education conference and topical symposia . Many of these associations 
26  http://www .csrees .usda .gov/qlinks/partners/state_partners .html (last viewed 1/28/2008)
are focused on a specific scientific discipline; food safety is but one component of a broader agenda . 
Some major associations and societies are listed in Box 3 .4 .
Box 3.4—Some Scientific Societies 
and Professional Associations in Food Safety
American Chemical Society (ACS) http://www.acs.org 
American Dietetic Association (ADA) http://www.eatright.org 
American Society for Clinical Pathology (ASCP) http://www.ascp.org 
American Society for Microbiology (ASM) http://www.asm.org 
American Association of Food Hygiene Veterinarians http://www.avma.org/aafhv 
Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) http://www.idsociety.org
International Food Information Council Foundation (IFIC) http://www.ific.org 
International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) http://www.ilsina.org 
Institute of Food Technologists (IFT) http://www.ift.org 
International Association for Food Protection (IAFP) http://www.foodprotection.org
Society for Epidemiologic Research (SER) http://www.epiresearch.org 
Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) http://www.sra.org
Society of Toxicology (SOT) http://www.toxicology.org
Consumers 
Consumers play an important role in food safety, not only because they bear the risk of illness when a 
food is contaminated, but also because without properly handling, storing and preparing foods, they 
may introduce or compound the risk to themselves or others . They are connected, therefore, to the 
FSII first as recipients of information, such as restaurant inspection reports or information on food 
product recalls or ongoing outbreaks, that they may use to avoid hazards, as well as information on 
proper cooking temperatures and other safe food handling practices that they may use to improve 
their own behavior .
While consumers do not ordinarily collect food safety data, they are the focus of a number of different 
data collection activities . For example, foodborne illness victims are the focus of epidemiological 
investigations, while consumers are surveyed to find out information about their food consumption 
patterns, food handling and preparation practices or their perceptions or knowledge about risks . 
Consumers also generate valuable food safety information in the form of complaints to food com-
panies and regulatory agencies and by reports of adverse health events to physicians or local health 
departments .
Beyond individual consumers, organizations that represent and advocate for consumers and 
foodborne illness victims play important roles in the FSII as they request and analyze data from 
other sources, generate datasets on their own, and serve as a conduit between the food safety system 
and consumers . For example, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) produces a reg-
ularly updated Outbreak Alert, which lists and analyzes foodborne outbreaks in the United States, 
and maintains a searchable, online database on them . The data compiled in CSPI’s document was 
requested from CDC, sometimes via FOIA requests, as well as from state and local governments, and 
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pulled from media stories when other data were not available .27 Safe Tables Our Priorities (S .T .O .P .) 
recently announced it will create a national registry of foodborne illness survivors who have long-
term health problems, which it hopes will serve as a data source for scientific researchers .28 
Consumer education is another key activity of such organizations . For example, the FightBAC 
campaign about safe food handling and preparation is produced by the Partnership for Food Safety 
Education (PFSE), a collaboration of over 20 trade associations, professional organizations and 
consumer advocacy groups .29 A number of consumer organizations are listed in Box 3 .5 . 
Box 3.5—Consumer Organizations in Food Safety
Center for Food Safety (CFS) http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org 
Center for Foodborne Illness Research & Prevention (CFI) http://www.foodborneillness.org 
Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety
Consumer Federation of America (CFA) http://www.consumerfed.org
Consumers Union (CU) http://www.consumersunion.org
Food and Water Watch http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org 
Government Accountability Project (GAP) http://www.whistleblower.org 
National Consumers League (NCL) http://www.nclnet.org/food 
Safe Tables Our Priority (S.T.O.P.) http://www.safetables.org
The Need for Information Sharing
The preceding discussion of food safety data types and institutions, coupled with our vision for a 
modern, science- and risk-based food safety system, make clear why the sharing of food safety infor-
mation is so important . In broad terms, we have a dispersed network of public and private institutions 
that are good at generating and using information for their own particular purposes, but effective 
prevention of foodborne illness often requires integrating data and other information from multiple 
sources for common purposes .
Two examples underscore this point: foodborne outbreak response (Figure 3 .6) and microbial risk 
assessment and management (Figure 3 .7) . These are critical and recurring functions of the food safety 
system, and, in both cases, the quality of the food safety analysis and action depends on timely access 
to the full range of needed information . These figures are not intended to fully capture either scenario, 
but rather are highly simplified and illustrative diagrams intended primarily to show, in broad terms, 
the flow of many kinds of information from many sources that enter these processes (from the left) 
and emerge from them (on the right) .
27   Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) . 2007 . Outbreak Alert! 2007: Closing the Gaps in our Federal Food Safety Net . 
Washington, DC . Available from http://www .cspinet .org/foodsafety/outbreak_report_2007 .html 
28   Neergaard, L . 2008 . “Food Poisoning Can Be Long-Term Problem .” Associated Press . January 21 . Available at: http://ap .google .
com/article/ALeqM5iSxdgd9SwKcoSArikR4UzdnMAfOQD8UADJ800 (last viewed 1/28/2008)
29   http://www .fightbac .org (last viewed 3/28/2008)
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Foodborne Outbreak Response
As depicted in the simplified and illustrative diagram in Figure 3 .6, the public health response to 
foodborne outbreaks begins with the detection of illnesses, involves investigations into their causes, 
runs through the taking of control measures, such as the issuance of recalls, and concludes with 
follow-up efforts . Lessons from investigations may then inform long-term preventive efforts . Many 
outbreak investigations are incomplete and constrained by time, resources and available information . 
The figure suggests these points regarding information flow: 
A wide range of information types are needed throughout the process, from original reporting of •	
illness, to microbial testing of products, to estimating the costs of the outbreak .
Without rapid sharing of information, multi-jurisdictional or multi-state outbreaks may be wrongly •	
interpreted as individual cases of sporadic illness .
Information needed in outbreak investigations come from many sources at all levels of government •	
and from the private sector and academia, though most are collected by the public sector .
Certain kinds of information may need to come from multiple sources or sectors and different •	
datasets, such as microbial prevalence and incidence data that may come from federal government 
databases as well as from testing performed by the private sector and/or academia .
Timeliness of information exchange is critical; each step in the process requires information to •	
move forward quickly enough to help prevent future cases .
Dissemination of information by federal, state and/or local agencies is needed on an ongoing basis •	
to manage the outbreak process, inform the general public and provide the basis for future pre-
vention efforts .
While the figure focuses on the public sector role in outbreak response, members of the food •	
industry whose products are involved play critical roles in generating and using information in 
an outbreak response situation, both to manage any needed recall and identify needed corrective 
measures .
Without effective mechanisms in place to ensure that accurate and complete information is available •	
when and where it is needed, the product recall or other outbreak response may be wrong in its 
focus and scope and too late to prevent illnesses .
In many outbreak situations, root causes are not identified and complete final reports are not •	
prepared due to competing demands for scarce resources, which means that outbreak investigations 
too often do not produce information that can be used to plan future prevention efforts . 
Microbial Risk Analysis 
Microbial risk analysis, including risk assessment, risk management and risk communication is 
an inherently and intensely data-driven process, with a wide array of information being required 
from many sources . While outbreak response places a heavy premium on the timeliness with which 
needed information is available to analysts and decision makers, the process of risk assessment and 
risk management for microbial pathogens is slower and more deliberative, with greater emphasis 
on the breadth, depth and utility of data to support science-based decisions . As in any public health 
decision process, timeliness remains important, but decision makers must balance the need for timely 
decisions with the desire for the best possible scientific basis for those decisions .
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Figure 3.6—Information Flow in an Illustrative Foodborne Outbreak Investigation: 
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Figure 3.7—Information Flow in an Illustrative Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment: 
Potential Input and Output of Information by Data Type and Sectors
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Figure 3 .7 depicts, in highly simplified form, information flow in a hypothetical quantitative microbial 
risk assessment (QMRA) . This diagram is not intended to define or describe in detail the various 
stages of risk analysis, or to serve to adequately capture all of the information that might be utilized in 
any given analysis, but rather to illustrate how some of the information flows in a QMRA . This figure 
suggests the following observations: 
Compared to outbreaks, an even larger array of information sources typically come into play in •	
microbial risk analysis, including data from government and academic researchers, and potentially 
from industry . Information about practices during production, processing, distribution, retail, food 
service, and by consumers may be utilized .
Because there may be multiple and conflicting sources for many of the types of information used •	
in risk assessment, risk assessors must be able to choose the most appropriate dataset, aggregate or 
average across values, or otherwise perform sensitivity and uncertainty analyses to account for data 
gaps or conflicts .
Unlike in an outbreak situation, the public is not usually informed on an ongoing basis, but rather •	
during or following key stages in the analysis, and feedback is explicitly brought back into the 
process through risk communication efforts .
The iterative nature of a risk assessment allows for interagency and external peer review and vali-•	
dation of the approach and the data used .
If needed data does not exist or is not accessible, the quality and utility of the risk analysis will be •	
impaired and the process, including any needed risk management steps, may be delayed .
Recent Progress in Data Access and Sharing
As discussed in the next section of this report, there are many reasons why the availability and flow 
of information in today’s FSII is not optimal . It is important to recognize also, however, that many 
channels exist for making information accessible, and that new information management tools have 
improved the ability to share information efficiently and easily . 
Traditional Tools
The traditional approach to disseminating the results of food safety research and information col-
lection activities is through their written publication, either in refereed journal articles or non-refereed 
reports . 
Journal Articles
Refereed journals provide a critical outlet for sharing information produced by the research com-
munity . Articles in refereed journals generally summarize research and results and go through a peer 
review process, which helps ensure the underlying data, though not typically presented, has been 
collected in an appropriate manner and that the reported results are sound . These are advantages for 
some audiences and purposes in that journal articles may be more “actionable” than datasets alone . 
Readers of these articles may wish to perform their own analyses, or use the unpublished data for 
additional studies . Risk assessors, for example, prefer raw data over summary data . In such cases, the 
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traditional tendency of journal articles not to include primary data is a disadvantage . This is beginning 
to change, however, as some journals now allow authors to upload electronic appendices, including 
datasets, to their online versions and can, in this way, serve as accessible repositories of data . 
Annual Reports and Similar Publications
Reports or other similar types of written publications produced by individuals or institutions involved 
in research or data collection are a more flexible format for disseminating food safety information, 
and are often used by government agencies . For ongoing or periodic data collection programs, annual 
reports can be used to disseminate findings on a regular basis . Reports do not have the space limi-
tations of journals and thus can include substantially more data tables and figures based on the data . 
Examples of useful reports include CDC’s annual FoodNet report;30 FSIS reports on its baseline studies 
on the national prevalence and levels of bacteria in particular products;31 and the annual reports 
from the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS) prepared collaboratively 
by CDC, FDA and USDA .
Current Web-Based Information Tools
As with any effort today to make information more widely accessible, the future of the FSII is on the 
Internet . And, increasingly, so is the present . Almost without exception, even the traditional tools 
for disseminating information—journal articles and reports—are posted on a Web site and thus are 
available electronically . Nearly all journals can be searched via online indices such as PubMed and 
AGRICOLA, and most provide full text versions of articles for download to subscribers or for a fee . 
Many data collection initiatives, such as FoodNet, USDA’s MDP and FDA’s Health and Diet Survey, 
to name a few, have created online repositories where annual reports and other publications can be 
found in a single place . Similarly, NACCHO has created a Model Practices Database, which serves 
as a repository of publications relevant for local public health agencies . Some examples of these new 
methods of accessing traditional mechanisms are shown in Box 3 .6 .
In addition, modern information management technology enables the dissemination and exchange of 
data in unprecedented forms . Our far-from-complete canvas of the World Wide Web revealed nearly 
100 online databases and tools for making food safety information available in ways that would not 
have been possible before . These tools are being used most commonly by government agencies at 
all levels but also by universities, industry and the public interest community . Some of the key Web-
based tools are listed in Box 3 .6 and a more complete listing can be found in Appendix C .
Web-accessible Datasets
We include in the category of Web-accessible datasets compilations of data that are in searchable or 
otherwise analyzable database formats, such as those of Microsoft Excel, tab- or comma-delimited 
text files, SQL Server, Access or Oracle databases . Such online databases can provide much more 
complete information than summary tables in written reports and are useful for analytical purposes 
in ways—such as creating data tables customized to the needs of the user—that data in printable but 
fixed formats, such as PDFs, are not .
30  http://www .cdc .gov/foodnet/reports .htm 
31  http://www .fsis .usda .gov/Science/Baseline_Data/index .asp (last viewed 1/28/2008)
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For example, CDC’s summary national “line listing” data for foodborne outbreaks is in a PDF format, 
and data for each year is published separately .32 The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) 
annual report on outbreaks is more dynamic and accessible . It includes newly available data for the 
current year as well as data from previous years,33 and makes much of the underlying data freely 
available via a searchable database on the CSPI Web site .34
As reflected in Box 3 .6, FDA, USDA and other organizations maintain a number of online databases . 
One particularly robust tool is ComBase, the Combined Database for Predictive Microbiology, which 
includes data and predictive models of microorganisms in various food environments .35 ComBase 
is the result of collaboration between USDA’s ARS and food safety institutes in the United Kingdom 
and Australia . It allows users, such as those in small food firms attempting to build food safety man-
agement systems, to search the database for growth and inactivation models for a particular pathogen 
in a particular product under certain conditions, such as temperature and pH . Launched in 2003, 
ComBase is freely available and even allows registered users to upload their own microbial models .
Web Directories and Information Gateways
Most of the Web-accessible data-sets in Box 3 .6 and Appendix C have been developed independently 
of each other and are available primarily through isolated and disconnected Web sites . The growing 
abundance of such Web sites, which is a reflection of the many food safety institutions in the country 
and the proliferation of data collection programs, makes it difficult to find needed information unless 
searchers know exactly what they are looking for and who maintains it . 
This is a data awareness problem that is beginning to be addressed by some Web directories or “infor-
mation gateways” that attempt to cut across the tangled network of data and better connect indi-
viduals and institutions with the information they need . The “Gateway to Government Food Safety 
Information” is one such Web site that provides links to select food safety information from federal, 
state and local government agencies and may be thought of as a directory or yellow pages for the 
general public .36 
A more targeted gateway is provided by FoodRisk .org,37 formerly known as the Food Safety Risk 
Analysis Clearinghouse . FoodRisk .org is a project of the Joint Institute for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition (JIFSAN), a collaborative venture between the University of Maryland and FDA’s CFSAN . 
This publicly accessible Web site was formed to collect and catalog data and methodology pertaining to 
food safety risk analysis provided by federal and state agencies, trade associations, private sector firms, 
academia, and international sources . FoodRisk .org links to relevant databases on food safety from 
around the world, and unlike foodsafety .gov, is not restricted to government sources of information .
The Food Safety Research Information Office (FSRIO) of the National Agricultural Library (NAL) 
maintains the Food Safety Research Projects Database,38 another targeted directory or gateway con-
32  http://www .cdc .gov/foodborneoutbreaks/outbreak_data .htm (last viewed 3/17/2008)
33   Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) . 2007 . Outbreak Alert! 2007: Closing the Gaps in our Federal Food Safety Net . 
Washington, DC . 
34  http://www .cspinet .org/foodsafety/outbreak/pathogen .php (last viewed 3/17/2008)
35  http://portal .arserrc .gov/PMIPHome .aspx (last viewed 3/17/2008)
36  http://www .foodsafety .gov (last viewed 3/28/2008)
37  http://www .foodrisk .org (last viewed 3/28/2008)
38  http://fsrio .nal .usda .gov/quicksearch .php (last viewed 3/28/2008)
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Box 3.6—Examples of Online Mechanisms to Share Food Safety Information
Indices of journal publications
NAL Journal Index for AGRICOLA http://agricola.nal.usda.gov
NLM PubMed Journal Index http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PubMed
Online program-specific repositories of annual reports and publications
CDC FoodNet  http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet
FDA Health and Diet Survey  http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/crnutri.html
NACCHO Model Practices Database  http://www.naccho.org/topics 
 modelpractices/database 
NARMS (Antimicrobial Resistance) http://www.fda.gov/cvm/narms_pg.html
USDA Baseline (Microbiological) Data  http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Baseline_Data
Web-accessible data-sets
CDC Summary Outbreak Data http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks
ComBase (pathogen behavior) http://www.combase.cc
CSPI Outbreak Database http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/outbreak
EPA Fish Advisories http://epa.gov/waterscience/fish/advisories 
  /index.html
ETOXNET (Toxicity Information) http://extoxnet.orst.edu/ghindex.html 
FDA Pesticide Residue Database: http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/pesrpts.html
FDA Total Diet Study http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/tds-toc.html
FDA and USDA Food Recalls http://www.recalls.gov/food.html
NHANES Dietary Intake Data   http://www.ars.usda.gov/Services/docs 
 htm?docid=15044
Restaurant Inspection Scores Listings http://www.healthinspections.com
USDA ERS Food Availability Data   http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/ 
 foodconsumption
USDA PDP (Pesticide Data Program) http://www.ams.usda.gov/science/pdp
Web Site directories and information gateways
FoodRisk.org (JIFSAN) http://www.foodrisk.org
FoodSHIELD http://www.foodshield.org
Government Food Safety Gateway http://www.foodsafety.gov 
International Food Safety Network http://www.foodsafety.ksu.edu/en
NAL Food Safety Research Database http://fsrio.nal.usda.gov/index.php
Electronic networks and reporting systems
eLEXNET (food analytes) https://www.elexnet.com/elex/index.jsp
CDC eFORS (outbreak surveillance)  http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/index.htm 
CDC NEDSS (disease surveillance) http://www.cdc.gov/nedss
CDC PulseNet (PFGE subtyping) http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet
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sisting of over 1700 research abstracts from institutions such as ARS, CSREES, NIH, CDC and FDA, 
as well as some from academia and the private sector . The database is searchable through the FSRIO 
Web site and links to other resources and publications associated with specific projects .
Finally, FoodSHIELD,39 developed by the University of Minnesota’s National Center for Food Pro-
tection and Defense, is a Web-based platform that allows government laboratories and regulatory 
agencies to share information about their expertise and capacities to respond to emergencies, par-
ticularly intentional threats to the safety of the food supply . Though relatively narrow in its original 
purpose, and largely inaccessible to those outside of public health agencies, FoodSHIELD shows the 
potential for Web-based tools to create information sharing communities online . 
Electronic Networks and Reporting Systems
While online data-sets and Web directories make information published by a particular party 
accessible to the general public or to specific food safety communities, electronic networks and 
reporting systems permit real-time information sharing among participants in these systems . Such 
systems can dramatically speed up reporting functions and decentralize control over information, 
making the resulting data much more of a communally maintained property . The most prominent 
examples of such electronic networks and reporting systems are maintained by CDC and FDA .
CDC’s eFORS is a Web-based system now used by officials in all 50 states to submit data on out-
breaks to CDC, replacing a paper-based system . The new system includes improved forms for more 
consistent reporting and more active efforts to ensure the closure of investigations and reporting of 
results . The result has been a significant increase in the number of reported outbreaks and a poten-
tially very valuable information resource for food safety risk managers . The next step, now being 
explored at CDC, is to make the eFORS database fully accessible and analyzable online . 
As noted earlier, PulseNet is a CDC-coordinated network of federal, state and local laboratories 
that use PFGE molecular fingerprinting and a shared electronic database to promptly recognize and 
help contain outbreaks of foodborne illness . Participating laboratories can view results from nearby 
states and request detailed analysis by CDC scientists to rapidly determine whether PFGE patterns 
of bacteria isolated from sick individuals are similar and, therefore, likely linked to a common food 
source . By fostering more frequent and rapid detection of outbreaks and fostering real-time com-
munication and data sharing among federal, state and local health officials, PulseNet provides critical 
information needed both to contain ongoing outbreaks and help identify areas where implementation 
of new preventive measures may prevent future outbreaks .
Another example of a restricted (government use only) data sharing system is the Electronic Labo-
ratory Exchange Network (eLEXNET) maintained by FDA . eLEXNET is a Web-based information 
network allowing health officials at over 100 participating federal, state and local agencies to compare, 
share and coordinate laboratory findings about pathogens, chemicals and other analytes in food . 
Ready access to such a database supports the efforts of food safety officials at all levels to both inves-
tigate and mount initiatives to prevent food safety problems . eLEXNET also serves as the data capture 
and communication system for FERN .
39  http://www .foodshield .org (last viewed 3/28/2008)
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Emerging Web Technologies
In addition to the aforementioned Web-based approaches to making data-sets and other forms of 
information more accessible and more easily shared among parties, there are a number of new and 
rapidly evolving and emerging Web-based technologies that may revolutionize how food safety infor-
mation is shared . Although these so-called “Web 2 .0” technologies are not extensively used today for 
data sharing, there are a few new tools worth noting .
One technology that is increasingly utilized by those in the food safety system is the syndication 
of Web site content through “Web feeds .” Feeds allow users to keep track of updates to Web pages 
by “subscribing” to these feeds via a Web-based or stand-alone “feed aggregator” such as Google 
Reader40 or Bloglines .41 Feeds are particularly useful for breaking news situations or when sites are 
updated rarely . FDA, USDA, CDC and others maintain a number of news feeds, some of which are 
listed in Box 3 .7 . A person subscribing to FDA’s recall feed, for example, gets a notice when a new 
recall is announced . Feeds have great potential utility to announce when data have been updated . For 
example, CDC could create feeds that would let subscribers know when new data, such as updated 
foodborne outbreak “line listings,” are published on the Web .
Another area that is growing is the increasing use of online data visualization, particularly the use of 
mapping software . For example, HealthMap42 aggregates disparate data sources on infectious disease 
(including foodborne outbreaks and recalls) and presents the data as an interactive map and data 
tool allowing users to explore the embedded information . Similarly, a user-generated map is available 
through Google, identifying cities and counties that disclose restaurant health scores and providing 
links to those Web sites .43 For Los Angeles and San Francisco,44 Google Maps now includes health 
inspection scores for some restaurants . Another example of online data visualization is provided by 
Many Eyes,45 a Web site providing a platform for users to upload data, produce graphical analyses and 
share them with others . Although Many Eyes is a general data tool, there is already a food safety “hub” 
to which users have uploaded data and produced visualizations .46 All of these sites allow users to easily 
access and interpret information that otherwise might be difficult or time-consuming to obtain, and 
to explore the data in new ways .
Other Web 2 .0 technologies, such as “wikis,” collaborative tools, blogs, social bookmarking and social 
networking are increasingly utilized by scientists, researchers and professionals in many fields .47 
Though not currently used extensively for food safety information sharing, these tools are likely to 
become important moving forward . For example, the nanoHUB Web site serves the nanotechnology 
community by providing a number of resources, including online presentations, teaching materials, 
animations, podcasts, collaborative workspaces and online simulation tools to share research results .48 
Similarly, myExperiment is a scientific networking Web site that allows users to share detailed 
40  http://www .google .com/reader/ (last viewed 2/28/08)
41  http://www .bloglines .com/ (last viewed 2/28/08)
42  http://healthmap .org/en (last viewed 3/03/08)
43  http://maps .google .com/maps/ms?msa=0&msid=105416090121327158168 .000001132b797f407faa3 (last viewed 3/02/08)
44  http://maps .google .com/maps?f=l&hl=en&geocode=&q=food+cleanscores&near=Los+Angeles,+CA (last viewed 2/28/08)
45  http://services .alphaworks .ibm .com/manyeyes (last viewed 3/04/08) 
46  http://services .alphaworks .ibm .com/manyeyes/topichub/Ik76IsOtha6zbmwdejgI2~ (last viewed 3/04/08)
47  Gewin, V . (2008) . The new networking nexus . Nature, 451: 1024-25 . February 20 .
48  http://www .nanohub .org/ (last viewed 3/28/2008)
“workflows,” which are customary protocols for standardizing data, running simulations or con-
ducting statistical analysis on large data-sets .49 The Web site Connotea allows researchers to manage 
their literature and Web references online and share articles with colleagues,50 while SciVee invites 
scientists to link published journal articles to video presentations about their work .51
Box 3.7—Examples of Web Sites Using Emerging 
Technologies to Facilitate Information Sharing
Food safety syndicated feeds (e.g. RSS)
FDA news and recall feeds http://www.fda.gov/oc/rss 
USDA news and research feeds  http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal?navid=RSS 
 FEEDS
NAL FSRIO feeds http://fsrio.nal.usda.gov/rss_feeds.php 
CDC feeds http://www2a.cdc.gov/podcasts/rss.asp 
Iowa State University feeds http://www.extension.iastate.edu/foodsafety/rss
FoodRisk.org news feed http://foodrisk.org/about/rss/foodrisk.xml 
Other Web 2.0 sites in food safety
HealthMap disease alerts http://healthmap.org/en
Google Maps (Los Angeles)  http://maps.google.com/maps?q=San+ 
 Francisco,+CA
Many Eyes food safety hub  http://services.alphaworks.ibm.com/manyeyes/ 
 topichub/Ik76IsOtha6zbmwdejgI2~ 
Pageflakes food safety pagecast http://www.pageflakes.com/foodsafety 
Food Poisoning Blog (Marler Clark) http://www.foodpoisonblog.com
Not in My Food Blog http://www.consumersunion.org/blogs/nimf
Perishable Pundit http://www.perishablepundit.com/ 
Web 2.0 examples outside of food safety
Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org 
Citizendium http://en.citizendium.org




There are a number of food safety blogs (some are listed in Box 3 .7), but these currently focus on 
opinion and personal analysis . The technology could be utilized in other ways, however . Similarly, 
the open-source “wiki” technology that drives user-driven online encyclopedias such as Wikipedia, 
which is unedited and user-maintained, and Citizendium, which utilizes editors to validate user-
generated content, could be exploited by the food safety community to create Web-based reposi-
tories of food safety information and knowledge . The NAL has set up a proof-of-concept Web site 
that utilizes numerous Web 2 .0 services and technologies (RSS feeds, wikis, maps, data visualization, 
49  http://www .myexperiment .org/ (last viewed 3/28/2008)
50  http://www .connotea .org/ (last viewed 3/28/2008)
51 http:scivee .tv/ (last viewed 3/28/08)
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social bookmarks, tag clouds, etc .) to pull content from multiple Web sites and make it available in 
one central location .52 Regardless of whether any of these particular technologies become important 
tools for the sharing of food safety information and data, other technologies are likely to emerge that 
will prove useful .
Conclusion
The recent efforts to improve the FSII give a hint of what is possible with new commitment and infor-
mation tools . Our recommendations in Section Five seek to capitalize on both . First, however, it is 
important to clarify the constraints and problems facing the FSII and why concerted effort is needed 
to build a better functioning FSII . Those points are addressed in the next section .
52  http://www .pageflakes .com/foodsafety (last viewed 3/28/2008)
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s e c t i o n  f o u r: 
c o n s t r a i n t s  o n i m p r o v i n g  t h e  f s i i 
Introduction
As explained in Section Two of this report, the key attributes of a well-functioning FSII are that it 
produces the information practitioners need and provides it on a timely basis and in a useful form so 
it can be used to prevent problems and help ensure food safety . It is a system characterized by infor-
mation not only being generated and used well within organizations but also flowing among organi-
zations to enhance the overall effectiveness of the food safety system .
For all the good work of the many thousands of actors in the food safety system, including the 
important progress that we have seen recently, anyone who has worked within the system has seen 
ways the FSII falls short of our aspirations . No one in particular is at fault for this shortfall . It is rather 
a product of the fundamental reality of the FSII as a vast, complex and decentralized web of highly 
diverse institutions, each working on food safety within its own role and with its own focus, and 
lacking incentives or mechanisms to collaborate for mutual advantage . 
This reality of decentralization has its benefits, but also means that desirable change will be difficult 
to come by . Based on discussions in our project workshops, however, we think that improvement in 
the FSII is not only desirable, but possible, if we are realistic about the system’s constraints and devise 
solutions that directly address them .
In this section of the report, we outline some of the major constraints facing the FSII—ones our rec-
ommendations in Section Five are designed to address . We begin with constraints that apply generally 
across the system and conclude with some that are specific to government, industry and academia . 
These constraints are summarized in Box 4 .1 .
General Constraints
We see four general constraints on the success of the FSII: (1) lack of mechanisms for planning and 
coordination of information collection, (2) institutional obstacles to information sharing, (3) technical 
obstacles to information sharing, and (4) the economic costs involved in any improvement of the FSII . 
All of these need to be taken seriously and addressed in any recommendations to improve the FSII . 
 Box 4.1—Summary of Constraints
General Constraints
•  Lack of Mechanisms for Planning and Coordination of Information Collection
 Research programs are not accountable to regulatory agency needs
 Foodborne illness surveillance is not responsive to stakeholder needs
 Data on microbial and chemical contamination are not aggregated
•  Institutional Obstacles to Information Sharing
 Institutional focus and priorities
 Legal, business, cultural and bureaucratic obstacles
 Power of the status quo
•  Technical Constraints on Information Sharing
 Lack of standardized approaches to data collection
 Lack of harmonization in data systems
 Lack of available tools to aggregate diverse data
•  Economic Cost of Improved Information Sharing
 Materials and equipment costs are significant
 Costs borne by information providers, with benefits accrued by recipients
Specific Constraints on Individual Sectors
•  Government Issues and Constraints
 Lack of a Mandate and Resources for Coordination and Data Sharing
 Legal Constraints on Information Access and Sharing
 Privacy laws
 Confidential business information
 Information Quality Act (IQA)
 Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
 Agency Culture and Established Practices
 Sense of data ownership
 Professional first-to-publish culture
•  Food Industry Constraints on Information Sharing
 Proprietary or competitive value
 Concern about data misuse or misinterpretation
 Concern about punitive action by government or victim lawsuits
•  Academic Constraints on Information Sharing
 No professional reward for providing data, only for publication of results
 Lack of available repositories
 Delays in publication of peer-review journal articles
 Bias against publication of negative data
 Barriers to journal access—difficult and expensive to obtain
Lack of Mechanisms for Planning and Coordination of Information Collection
An important feature of a successful FSII would be that government-sponsored food safety research 
and information collection is systematically planned and coordinated to produce the information that 
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both government and industry need to play their parts in preventing foodborne illness . The FSII cur-
rently lacks sufficient mechanisms to make this happen . 
Most government-sponsored food safety research at the federal level is carried out through intramural 
and extramural programs at USDA that are organizationally separate from and not directly accountable 
to those in government responsible for managing food safety risks . And, while there is informal 
dialogue about research needs, there is no formal, accountable interagency planning process . Likewise, 
when the food industry confronts a new food safety challenge, such as the problem of pathogen con-
tamination facing the produce industry, there is no established mechanism for planning and coordi-
nating the government and industry research on measures needed to solve it . 
Most foodborne illness investigations are carried out by state and local agencies to contain outbreaks, 
rather than through a planned process intended to maximize the value of information the investi-
gation can generate . Through the Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR),53 
these agencies are working together with federal partners to improve the flow of information within 
the public sector, particularly across jurisdictional lines . Nonetheless, they lack mechanisms and 
resources to work systematically with the food industry on the necessary follow-up investigations to 
identify root causes and better inform future preventive efforts . The FoodNet system is a step forward 
in our ability to collect reliable data on foodborne illness, independent of outbreaks, and involves active 
planning of data collection among the CDC scientists and state agencies that run the 10 FoodNet sites . 
However, this planning process does not actively involve food industry risk managers who have their 
own epidemiology data needs and priorities .
Finally, many government agencies and food companies invest substantial effort data collection on 
chemical and microbial contamination of food . If aggregated, this data would provide a much more 
robust picture of the nature and distribution of hazards across the food supply than we have today . 
This data is typically collected, however, for specific purposes and with little consideration of how it 
might contribute to an overall understanding of food safety risks and opportunities to reduce them . 
This is understandable and to some extent unavoidable for institutional, cost and technical reasons, 
as we discuss further below . Opportunities exist, however, to plan certain types of data collection, 
such as environmental and baseline surveys or ongoing monitoring programs, in ways that make the 
resulting data more widely useful, not only to the full range of government agencies but to industry 
and academia as well . There is little impetus and no established structure in the system for this kind 
of effort . 
The lack of mechanisms for planning and coordination of information collection is a natural conse-
quence of the complexity and decentralization of the FSII . These realities are likely to remain . The 
question is how to take advantage of targeted opportunities to improve planning and coordination of 
information collection to better serve diverse participants and the system as a whole . 
53   CIFOR is a multidisciplinary working group comprised of food safety officials in all levels of government who collaborate “to 
improve methods at the local, state, and federal levels to detect, investigate, control, and prevent foodborne disease outbreaks .” 
It is co-chaired by the CSTE and NACCHO, and receives funding support from CDC . http://www .cifor .us/ (last viewed 
3/29/08)
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Institutional Obstacles to Information Sharing 
In addition to better planning and coordination of information collection, our goals for the FSII 
include more open access to and active sharing of existing food safety information . Any effort to 
improve information sharing should take into account, however, the forces that influence the behavior 
of institutions and individuals in the food safety system and make such information sharing difficult . 
At least three such forces apply across the board to government, industry and academic generators of 
food safety information .
The first is the simple reality of institutional focus and priorities . As described in Section Three, gov-
ernment agencies, food companies and food safety researchers all collect information for their own 
specific purposes using methods of collection and reporting that are suitable for those purposes . 
Even government food safety agencies, which certainly have an interest in helping other institutions 
play their food safety roles, naturally give priority to meeting their own information needs and pro-
grammatic goals, rather than devising ways to share information with others . 
In the case of CDC, for example, the traditional focus has been on reporting incidence rates of illness 
associated with specific pathogens and publishing further summaries and analysis in journal article 
form, rather than making detailed epidemiologic data available for analysis by others . In the case of 
FDA and FSIS, contamination data is collected primarily to support each agency’s regulatory and 
enforcement functions, rather than to inform their state and local counterparts or industry . 
Information sharing by the food industry and academia is similarly constrained by the reality of 
why they collect information in the first place . In the case of food companies, it is to better mange 
their own food safety systems, not to produce databases for use by others . In the case of academic 
researchers, it is to support the achievement of publishable research results, not to provide raw data 
to government or industry analysts .
Among government, industry and academic participants in the food safety system, we find an 
increasing recognition of their interdependence and the need to collaborate on food safety; some 
progress has certainly been made on information sharing . Due to the scarcity of time and financial 
resources all institutions face, however, making it a higher priority will likely require both expanding 
each institution’s understanding of its food safety role and taking specific steps to ensure that infor-
mation sharing helps them play that role . 
Even if information sharing enjoys a new priority, institutions still operate under a range of legal, 
business, cultural and bureaucratic obstacles that need to be addressed . We are referring here to, for 
example, the legal limits placed on government by privacy and trade secret laws and, at the federal 
level, by the recently enacted IQA . We also include the food industry’s concerns about protecting 
business-sensitive proprietary information and avoiding legal and regulatory liability that could 
potentially arise from sharing food safety information . In CDC and academia, institutional cultures 
and professional pressures contribute to individuals and organizations taking a proprietary interest 
in data they generate . Public and private institutions alike express concerns about their information 
being misinterpreted or misused by others . Any serious effort to improve the FSII, and information 
sharing in particular, must address these very real constraints . 
A third cross-cutting obstacle to information sharing is simply the power of the status quo . Elevating 
the priority of information sharing and addressing specific legal, business and other constraints are 
important steps, but, even with such efforts, human nature makes changing long-established ways of 
section four: constraints on improving the fsii
| 59 |
doing things very difficult . And many of the practices surrounding the collection and sharing of food 
safety information have been in place for a long time, ranging from traditional approaches to outbreak 
investigations and CDC’s management of outbreak data to the food industry’s protectiveness of food 
safety information it generates . Significant change in the status quo requires sustained, institution-
alized effort and leadership, not just an earnest but transient willingness to change .
A number of the items we describe here as institutional obstacles to information sharing were dis-
cussed in our workshops in terms of a lack of trust, primarily among institutions and individuals that 
shared data would be properly understood, interpreted and used . Lack of trust, or confidence, that 
efforts to share information will be rewarded seems also to help explain the difficulty of changing 
longstanding practices . 
Technical Constraints on Information Sharing
Even when these institutional obstacles are addressed, and organizations have the will to publish or 
share their data, significant technical obstacles may limit the utility of these data once they are shared . 
These obstacles have to do largely with the diverse ways that data is collected and stored and the chal-
lenges that arise in aggregating and meaningfully analyzing data from diverse sources .
A central premise underlying interest in improving the FSII is that specific information collected 
by one party for that party’s particular purpose can have value for other parties in the food safety 
system, possibly for different purposes . For example, data collected by the government on pathogen 
incidence and levels might be of use to food companies in assessing their own performance in relation 
to national averages, and the government might benefit from access to aggregated data from industry 
pathogen testing .
Another example: data from outbreak investigations conducted by different state health departments 
around the country can be, and has been, aggregated to provide information on the incidence of out-
breaks nationally associated with particular pathogen-food combinations . While the value of outbreak 
attribution is somewhat limited by the fact that outbreaks are not representative of sporadic illnesses, 
such information is still vital for targeting and prioritizing efforts to reduce foodborne illness .
The utility of data for such purposes is often constrained, or even eliminated, however, by the lack of 
standardized approaches to data collection . For example, in the case of gathering microbial test data 
for a particular pathogen on a particular product, different approaches can be taken on how products 
are selected for sampling (random versus “for cause”), how samples are actually collected (swab versus 
rinse), the measurement outcome (positive/negative prevalence versus quantification of microbial 
load), and especially the specific type of test and test protocol used to make the measurement . Vari-
ations in any of these methods across datasets may make it difficult or impossible to compare the data 
or aggregate them to draw the bigger picture of contamination rates or levels, or for other purposes . 
Non-standardized approaches to data collection are also an obstacle to aggregating epidemiological 
data from outbreak investigations . For example, while great strides have been made in standardizing 
laboratory methods used in foodborne outbreak investigations, allowing for the creation of nationally 
aggregated datasets, little effort has been made to standardize the way food vehicles are reported . 
Each individual investigator simply lists the foods or ingredients found or suspected to have been con-
taminated . As a result, for example, “hamburger” may mean “ground beef ” or “hamburger sandwich,” 
an important distinction considering the latter may contain lettuce, tomatoes, a bun or other ingre-
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dients associated with foodborne illness . Standardizing the reporting of food vehicles would sub-
stantially improve our ability to estimate the rates of illness attributable to particular pathogen-food 
combinations .
To be able to combine and compare similar data, it is likely that standardized approaches to data 
gathering will have to be developed and employed by the numerous individual parties engaged in that 
activity . But, while standardization seems an obvious goal to those interested in aggregating infor-
mation from multiple sources, the original collectors of data are not always supportive, for a number 
of reasons . Chief among them is the concern that by standardizing for the greater good, the data 
may have less value to the original collector . For example, a local or state epidemiologist may feel the 
standardized form or approach is less protective of the public health of their locality or state because 
it ignores critical aspects relevant to the local population . Similarly, an individual firm may not want 
to use a standardized testing approach that costs more than a lower cost method that is adequate for 
its needs or better suited to its specific conditions . 
Standardization is a pervasive issue in data collection and management, and has been a topic in food 
safety for years . Efforts to develop standardized methods are time- and energy-consuming, however, 
and rarely without honest disagreement among experts and practitioners . Agreement is even more 
challenging in areas such as microbial testing where the science is rapidly evolving and numerous 
technologies are competing in the marketplace . Care must be exercised so efforts to standardize do 
not impede further innovation in test methods . Well-targeted efforts to expand standardization are 
needed, however, to get full value from the investment government and industry make in collecting 
food safety data . It may be possible to find compromises that avoid strict “one size fits all” approaches 
to standardization in favor of flexible systems that set some bounds on the most important data 
characteristics (such as for the most important variables) but which allow greater freedom to add or 
change other components .
Another technical constraint on data sharing is the lack of harmonization of data systems. Just as there 
may be differences in how data is collected, there may be differences in how it is stored . This incon-
sistency stems, in part, from the many different software platforms available for data management 
which use different structural approaches to store data and may or may not “talk” with one another . 
In addition, regardless of platform, the format of the data may differ in terms of what variables are 
recorded or the format of these variables . Basically, the data may not “line up;” for example, two 
databases may record the same variable using incompatible ranges, such as 0-10 and 10-20 in one 
dataset and 0-7,7-13,14-20 in another . Some of these issues can be resolved through translation tables 
or features of modern data analysis software, but it is possible that differences in data formats could 
preclude proper aggregation . 
Costs of Improved Information Sharing
The economic reality of cost will always be an obstacle to any institution’s willingness and ability to 
share information . And meaningful sharing of food safety information certainly imposes costs, such 
as for standardizing data collection methods to make sharing data technically feasible and for putting 
information in a form suitable for sharing without jeopardizing the legitimate interests of the insti-
tution that generated it .
The potential material and equipment costs are significant by themselves, and may include computer 
workstations, data storage hardware, off-the-shelf or custom-built software for data entry, data man-
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agement and analysis, computer networking infrastructure, and additional hardware and software 
for Web sites . Labor costs may be even higher, with highly skilled workers needed to, among other 
activities: develop data collection protocols; perform field and laboratory work; design, develop, and 
maintain the data management and information systems; design data entry and other user interfaces; 
enter data into the systems; clean and validate the data; perform necessary analyses; and respond to 
incoming data requests .
Compared to the investment that many government and private organizations make in generating 
information, the incremental cost of making the information more readily and usefully available may 
be relatively modest, at least in some cases . Unless the costs are covered, however, the desired infor-
mation sharing is unlikely to occur . This is particularly true, as is often the case, when the benefit of 
information sharing goes more to the parties receiving the information than those who generate and 
share it, and thus incur the costs . In those cases, consideration needs to be given to how those costs 
can be minimized or covered, as well as to providing incentives or benefits to those who are willing to 
share their information to support improvement in the overall food safety system .
Specific Constraints in Government, Industry and Academia
In addition to the general constraints on information sharing or the utility of information once it has 
been shared, government, industry and academia each operate under constraints specific to them . 
Government Issues and Constraints
Government agencies are central to the FSII . They collect extensive food safety information for their 
own use and some, such as CDC, ARS and CSREES, generate information primarily for use by others; 
as government agencies, all must act in the broad public interest . It is appropriate, therefore, to look 
to government for leadership in improving the functioning of the FSII . All government agencies 
work, however, under policy, resource, cultural and legal constraints that make coordinated planning 
of information collection and sharing easier said than done . Some of these constraints are briefly 
outlined here . 
Lack of a Mandate and Resources for Coordination and Information Sharing
In the U .S . government, executive branch agencies focus on carrying out what they consider their 
core legislative mandate, and of course they depend on the legislature for the resources they need to 
do their assigned job . To be successful in the political and policy process, food safety agencies must 
consistently meet the expectations of the legislature, which in turn requires being responsive to their 
public stakeholders, including consumers and the food industry .
Efforts to improve the FSII are generally not prevented by the core food safety mandates of federal, 
state and local agencies . We know many agencies participate in such efforts, but they have no clear 
mandate or dedicated resources to do so . Additionally, in today’s food safety environment, charac-
terized by expanding domestic and international food safety challenges and diminishing resources, 
our food safety agencies commonly find themselves overburdened with competing priorities and 
responsibilities that are at the core of their current mandates and stakeholder expectations .
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For FDA, this means responding well to the crisis of the moment, be it an outbreak of illness asso-
ciated with tainted lettuce from California or unsafe chemical residues in fish from China . For FSIS, 
it means meeting its strict statutory inspection mandate . For CDC and its counterparts in state and 
local health departments, it means investigating and managing the latest outbreaks of foodborne 
illness . Activities without immediately measurable benefits or which have benefits secondary to those 
required by the core mandate of the agency (such as improving the functioning of the entire food 
safety system through broader coordination on data collection and improved information sharing) 
will, on any given day, take a backseat .
As a general rule, therefore, such activities as interagency planning of research and data collection, 
producing public-use data-sets, publishing information in a timely manner, making information 
accessible through Web sites, and responding to information requests are secondary priorities to most 
food safety agencies . They typically lose out in the competition for scarce resources and management 
attention to emergency response, inspection activities, or other core functions . This reality of life for 
federal agencies will not change until improving the collection and use of food safety information on 
a system-wide basis becomes a part of the mandate for food safety agencies and Congress provides 
resources for this purpose .
Legal Constraints on Information Access and Sharing
Federal, state and local agencies are subject to legal constraints affecting their ability to share food 
safety information, including laws intended to protect personal privacy and confidential business 
information, and ensure the quality of information released by the federal government . 
Privacy Laws—Under federal, state and local privacy statutes, governments are generally precluded 
from disclosing personal information about individuals, such as might be obtained during a health 
department’s investigation of a foodborne disease outbreak . CDC and the state and local health 
departments must thoroughly protect patient privacy and operate under agreed-upon guidelines that 
require, for example, careful review and deletion of any potentially identifying information prior to 
releasing records . 
While it is important to protect patient privacy, the resulting thorough review of records inevitably 
slows the availability of epidemiological data for analysis and reduces the amount of information 
available to other food safety agencies and analysts . For instance, these procedures often hinder access 
to non-confidential information that may be a part of the same dataset . In addition, it may not always 
be clear which data require protection for privacy purposes, particularly in cases for which the data 
include geographic identifiers or other information that could help identify a specific patient even if 
he or she were not identified explicitly . Furthermore, the labor-intensive review process imposes costs 
on resource-poor agencies that create a disincentive to even consider preparing data for release .
Laws Protecting Confidential Business Information—Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) at 
the federal level and similar FOIA or “government in the sunshine” laws at the state and local levels, 
agencies are precluded from disclosing confidential, commercially valuable business information . 
There is room to debate the types of food safety-related information that fall within this disclosure 
exemption, but possibilities include descriptions of a company’s food safety procedures as they relate 
to a particular product, or microbial test data on environmental or product samples taken from a 
company’s plant . Federal, state and local agencies commonly obtain such information through epide-
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miological investigations or regulatory inspections . For purposes of food safety information sharing, 
the practical results of the protection afforded confidential business information are, similar to the 
privacy laws, the imposition of staff costs for pre-disclosure review, delays in disclosure of infor-
mation, and limitations on what can be disclosed . This is another case in which one legitimate set of 
values is balanced against another in a way that complicates information sharing . 
The Information Quality Act (IQA)—Also known as the Data Quality Act (DQA), the IQA was enacted 
as a two-sentence rider in the consolidated appropriations bill for FY2001 . It mandated the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to “provide policy and procedural guidance to federal agencies for 
ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information (including sta-
tistical information) disseminated by federal agencies .”54 OMB subsequently issued detailed guidelines 
on how the IQA is to be implemented .55 The IQA is designed to ensure that information used in regu-
latory decisions meets quality standards, but it may also adversely impact the broader flow of infor-
mation from federal agencies to the public . 
In short, under the OMB guidelines, the release of information that has potentially significant economic 
impact may be required to undergo some type of pre-release peer review, the nature of which depends 
on the significance of the data . Private parties who feel affected by a release may challenge the agency 
and, if successful, force withdrawal of information that does not meet certain quality standards . 
Exactly how the IQA and the OMB guidelines apply as a strictly legal matter to release of various 
types of food safety information remains to be seen as implementation of this relatively new law 
unfolds . Some of the thresholds and flexibilities provided in the OMB guidelines would likely shield 
many routine disclosures of food safety information, such as recall information, from the more time-
consuming IQA procedures . Moreover, major risk assessments for which IQA peer review might be 
required would ordinarily be put through some appropriate peer review anyway . 
Nevertheless, the IQA adds another procedural requirement that agencies must address as they 
consider any significant release of food safety information and another reason for caution in sharing 
such information . We heard anecdotal concerns that the IQA might deter agencies from seeking data 
from external sources, such as other agencies or sources, since they would not be as able to verify that 
the data were developed and reported in accordance with the applicable data quality standards . This 
result would run directly counter to the need for much wider sharing of information to improve food 
safety . 
During our project workshops, many experts expressed concern about the impact of the IQA on the 
flow of food safety information . These concerns should be addressed so that the legitimate interest in 
ensuring information quality does not unnecessarily hinder the ability of agencies to obtain and share 
information needed to ensure food safety . 
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)—The PRA56 regulates the paperwork burdens federal agencies 
can impose on the public and affects the ability of food safety agencies to obtain information from 
the food industry . Under this law, agencies must obtain approval from OMB for surveys or other 
broad solicitations of information and, to get approval, must demonstrate the information cannot 
54  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (H .R . 4577) (Pub .L . 106-554)
55   OMB, “Issuance of OMB’s ‘Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review’ (December 4, 2004)(http://www .whitehouse .
gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03 .pdf) (last viewed 4/16/08) .
56  44 U .S .C . 3501 et seq .
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be obtained in other, less burdensome ways . As a result, for example, if FDA or USDA wanted to 
survey companies in a segment of the industry concerning current best practices for controlling a 
particular hazard, it would have to obtain OMB approval through a process that agency staff consider 
overly onerous and a strong disincentive to even considering such surveys . The criteria used by OMB 
to determine whether or not a survey is a “burden” are not well defined, so the denial by OMB of a 
survey to collect critical information to inform federal food safety decisions can appear arbitrary . 
Agency Culture and Established Practices
Beyond the very concrete constraints on data sharing imposed by legislative mandates, scarcity of 
resources, and legal requirements, there are some more subtle constraints that arise as a product of 
what might be termed agency “culture .” 
One category of cultural constraints relate to a sense agencies sometimes have of information “own-
ership .” This arises in different ways at different agencies . In general, agencies, laboratories and indi-
viduals responsible for generating or collecting data have a tendency to feel they own the information, 
or at least should be able to control it, due to the amount of time, labor and money they expended to 
gather it . They may hesitate to give up control of what they perceive as theirs, though in reality the 
data is publicly owned, and it may clearly be in the public’s interest for it to be shared openly . 
The sense of ownership and efforts to closely control information are of course influenced by some of 
the privacy, FOIA and other legal requirements cited earlier, and the legitimate interest agency workers 
have in not violating those requirements . The generators of information are also understandably con-
cerned that it could be misinterpreted or misused by those who either do not understand the data and 
its limitations or who have an agenda to use the data in ways the generator of the data would consider 
unjustified . 
Moreover, regulatory agencies, such as FDA, collect much of their food safety information, such as 
observations of conditions and practices in a food processing plant or microbial test data, in con-
nection with regulatory inspections that have the potential to lead to enforcement action . In those 
cases, the agency is entitled to withhold the information under the FOI Act as long as it is part of an 
“open investigatory file,” and the agency has a legitimate interest in controlling the data in order to 
protect a possible enforcement case . 
In some agencies, notably CDC, a sense of data “ownership” comes from a professional culture that 
rewards agency staff for publishing research results in peer reviewed journal articles . In the case of 
food safety epidemiology, the data at issue are typically surveillance data, such as compilations of 
outbreak data submitted by states or data generated through FoodNet . CDC compiles these data at 
the national level and regularly reports summary results . CDC scientists also tap this rich body of data 
to generate more detailed analyses and research articles . The professional rewards associated with 
academic publishing create an incentive for CDC staff not to release the more detailed data until they 
have time to prepare and publish articles based on it . While it is in everyone’s interest for agencies to 
publish analyses of data that are of the highest scientific quality and can pass the muster of the peer 
review process, timeliness of access to information generated with public funds is important as well . 
It is important to note that the interest in journal publication is by no means the only reason that 
CDC is historically slow in making available detailed food safety epidemiology data . Externally 
imposed legal requirements, scarce funding and many competing priorities for CDC staff time are 
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also important factors . CDC also deserves credit for its plans to pursue more rapid and in-depth 
access to its repository of foodborne outbreak data (eFORS) .
For all agencies with information of potential value to others in the food safety system, however, the 
only effective counter to a sense of information ownership that impedes sharing is a new culture of 
public ownership . The presumption should be that information generated with public resources is 
properly in the public domain and should be available on a timely basis and in a useful form to those 
who can utilize the information to help ensure food safety . There will still be legitimate factors, like 
privacy concerns, that properly limit disclosure, but the presumption should be that the information 
belongs and should be made available to the public . 
Food Industry Constraints on Information Sharing
Over the past 15 years or so, the food industry has dramatically increased the amount of food safety 
information it generates . This includes the much greater use of microbial testing as a process control 
and verification tool, as well as the gathering of information about environmental risk factors, 
improved production practices and process controls, and intervention efficacy . This information may 
be valuable not only to the firms that generate it but also to others throughout the food safety system . 
As with information collected by government, however, there are a number of obstacles to industry 
sharing its information . 
Unlike publicly funded information collected by the government, information collected by private 
firms or trade associations is private and proprietary and does not “belong” to the public . While it 
can be argued that it may have important public health benefits to the extent the information enables 
government to make better decisions and allows consumers to make more informed choices, there is 
no inherent right of anyone other than these firms to use the information . Rather, there is an inherent 
right of the owners of information to use the data as they see fit . The costs of information collection 
are significant, and firms want to get as much value for their investment as possible, while minimizing 
their costs, which may mean keeping the information private . 
There may be a number of possible business, public relations, regulatory and liability reasons why a 
company would want to keep information private . First, detailed information on a company’s food 
safety systems or product-specific data generated by those systems may be deemed to have value for 
the company’s competitors, who might use the information to improve the quality and effectiveness of 
their own operations . This would be particularly true if one company had invested in proprietary food 
safety technology and wanted to protect that investment in a very competitive marketplace . In some 
sectors, however, such as the beef industry, leading companies have recognized they have a mutual 
interest in ensuring all companies in the sector produce safe food to maintain public confidence . As a 
result, they have declared food safety a “non-competitive” issue and actively share information within 
the industry . 
Companies might also be concerned that information they generate will be misinterpreted or misused 
in a public relations setting, advertently or inadvertently, if it is shared with others . As discussed 
earlier, the way in which information is collected may limit its utility or meaning when taken out of 
context or used for other purposes, such as where targeted sampling and microbial testing is miscon-
strued as representative of overall conditions in a plant . Once such data becomes public, however, the 
risk it will be used or conveyed in a way the company would consider misleading is real and beyond 
the company’s control . For example, a researcher might use the data in a risk assessment and report 
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the results in a way that might trouble the original owner of the data, or a news reporter might report 
isolated results or summary statistics without understanding how to interpret the information . 
Companies might be concerned about how a regulatory agency will use information that the company 
shares voluntarily . Specifically, companies might worry that their information will be used for what the 
company might consider a punitive enforcement purpose rather than for a broader purpose, such as 
to make better decisions down the road, to focus efforts towards the biggest problems, or to aggregate 
their information with that of other companies . 
Similarly, a company might be concerned that information from their operation would be used in 
lawsuits filed on behalf of victims of foodborne illness and that misconstrued information might 
result in frivolous lawsuits based on false connections between an outbreak and, for example, sampling 
data . 
These reasons for keeping information private can readily add up to a situation in which a company 
sees the various forms of potential costs exceeding any possible gain from sharing . To improve sharing 
of private information, efforts would be needed to decrease the risks and to increase the benefits 
for companies . One approach to reducing downside risks is to use a third party to aggregate infor-
mation across companies and remove company or plant identifiable information . Creating positive 
incentives for companies to voluntarily share food safety information, beyond the knowledge they 
may be helping the system as a whole, may be more difficult . The clearer the benefit to food safety of 
sharing particular information, however, the more likely companies will be to cooperate . 
Academic Constraints on Information Sharing 
The academic research community is an important part of the FSII, as a generator of basic knowledge 
relevant to understanding food safety hazards and possible interventions, and a resource for meeting 
specific government and industry information needs . Like government and industry, academia has 
its own interests and established practices that inhibit timely and complete access to the information 
researchers generate . 
The academic norm of publishing research results in peer reviewed scientific journals plays an 
important role in validating research and providing permanent and proper archiving of results . It also 
is the chief means of measuring an individual researcher’s productivity and reputation . 
As discussed in Section Three, journal articles typically include the researcher’s analysis and con-
clusions based on data the researcher or others have generated . Academic researchers are rewarded 
professionally for providing novel analyses or reaching new conclusions, not for generating datasets . 
Articles might include, therefore, a brief summary or description of the underlying data, but not 
incorporate typically large volumes of primary research data, such as microbial test data or detailed 
measurements of all factors related to assessing an intervention’s effectiveness . As a result, large 
volumes of primary research data generated through academic research are not generally shared in 
any systematic way with others . 
Recently, the academic community and journal editors have recognized that other researchers, 
analysts and experts may need access to data underlying a journal article to further validate results, 
perform additional analyses, or compare to data from other studies . Some journals now allow authors 
to upload electronic appendices, including datasets, to their online versions which serve as accessible 
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repositories of data . This is a positive step, though tying data access to journal publication has inherent 
limitations that affect not only the timeliness of access to underlying data but also to the researcher’s 
analysis and findings . 
One such limitation is the generally slow nature of journal publication . Delays can be caused by a 
number of parties in the system, including journal and publisher staff, editors, reviewers or even 
authors themselves . In all, the peer review process may delay publication for a year or longer, par-
ticularly when one considers the impacts of rejections and requests to “revise and resubmit,” which 
further delay publication . While the process is an important check on the quality of research, it puts 
potentially important data and results out of reach for extended periods in often fast-moving fields of 
research . Research that was cutting edge when it began may be outdated or impractical by the time 
it is published . This is particularly true for “practical” research on industry practices . One complaint 
from industry is that they see a large number of publications evaluating aspects of processes they no 
longer use .
Another limitation is caused by “publication bias,” wherein research is rewarded less for its potential 
utility than for how “novel” it is . A study that generates potentially large amounts of useful data but 
has not yet produced findings that editors or reviewers find novel may not find a publishing outlet at 
all, with the data typically remaining unavailable to other researchers . Negative results are generally 
difficult to publish, but may be very valuable to those attempting to understand the risks across the 
system .
Even when published, journal articles and any accompanying data may be difficult or expensive to 
obtain, especially for those outside of academia . There are increasing numbers of scientific journals, 
and more and more journals are being published by for-profit publishers . This has increased the costs 
of journals, and even many university and college libraries have had to cut back on subscriptions .
In response to the high and increasing costs of journals, and to the difficulties experienced in accessing 
obscure journals, there has been a growing “open access” movement calling for free online journals to 
replace costly print journals .57 A related movement calls for publicly funded research to become more 
accessible . Under one legislative proposal, eleven federal agencies with extramural research budgets 
over $100 million would require grant recipients to publish their work, online and free, within six 
months of publication elsewhere;58 and NIH recently announced a policy requiring all articles resulting 
from research funded in whole or in part by NIH to be made available in a free digital archive within 
12 months of publication .59
While such open access efforts might solve some of the problems of accessibility, they do nothing 
about the fact there is no systematic approach to ensuring prompt publication of academic research 
data or otherwise making it accessible on a timely basis to other researchers or analysts in government 
and industry .
Finally, intellectual property concerns can be a constraint on information sharing by food safety 
researchers . Researchers whose work could lead to patentable inventions—such as new microbial test 
methods or intervention technologies—have incentives not to disclose their potential inventions pre-
57   Guerrero, R ., and M . Piqueras . 2004 . “Open access: A turning point in scientific publication .” International Microbiology 
7:157-161 .
58  Federal Research Public Access Act of 2006 (FRPAA) (S .2695)
59  http://grants .nih .gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-08-033 .html (last viewed 1/28/2008)
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maturely . While the patent system serves the legitimate purpose of stimulating innovation by granting 
inventors the reward of exclusive marketing rights for a period of time, it can have the secondary 
consequence of slowing the dissemination of information that could have value to others in meeting 
important social needs, such as ensuring food safety .
Conclusion 
The constraints and problems outlined here are considerable and will not be easily overcome . Any 
progress will be gradual and come only with concerted effort on the part of many parties working 
in the food safety system . The recommendations in the next step call for such a coordinated effort, 
confronting the many constraints and problems outlined here, and seeking to leverage many oppor-
tunities for improving the FSII .
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s e c t i o n  f i v e : 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  f s i i
Introduction
In this concluding section, we offer recommendations for improving the FSII . Our recommendations 
are based on discussions that took place throughout the FSII project among government, industry, 
academic and consumer experts, backed up by our own analysis of the FSII and the constraints and 
opportunities confronting it . Before revealing our recommendations, however, a few general obser-
vations are in order .
First, we were struck throughout by the high enthusiasm for working to improve the FSII among key 
experts in all levels of government, the food industry, academia and the consumer community . This 
reflects, we believe, the central role that information plays in the day-to-day activity of people working 
in the food safety system and the reality, as illustrated in Sections Three and Four of this report, that 
today’s FSII falls short of meeting important information needs .
This enthusiasm across a range of experts will be crucial to making significant positive changes to the 
FSII, but it must be coupled with an appreciation among policymakers, at the agency-head and political 
level, of information’s role in food safety . In this regard, we think it very promising that the recently 
issued FDA Food Protection Plan and the White House Action Plan for Import Safety both recognize 
the central role of improved information systems in modernizing the food safety system .60,61
60   FDA (Food and Drug Administration) . November 2007 . Food Protection Plan: An integrated strategy for protecting the na-
tion’s food supply . U .S . Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC .
61   Interagency Working Group on Import Safety . November 2007 . Action Plan for Import Safety: A roadmap for continual im-
provement . Report to the President . Washington, DC .
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Second, the four workshops we convened during this project generated many good ideas for improving 
the FSII . They ranged from scientific and technological ideas for improving data collection and man-
agement to much broader ideas about changing roles and relationships within the FSII to improve 
data collection, access and sharing . We are grateful to workshop participants because, without their 
ideas, the project could not have achieved its primary goal of identifying opportunities to improve 
the FSII . 
The recommendations outlined in this section are both a distillation and a synthesis of what we heard 
in the workshops: a distillation, in that not everything we heard met the tests of broad interest and 
practical feasibility; and a synthesis, in that we have put the ideas together and developed recommen-
dations that meld multiple ideas, including our own . Thus, while we think that many of the partic-
ipants in the project will embrace the general direction of our recommendations, and we hope many 
of the details, they are our recommendations for which no one else need feel responsible .
Finally, one of the core themes emerging from this project is that many of the most important issues 
needing to be addressed to improve the FSII relate to institutional roles and relationships . At the 
outset of this project, we expected the recommendations from the project would address a relatively 
short list of specific, high-priority problems related to information collection, access and sharing that 
could be solved by bringing the right group of motivated parties to the table to work out details of 
better ways to operate . Some such ideas did emerge and are included here .
We found, however, that most of the problems in the FSII are systemic or institutional in nature, 
meaning they are grounded in how the vast network of players in our decentralized food safety system 
see their roles, what their incentives are to act in particular ways, and the obstacles that exist to acting 
differently . We believe that lasting solutions must respect and address these institutional realities and 
must include mechanisms that facilitate diverse institutions working together in new ways . 
Our recommendations thus include the establishment of a national FSII policy and program that is 
intended to provide both “top-down” leadership and catalyst for change in the government’s approach 
to food safety information, as well as “bottom-up” mechanisms for devising and implementing it . We 
also recommend a number of initiatives intended to respond directly to specific concerns and oppor-
tunities for improvement that we heard in the workshops . Some of these are cross-cutting efforts that 
impact the entire system, while others are more sharply focused . These recommendations are sum-
marized in Box 5 .1 .
Initiating and maintaining such efforts requires new or shifted resources, but discretionary resources 
tend to be limited across the food safety system, especially within government . We emphasize 
throughout our recommendations, therefore, that coverage of costs must be considered for every 
recommendation we make .
FSII National Policy and Program 
One of the most persistent issues that surfaced during the FSII project concerns possible sources of 
leadership and initiative to improve the FSII . The FSII is composed of many institutions at all levels of 
government and in the private sector, none of which represents or is responsible for the entire system . 
As documented in Section Three, therefore, the current state of information collection, access and 
sharing is the product of many diverse institutions carrying out their particular roles in the food safety 
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Box 5.1—Summary of Recommendations
FSII National Policy and Program




Mechanisms to enact the national policy:
•  FSII Council
  Intergovernmental body composed of heads of federal food safety agencies and 
representatives of state and local food safety agencies
 Coordinate and implement actions needed to fulfill FSII policy responsibilities
•  FSII Stakeholder Forum
 Administrated by FSII Council, but led by third party, such as NAS
 No fixed membership, but a tool for convening the food safety community
 Principle vehicle for dialogue and collaboration to enact improvements to FSII
Priority areas should include:
•   Improving collection of and accessibility to public information, including CDC outbreak 






Specific Initiatives to Improve the FSII
1. Create a food safety epidemiology user group, to address:
•  Improving surveillance and analysis to meet stakeholder needs
•  Increasing timeliness and depth of information access
2. Create a “network of networks” to improve interconnectivity of the food safety web
•  Collaborative relationships between Web sites and information owners
•  Standardized summary pages and organized structure for browsing
3. Create database for tracking research and information collection
•  Build on USDA/NAL/FSRIO database to include more research projects and to include 
additional information collection activities
4. Conduct targeted analyses to identify knowledge and information gaps
•  Utilize database of research to analyze trends
•  Use “systematic reviews” to deeply examine specific knowledge areas
5. Initiate dialogue to prioritize information needs
•  Engage community to identify research priorities






7. Increase access to industry-generated food safety information
•   Identify specific problem-areas or information needs that industry data could address
•   Develop guidelines or “business rules” to govern information collection and sharing
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system but lacking the mandate, incentives or resources to address food safety information issues as 
a system-wide challenge . 
Logically, the responsibility for leadership on improving the FSII should begin at the national level . 
The federal food safety agencies, including FDA, FSIS, EPA, CDC, ARS and CSREES, all play major 
roles as generators and users of food safety information, and their policies and practices can affect 
how information flows throughout the system . There is, however, no federal policy or commitment 
to better coordinate public information collection and expand access to existing information, and no 
federal agency has been given the job of improving the FSII . Thus, our first recommendation calls for 
a national policy and program to improve the FSII . 
Congress currently has before it several proposals to reform the nation’s food safety system, including 
modernizing the statutory mandates of FDA and FSIS and unifying the federal program under a 
single agency . While unifying food safety agencies under a single roof would facilitate improvements 
in information sharing, this alone would not solve the problem . In today’s FSII, problems occur 
with information sharing among offices of the same agency, and the need for improvement extends 
well beyond federal agencies to include state and local agencies, industry, academia and consumers . 
Improvements to the FSII are thus necessary regardless of how or when the unification issue is 
resolved, and we should not wait to take action . 
For this reason, our recommendations take the basic structure of the federal food safety system as it is, 
though most of the recommendations would remain just as relevant, perhaps with some modification, 
if the federal agencies were unified .
While national leadership is essential, it is neither possible nor desirable to change the fundamental 
character of the FSII as a highly decentralized set of public and private institutions collecting and 
using information primarily to support their particular roles in the food safety system . Rather, sus-
tainable improvement in the FSII can be achieved only if the federal agencies have the mandate and 
the mechanisms to work in partnership with state and local governments, the food industry, academia 
and consumers . We recommend, therefore, legislation establishing the principles and goals of the 
FSII, creating an inter-governmental FSII Council with prescribed duties, and establishing a FSII 
Stakeholder Forum to foster collaboration among stakeholders at all levels on the design and imple-
mentation of specific improvements .
Finally, while we call for legislation because we believe political commitment and a congressional 
mandate are needed to bring about sustainable change, we recognize that most of our recommen-
dations for a national policy and program could be implemented through a presidential executive 
order . In the short run, this may be a more practical mechanism and certainly deserves consid-
eration . 
National Policy and the Responsibility of Federal Agencies
The legislation (or executive order) should make it the policy of the federal government and duty of all 
federal food safety agencies, whether involved in regulation, surveillance, or research, to: 
Foster coordinated and collaborative approaches to collecting food safety information;1 . 
Consider the needs of the food safety system as a whole in planning information collection 2 . 
activities; and 
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Maximize access to and active sharing of food safety information among government agencies 3 . 
and with the private sector . 
The new policy should reaffirm the presumption that food safety information generated with public 
resources is in the public domain and should be readily available to those who seek it, while not over-
riding established protections for private or confidential information . 
Mechanisms
The legislation (or executive order) should create two mechanisms to implement the national policy: 
an inter-governmental FSII Council with prescribed duties and a broad-based FSII Stakeholder Forum 
to foster collaboration among the many parties in the system on information sharing issues . 
FSII Council
The FSII Council would be an inter-governmental body composed of the most senior food safety 
official of the key federal agencies, including at least FDA, USDA, EPA, CDC and DHS; the heads of 
key offices and centers within these agencies such as CFSAN, ORA and CVM within FDA and FSIS, 
ARS and CSREES within USDA; and at least an equal number of representatives of state and local 
food safety agencies . The Secretary of HHS would appoint representatives of state and local agencies 
based on nominations from the professional organizations representing state and local officials 
involved in food safety, such as AFDO, APHL, ASTHO, CSTE, NACCHO, NASDA and NEHA . The 
Council’s chairmanship would rotate annually among the members, but the Council would have a 
full-time executive director and staff, appointed by the Secretary of HHS in consultation with Council 
members . The Council staff would include liaisons to the key congressional committees . The Council 
would have a line item in the HHS budget with an initial authorization in the range of $25 million 
to fund its own base activities, as outlined below, and catalyze initiatives to improve the FSII . Opera-
tional improvements in the FSII at the agency level would require separate and likely more substantial 
investments .
The primary responsibility of the Council would be to convene, coordinate and perform other 
functions needed to support the agencies in fulfilling their new responsibilities under the national 
FSII policy . The Council’s specific duties would include:
Seeking regular input on information needs from all participants in the food safety system, 1 . 
including agencies at all levels of government, the food industry, the research community and 
consumers; 
Prioritizing, planning and coordinating implementation of actions to improve the collection 2 . 
and flow of food safety information;
Identifying any legislative or policy changes needed to carry out required actions, including 3 . 
reducing legal or policy obstacles to and providing positive incentives for collaboration and 
information sharing;
Estimating the costs and benefits associated with needed actions; and4 . 
Reporting annually to Congress and the public on food safety information needs, progress in 5 . 
improving the FSII, and key obstacles to progress . 
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FSII Stakeholder Forum 
While the federal government has both the duty and capacity to drive improvement in the FSII, the 
active participation of practitioners and experts from state and local government, academia, industry 
and consumers is necessary to make meaningful progress on many issues . To facilitate this partici-
pation, a FSII Stakeholder Forum should be established under the auspices of the FSII Council . This 
recommendation responds directly to the desire expressed by many participants in our FSII project 
for an on-going mechanism to make information collection and access more responsive to user needs, 
and to foster dialogue and collaboration on FSII issues among the public and private participants in 
the food safety system .
The Forum would have no fixed membership but function, rather, as a tool for convening interested 
members of the food safety community on both a regular and ad hoc basis . It would be overseen 
administratively and funded through the Council, but its management would be contracted out to an 
independent body, such as the National Academy of Sciences .
The Forum would play consultative, information exchange and implementing roles . In its consultative 
role, it would be a principle vehicle through which the Council would gain input on information 
needs and priorities for improving the FSII . In its information exchange role, it would provide a 
setting in which members of the food safety community could discuss common problems and share 
best practices, including advances in information technology that can facilitate data sharing .
The Forum could also serve as a mechanism for implementation of specific initiatives that require 
broad dialogue and collaboration, such as deciding when standardization of data collection and 
reporting methods would be worth the effort, as well as devising standardized approaches that satisfy 
diverse needs . 
Priority Actions of the FSII National Program 
Participants in our project workshops made a number of suggestions for improving government 
practices related to information access and sharing . We recommend that Congress (or the president) 
direct the FSII Council, in consultation with the FSII Stakeholder Forum, to consider and prioritize 
the following possible actions:
1 .  Prompt reporting and deeper access to CDC’s outbreak and surveillance data, including online 
public access to national outbreak data collected via eFORS;
 2 .  Treating FoodNet data as a public resource and making it promptly available and user-friendly 
to all interested parties in the public and private sectors, limited only by appropriate protection 
of patient privacy; 
 3 .  Expanding participation in eLEXNET by government laboratories, and possibly non-
government laboratories as well, and, eventually, creating a means to make the information 
available online to the public; 
 4 .  Creating mechanisms to aggregate, analyze and share among jurisdictions the  inspection, 
enforcement and recall information generated by federal, state and local agencies, including 
harmonized inspection reporting criteria and searchable online databases; state and local 
agencies, including harmonized inspection reporting criteria and searchable online databases;
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 5 .  Clarifying and strengthening protocols for rapid information sharing in outbreak situations 
among public agencies, with the food industry and the public, to ensure timely access to 
information needed to contain outbreaks and prevent future ones;
 6 .  Greatly expanding the commissioning of state and local officials by FDA and other agencies to 
help foster information access and sharing during illness outbreaks, compliance investigations 
and other settings;
 7 .  Amending or interpreting the IQA so as not to affect the release of information to other public 
agencies;
 8 .  Making fully public information concerning research activities performed or funded by federal 
agencies, in particular USDA’s Agriculture Research Information System (ARIS);
 9 .  Standardizing and harmonizing sampling methods and laboratory procedures to enable data 
and results to be compared; and
10 .  Generally improving public Web access to publicly generated data-sets .
The FSII Council should report publicly on the value and feasibility of these actions and its plans for 
pursuing them .
The Difficulty and Sustainability of a New National Policy and Program
We believe a new national policy and program along the lines outlined here are a necessary response 
to the current state of the FSII and the opportunity we have to better ensure food safety by improving 
the way the many elements of the FSII work together . Such a policy and program represent a major 
shift in philosophy and practice, however, and any such major change in the status quo of longstanding 
government programs is inherently difficult to achieve . It will require high-level commitment, lead-
ership and action by Congress and the executive branch to both drive the policy change and provide 
the resources needed to implement it . Our hope is that recent events and the clear shortcomings of 
the current system will provide sufficient motivation for change .
To deliver lasting value, however, any new policy and program must be sustained, which requires con-
tinued support from political leaders in Congress and the White House to provide resources . In the 
case of a new national policy and program for the FSII, sustainability will depend, ultimately, on the 
success of the program in meeting the information needs of practitioners at all levels of government 
and in the food industry, the consumer community and academia . If the program succeeds in that 
regard, the political support needed to sustain it will likely be there . If the program fails to deliver 
benefits that practitioners value, the program should and likely will be abandoned . 
This practical test of sustainability—whether practitioners get better access to the information they 
need to ensure food safety—should also apply to the specific initiatives that follow .
Specific Initiatives to Increase the Value of Food Safety Information
Participants throughout the food safety system conduct extensive research and collect volumes of 
information aimed at better understanding hazards and interventions to control them, but the food 
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safety system is not getting full value from these efforts . In addition to the national FSII policy and 
program, we recommend seven initiatives that would significantly improve the way information is 
collected, made accessible and actively shared throughout the system . Any of these initiatives could be 
implemented and return value regardless of whether the proposed national FSII policy and program 
goes forward . 
The first two recommendations are broad cross-cutting initiatives that would involve and be a 
benefit to much of the food safety community . The first is the creation of a food safety epidemiology 
user group by CDC to reflect the critical role of epidemiology data in the efforts of the entire food 
safety community to understand foodborne illness and its causes and to design effective preventive 
measures . The second is the creation of a “network of networks” and associated gateway Web site that 
would provide a convenient and efficient way for interested parties to find and access datasets and 
other forms of information from sources that are currently dispersed and disconnected . 
The remaining five recommendations involve specific institutions within the system and are intended 
to improve coordination in research and information collection, and to improve access to academic 
and industry data . As discussed in Section Three, food safety research and information collection are 
undertaken through a fragmented network of government and private institutions for a wide range 
of purposes . It would be neither feasible nor desirable to centrally direct all such work, but many par-
ticipants in our project workshops expressed interest in taking steps to ensure that the whole system 
gets maximum value from its investment in food safety information .
Moreover, experience has taught that many food safety problems cannot be solved without well-
planned research and data collection applied in a concerted way directly to the problem at hand . This 
need has been demonstrated most recently in the context of produce safety, with the recognized need 
to better define risk pathways and determine specific control criteria and interventions to ensure 
safety throughout production and processing . The purpose of the recommendations that follow is 
to foster the kind of intentional, coordinated research, data collection and analysis required to solve 
such food safety problems, and to ensure the results of these activities are accessible to all in the com-
munity . 
Specifically, we recommend the food safety community should, through various institutional mech-
anisms: 
Create and maintain a database for comprehensive and ongoing tracking of research and infor-•	
mation collection; 
Conduct targeted analyses to identify knowledge and data gaps related to specific food safety •	
problems; 
Initiate a dialogue-based process to make more systematic assessments of information needs and to •	
identify research priorities; 
Create mechanisms and provide incentives for the academic community to increase accessibility to •	
research data, particularly when such research is publicly funded; and 
Find collaborative approaches to using industry-generated information to help solve specific food •	
safety problems .
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1. Create a Food Safety Epidemiology User Group 
CDC should create a Food Safety Epidemiology User Group to ensure publicly funded food safety 
epidemiology is as demand-driven as possible and of the greatest feasible value to those working 
to improve food safety . The User Group would include state and local health officials and the entire 
food safety community, and aim to prioritize the data and analytical needs of the community and 
ensure information from publicly funded epidemiology is increasingly made accessible in a timely 
and meaningful manner .
Motivation
The FSII workshops and discussions revealed the exceptional importance placed on outbreak and 
surveillance data by the entire food safety community, including federal regulatory agencies, state and 
local agencies, the food industry, consumer advocates and food safety researchers . Epidemiological 
data and analyses are, or could be, used by these parties for such critical purposes as attributing ill-
nesses to foods, mapping trends in illness, understanding contributing risk factors from farm to fork, 
identifying and targeting interventions to reduce foodborne illness, and setting priorities for allo-
cating public and private food safety resources . 
The unique role and importance of epidemiological information make it essential that the collection 
of the information be designed to meet the needs of all those who use it and that the information be 
of high quality and widely accessible in a timely manner . This is difficult because, like other aspects of 
the FSII, food safety epidemiology is highly decentralized, with states and localities collecting most of 
the data and most of the data storage and analysis being done by CDC . 
CDC works with state and local health officials to define characteristics of illness surveillance and 
outbreak investigations, and works through CIFOR on specific ways to improve the epidemiological 
response to outbreaks . Other stakeholders who utilize or might utilize epidemiological data, however, 
including those in the food industry, academia and consumer organizations, are not regularly engaged 
in planning surveillance programs or follow-up investigations . In our project workshops, a number 
of participants expressed interest in closer collaboration on such matters with CDC and its state and 
local partners .
There is also a perception in the food safety community that data aggregated by CDC is not made 
available to potential users in a timely fashion or sufficient detail . This perception is particularly 
strong with respect to the eFORS database of foodborne illness outbreaks, which CDC has expressed 
interest in making more promptly and fully available . CDC reports results from the FoodNet active 
surveillance system for foodborne illness more rapidly, through preliminary and finalized annual 
reports . Some have expressed interest, however, in more timely and deeper access to FoodNet infor-
mation than is currently available in these reports, so they can rapidly learn as much as possible about 
how to prevent illness based on the best available information .
One of the clearest messages from the FSII workshops concerned the need for the nation’s food 
safety epidemiology enterprise to be increasingly demand-driven, with all stakeholders more actively 
engaged in planning the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on foodborne illness and its 
causes . To their great credit, food safety leaders at CDC and state epidemiologists have participated 
actively in the FSII project, with CDC leading the discussion at one of the workshops on ways to 
improve access to CDC data and be more responsive to stakeholder needs . CDC’s continued lead-
ership on this issue will be essential to progress . The idea outlined below is intended to support and 
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advance that leadership by creating a true partnership involving CDC, state and local officials and 
the broader stakeholder community, and enabling the entire community to share in defining and 
fulfilling their foodborne disease surveillance, investigation and analytical needs .
Implementation
CDC should take the lead in forming a Food Safety Epidemiology User Group as a vehicle through 
which the information and analytical needs of the food safety community can be publicly voiced 
and properly addressed on an ongoing basis and a true partnership developed . Unlike CIFOR or 
OutbreakNet, this User Group should include representation from parties who are not often “at the 
table” when it comes to decisions about how surveillance systems are designed and implemented, or 
how information is shared or disseminated, including food industry firms and trade associations, 
consumer and victim advocates, food safety researchers and members of numerous offices within 
FDA and USDA . In addition to these parties, the User Group should also include state and local 
officials and their national associations, such as AFDO, APHL, ASTHO, CSTE, NACCHO, NASDA 
and NEHA . Congress should provide CDC with funds to engage a neutral third-party to facilitate 
discussions and development of recommendations serving the widest possible interests .
The mandate of the User Group would be to address, on a continuing basis, two questions concerning 
the utility and accessibility of information: (1) How can the collection and analysis of surveillance and 
outbreak information be improved so the information has greater value to improving food safety?; 
and (2) How can the timeliness, ease and depth of access to the information be improved?
Examples of issues concerning the utility of information derived from surveillance and investigations 
that the User Group could address include: 
Whether further pathogens should be added to the existing list covered by FoodNet;•	
Which pathogens most require attribution studies in FoodNet;•	
Whether and how food vehicles should be standardized in outbreak reporting forms; •	
What information should be collected during outbreak investigations;•	
What targeted information collection and analysis should be undertaken to support analysis of root •	
causes and design of preventive measures; and
What analyses CDC should perform on the data it collects . •	
With regard to improving the accessibility of information, a number of ideas and issues arose during 
the workshops that could be addressed by the User Group . One frequently raised topic was the need 
to enhance CDC’s current Web-based repository of foodborne outbreak data (eFORS) to make it 
more complete, easier to use and more timely . Currently, data are published in the form of a large 
number of separate PDF files of summary “line listings” tables, which require substantial effort to 
convert into a format amenable to analysis . Further, data are published 15 months after the end of a 
calendar year, to accommodate state reporting delays and data validation procedures; as a result, an 
outbreak occurring in January 2007 will not be published as a line listing until March of 2009 . Possible 
improvements to address these and other issues affecting access to outbreak information that the User 
Group could consider include CDC acting to:
Publish data in standard tabular formats such as spreadsheets or tab-delimited text files; •	
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Publish documentation alongside the dataset explaining the data fields and how to properly interpret •	
the information; 
Develop an interface allowing users to search subsets of full datasets, such as all outbreaks for a •	
particular pathogen, from a certain state, or within some range of years;
Publish all relevant and appropriate data fields collected by CDC, and not just the limited fields in •	
the summary line listings, including data on contributing factors, pathogen subtype, and age and 
gender information; and 
Publish preliminary data more quickly, perhaps quarterly, until data are finalized . •	
In addition to convening regularly to address the questions of utility and accessibility of food safety 
epidemiology data, the User Group could serve as a sounding board when CDC and/or state and 
local officials are considering changes in their surveillance and investigation activities related to food 
safety . 
2. Create a “Network of Networks” to Improve the 
Interconnectivity of the Food Safety Web
To increase awareness of food safety information sources and overcome the stove pipe effect of isolated 
food safety databases, the food safety community should collaborate to create a “network of networks” 
for food safety information, consisting of a gateway Web site allowing users to browse and search a 
directory of food safety data collection activities and information sources across all elements of the 
food safety system . Such a network would maintain the diversity of the current FSII but improve the 
ability to find relevant information . 
Motivation
As discussed in Section Three, food safety information is collected and analyzed by a range of insti-
tutions concerned with a wide array of hazards, foods and points on the farm-to-table continuum . 
These information collection activities tend to have a specific purpose and focus and have resulted in 
a large number of food safety Web sites and electronic networks operating in isolation from others in 
the system (see Appendix C) . 
The stove pipe effect that results is largely an issue of awareness . People can not infer what information 
is available and how to access it . While the diversity of information sources, perspectives and Web 
sites is an important strength of the FSII, the lack of awareness and interconnectivity among them is 
a significant weakness .
The “awareness” issue arose repeatedly during our project workshops as a problem that must be 
addressed by increasing both human interaction (such as through an FSII Stakeholder Forum) and 
system interconnectivity, such as through a “network of networks .” There was also clear consensus 
that the current diversity of information sources is both an unavoidable reality and a genuine strength 
of the food safety system and the FSII . It is therefore preferable to create a hub Web site that links up 
existing resources rather than attempt to create a single, unified Web site that would serve as a com-
prehensive information repository, a goal that is neither feasible nor desirable .
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Implementation
The “network of networks” for food safety information (hereafter the “FSII Network”) would be built 
upon the central premise of a hub Web site housing a directory of food safety information, collection 
activities and information sources from all entities of the food safety system, public and private . This 
Web site would serve as a gateway for browsing and searching, as well as a focal point to link together 
otherwise disconnected information sources . Key to the success of the FSII Network in improving 
awareness is for each individual information source or Web site to link back to the hub Web site . 
Without linking back, those searching for information can only move in one direction (from the 
gateway to an individual data source) and the network would not sufficiently solve the stove pipe 
effect of isolated datasets .
Among the key features of the FSII Network are collaborative relationships, standardized summary 
pages for each connected information source, and an organized structure for browsing . 
Collaborative Relationships•	 —Although the technological aspects of the FSII Network are important, 
its success would depend most fundamentally on building collaborative relationships among key 
players in the food safety system who share the aspiration of improved interconnectivity, especially 
the many actors who are currently operating food safety Web sites or managing databases . These 
actors and other members of the food safety community would have to agree to collaborate in the 
development of the hub Web site and promote it by placing links on their own Web sites . 
Standardized Summary Pages•	 — The hub Web site would include a directory of information sources 
across the system built upon standardized summary pages for each source . Each summary page 
could include basic information about each information collection activity that answers the standard 
“who, what, when, where, why and how” questions about the information source, including a list 
of relevant publications, and provides information on how to access the information being col-
lected . Direct links to external Web sites would be an essential component of the directory and 
summaries .
Organized Structure for Browsing•	 —Due to the depth and breadth of information available, the 
directory should be built around an organized structure that would allow for numerous ways to 
find the information, such as browsing by institution, type of information, pathogen, place in the 
farm-to-table continuum, or food product, to name a few . In addition to this organized structure, 
the directory should allow searching by freeform keywords or “tags .”
Because the development and sustainability of the FSII Network depends on buy-in across the food 
safety community, it must be developed and managed through a broad-based, bottom-up mech-
anism—such as the FSII Stakeholder Forum—and a widely representative steering committee com-
prised of actors from across the food safety system . The FSII Network could be explicitly connected 
to the proposed FSII Stakeholder Forum, with the network Web site serving as the internet home for 
the Forum; The FSII Network could also be developed independently of the Forum . In any case, some 
entity must be willing and able to play the catalytic, leadership role and be responsible for ensuring 
that adequate, sustainable funding is available .
Finally, the possibility of building upon one or more existing Web sites, rather than duplicating the 
capabilities of existing sites, should be explored . For example, the JIFSAN Web site “FoodRisk .org” 
and the NAL’s Food Safety Information Center (FSIC) Web site already serve as centralized resources 
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for food safety information, have searchable directory structures that may be amenable, and have 
been actively engaged on issues involving the food safety information infrastructure .62,63
3. Create a Database for Tracking Research and Information Collection 
The federal government, acting through the proposed FSII Council and Stakeholder Forum or other 
suitable mechanism, should develop and maintain a Food Safety Research Tracking System, which 
would be a Web-accessible and searchable database of past and ongoing food safety research and 
information collection activities, focused on subjects of current interest to food safety practitioners . 
The goal is to make it simple for practitioners to learn what information is being collected across the 
system and what research is underway on a particular topic of interest, whether that research is being 
performed or funded by the federal government, an individual researcher through a grant from a 
foundation, or a private company .
The Tracking System should include research and information collection activities related to par-
ticular pathogens, foods or commodities, and interventions—information practitioners could use to 
understand hazards and how to prevent them . The idea is to supplement, not duplicate, indices of 
published scientific literature . The database would be useful because it would include information 
about ongoing research prior to publication, which may not appear in the literature until years after 
the work is completed, plus include information collection activities that are not regularly published 
in journal articles .
The Tracking System could supplement the recommended FSII Network by providing access to infor-
mation that might otherwise be unknown to many, or difficult to obtain . It could be linked to, or be 
a part of, the FSII Network . The proposed database is different from the FSII Network, however; the 
latter is a gateway designed to ease access to information from existing Web sites and data sources, 
while the Tracking System includes information not published elsewhere and would, therefore, 
require an active and ongoing effort to compile information on research and information collection 
activities . 
The Tracking System should build on the significant contribution of the Research Projects Database64 
created and maintained by the National Agricultural Library (NAL) . This database contains some 
1700 summary notes on research activities, primarily by the federal government . Though updated 
somewhat regularly, research funded or performed by those outside USDA is quite underrepresented, 
and routine data collection activities are excluded . Current funding for maintaining the NAL database 
seems insufficient to make it comprehensive enough to be useful as a reliable tracking system for 
research activities .
By building awareness and providing access to both completed and ongoing research and data col-
lection activities, the Tracking System would also support analysis of gaps in available data, and 
influence knowledge and planning for future efforts . Knowledge of past and current research on a 
particular topic is crucial to identifying the important unanswered questions and avoiding dupli-
cation of effort . It can also spur collaboration among researchers who might otherwise pursue efforts 
in parallel .
62  http://www .foodrisk .org (last viewed 4/12/2008)
63  http://foodsafety .nal .usda .gov/ (last viewed 4/12/2008)
64  http://fsrio .nal .usda .gov/quicksearch .php (last viewed 2/28/08)
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The task of building and maintaining the database should be contracted out to an organization with 
the independence, credibility and technical competence to design and manage it in a way that meets 
the diverse needs of the community . In doing so, however, the government should make a long-term 
funding commitment to the database . Certainly, the progress and utility of the project should be 
evaluated over time, with provision for making changes or terminating it if not successful, but the 
one-time creation of a database that is not regularly updated would be of limited value . 
4. Conduct Targeted Analyses to Identify Knowledge and Information Gaps 
One of the primary reasons for creating a database on past, recent and ongoing research and data col-
lection is to support analyses of what is known about particular problems to better inform decisions 
about the further research and information collection needed to solve the problems . What is known 
about the hazards and possible interventions associated with leafy greens production, for example, 
suggests a host of questions about vectors of contamination and effective preventive measures that 
must be answered through well-targeted research and information collection . 
The proposed research database should make it easier for any entity in government, industry or 
academia to conduct analyses of the state of knowledge and knowledge gaps on key problems . To 
better inform all participants in the food safety system, however, the federal government, through 
the FSII Council and Stakeholders Forum or other mechanism, should take the lead in conducting or 
sponsoring targeted analyses of existing information in the research database . Such analyses might 
look for trends in research activities, unnecessary overlap in research, and significant research gaps . 
These analyses could be supplemented through what are termed “systematic reviews”— targeted 
in-depth reviews of the published scientific literature—to identify research priorities and data gaps 
in specific areas .65 Systematic reviews have the capacity to go deeper than any analysis of overall 
research activities by looking not only at the subjects of research, but the results . Systematic reviews 
may identify areas where similar research projects come to different conclusions or by which subtle 
differences in methods result in significant differences in results, indicating further research may be 
needed to reduce uncertainties or resolve disparities . As a form of meta-analysis, systematic reviews 
should use methodological standards to evaluate quality, as have been developed and utilized in the 
medical community .66
5. Initiate Dialogue to Prioritize Information Needs
Through the FSII Council and Stakeholder Forum or other mechanisms, the federal government 
should drive a continuing community-based and dialogue-oriented process to identify and prioritize 
the information needs of the food safety system . The proposed database and meta-analyses outlined 
above would support such a process, but many participants in our project workshops called for active 
dialogue among diverse stakeholders to better define information needs and priorities among actors 
in the food safety system . 
65   Denagamage TN, O’Connor AM, Sargeant JM, Rajić A, McKean JD . 2007 . “Efficacy of vaccination to reduce salmonella 
prevalence in live and slaughtered Swine: a systematic review of literature from 1979 to 2007 .” Foodborne Pathogens and Disease 
4(4):539-49 .
66   Sargeant JA, Torrence ME, Rajić A, O’Connor AM, Williams J . 2006 . Methodological quality assessment of review articles 
evaluating interventions to improve microbial food safety . Foodborne Pathogens and Disease 3(4): 447-456 .
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Such dialogue would help ensure, for example, that government baseline surveys of food contami-
nation are relevant and useful; that the information needed to address the most pressing problems is 
well defined; and that both government and academic food safety research more effectively meets the 
needs of food safety practitioners .
It would be neither desirable nor feasible to establish a single, centralized priority list of food safety 
information needs . The goal should not be to micro-manage research or to seek universal consensus . 
The food safety system’s stakeholders and their goals are too diverse, and research and data collection 
are likely to remain decentralized to a large degree . It should be possible, however, through an inclusive, 
continuing dialogue process to build a common understanding from a system-wide perspective of the 
most significant food safety problems and the information most urgently needed to address particular 
problems or categories of problems, such as the risks posed by important commodities or pathogens . 
Such dialogue and understanding would help alter the research and data collection priorities of par-
ticular institutions and lead to new opportunities to coordinate and collaborate on research to achieve 
shared goals . 
One approach to achieving such dialogue would be to hold an annual research and data collection 
conference, bringing representatives of major funding organizations together with representatives of 
regulatory and public health agencies, private industry, consumers and scientists from the research 
community . The conference should not be a simple research update with presentations on current 
and planned work but rather a focused and well-facilitated discussion of research and data collection 
required to solve current food safety problems, leading as much as possible to agreement on what 
needs to be done . It would be important to convene the conference annually because the challenges 
facing the food safety system evolve rapidly, and knowledge generation must evolve with them . An 
important contribution of such an annual conference is the building of relationships among diverse 
generators and users of food safety information, which can occur meaningfully only over a period of 
years . 
The ongoing work needed to prepare and conduct this dialogue process should be contracted out by 
the federal government to a neutral institution with the required scientific credibility and process 
management skills . 
6. Increase Access to Information and Publications Resulting 
from Publicly Funded Food Safety Research 
Data from publicly funded food safety research, including academic research, has potential public 
health value . They should not be considered the proprietary resource of the researcher, but rather a 
public resource that should be publicly available on a timely and complete basis, subject to some rea-
sonable protection of the researcher’s right to “first publication .”
Achieving this will require efforts by researchers, those who fund their work, and those who publish 
the results . We recommend the following: 
The academic and government research community, including individual researchers, should take the 
initiative to use online data repositories to supplement peer reviewed journal articles as the vehicle 
for publishing data from food safety research . This could include taking advantage of existing reposi-
tories, such as ComBase or FoodRisk .org, and developing new ones .
Public research funding agencies should mandate all peer reviewed journal articles for research that 
have been funded in full or in part through taxpayer dollars be made freely and publicly available 
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online within a year of original publication through agency-run repositories . Such a public access 
policy has recently been instituted at NIH .67 Congress should require this of other research funding 
agencies; foundations and other private funders of research should consider similar initiatives . 
Public agencies, research foundations and others who fund research and the collection of data should 
move to ensure complete data resulting from their investments, not just articles, are made available 
to others once the research projects are completed . One example of such a mandate is provided 
by genetics journals, most of which require researchers to submit their DNA sequences to NIH’s 
GenBank prior to publication .68 Funders should consider creating their own Web-based data reposi-
tories for their funded projects and should consider mandating and enforcing timelines for the online 
publication of data associated with research . Such deadlines would encourage researchers to publish 
their results promptly, to ensure that their articles are published prior to their data being available for 
others to analyze .
Publishers should make efforts to facilitate and promote greater use of data repositories for datasets 
associated with published articles, whether these repositories (or online supplements) are hosted 
in-house or elsewhere . Publishers might also consider making this sort of data publication a con-
dition of article publication . Similarly, publishers should consider alternatives to current practices 
that would make data available earlier and more broadly without hindering peer review . Such actions 
might include allowing authors to publish general information online or in other non-peer reviewed 
publications without invalidating the “first time published” rule of most journals . 
Publishers should also work to ensure broader access to articles . For example, they could increase the 
number of back issues available online to ensure current researchers do not replicate previous work . 
When possible, journal owners should consider moving toward an “open access” policy, such as is 
promoted by the non-profit Public Library of Science (PLoS), which publishes six peer reviewed online 
journals freely and openly accessible to the public .69 CDC’s Emerging Infectious Diseases journal is 
also publicly available in electronic format free of charge . Any of these changes will of course require 
alternative funding mechanisms to meet the unavoidable costs of journal publication . 
7. Increase Access to Industry-Generated Food Safety Information 
The food industry should work with government and academic researchers to identify specific 
problems whose solutions might be advanced by industry-generated information and find workable 
means to make such information available in an appropriate form .
Food processing companies and other entities within the food industry generate substantial infor-
mation on product and environmental contamination, intervention effectiveness, and other topics in 
the course of managing their production and food safety systems . Such information might also help 
improve food safety beyond the particular company’s operations . Government agencies, for example, 
might be able to use the information to better understand food safety problems and solutions, support 
specific policy decisions, ensure risk assessments represent real-world conditions, or aid outbreak 
67  http://publicaccess .nih .gov/ (last viewed 4/16/2008)
68  http://www .ncbi .nlm .nih .gov/Genbank/ (last viewed 3/28/2008)
69  http://www .plos .org/ (last viewed 3/28/2008)
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investigations . The research community might be able to use the information to pursue questions 
relevant to the private sector, as well as to the system as a whole .
The workshops identified serious technical and business constraints on the use of such information 
for purposes other than those for which it was originally collected . These constraints include the fact 
that diverse methods of collection and laboratory analysis make comparison and aggregation of such 
information difficult, if not impossible, and the legitimate business interest companies have in pro-
tecting proprietary or otherwise sensitive information .
Nevertheless, industry participants in the workshops expressed interest in collaborating with 
government agencies and academic researchers to identify specific problems for which industry 
information might be useful in devising solutions and exploring how it could be shared . In addition 
to addressing one or more specific problems, such collaboration and accompanying dialogue could 
result in more generalized “business rules” or agreed-upon principles that might govern the collection 
and access to industry information in the future . 
Conclusion
There are no panaceas for the problem of improving the FSII . Our project workshops and other 
outreach to the food safety community revealed, however, both high interest in the problem and 
many good ideas to help solve it . We hope the recommendations outlined here do justice to both the 
problem and possible solutions, and that they help foster change that can make a real difference for 




a p p e n d i x  a : 
w o r k s h o p a g e n d a s a n d p a r t i c i p a n t  l i s t s
The FSII Project convened four workshops to bring the food safety stakeholder community together 
to identify issues and discuss opportunities for improvement in the food safety information infra-
structure . The first three workshops focused on three key sectors of food safety information pro-
ducers and users—the public sector, the private sector and the research community—while the final 
workshop focused on the specific mechanisms for sharing or providing access to information . Each 
workshop was planned collaboratively with relevant cross-sections of the food safety community, 
who composed the workshop planning committees . CDC was a significant leader in planning the 
first workshop, while GMA helped organize and convene the second workshop . Researchers from 
numerous universities helped guide the third workshop, while the fourth was planned by a committee 
pulled from major food safety information sharing initiatives in government and academia .
This appendix provides the detailed agendas for the following four workshops, as well as a listing of 
participants who attended them (and their affiliations at the time):*
Workshop 1:  Public Sector Food Safety Data Collection, Access and Sharing
 November 2-3, 2006, Decatur, GA, 51 participants
Workshop 2: Industry Interests and Issues
 December 13, 2006, Washington, DC, 26 participants
Workshop 3:  The Research Community’s Role in Collection, Access and 
 Sharing of Food Safety Information
 February 1, 2007, Baltimore, MD, 24 participants
Workshop 4: Mechanisms for Improved Food Safety Data Access and Sharing
 March 2, 2007, Washington, DC, 34 participants
* More materials from these workshops are available at http://www .thefsrc .org/FSII/events .htm
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Workshop 1: Public Sector Food Safety  




The goals of this workshop are to: (1) foster cross-sector dialogue among public and private stake-
holders on their shared interests in improving the food safety information infrastructure (FSII) as 
it operates in the public sector, (2) develop a deeper understanding of key topics stakeholders have 
selected as important to improving the FSII, and (3) identify and analyze specific, realistic opportu-
nities to improve the FSII . 
The workshop will include about 50 invited participants from federal, state and local government; the 
food industry; academia and the research community; and the public health and public interest com-
munities . It will be conducted in a roundtable format to promote discussion among all participants . 
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2
7:30 – 8:30 Breakfast
 Continental breakfast to be served outside of meeting room
8:30 – 9:00 am Introduction
 Led by:  Mike Taylor, University of Maryland School of Medicine 




9:00 – 10:30 am  Session 1: Public Health Illness Surveillance: How Can It Better Meet 
Stakeholder Needs?
 Led by:  Chris Braden, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Kelly Hise, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Elaine Scallan, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Rob Tauxe, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
  Using FoodNet, OutbreakNet (including eFORS, the Electronic Foodborne 
Outbreak Reporting System) and PulseNet as examples to focus the 
discussion, this session intends to stimulate discussion about how national 
systems of foodborne illness surveillance can better meet stakeholder needs . It 
will engage participants in discussion of such questions as:
•		 	What	do	stakeholders	need	from	the	foodborne	illness	surveillance	systems	
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•		 	How	might	the	timeliness	and	depth	of	access	to	foodborne	illness	sur-
veillance data be improved?
•	 	What	are	the	key	constraints	(e.g.,	legal,	policy,	bureaucratic,	resource)	on	
CDC’s ability to collect, report and share data from different surveillance 
systems?
•	 	What	are	the	realistic	opportunities	to	overcome	constraints?	
10:30 – 10:45 am Break
10:45 – 12:00 pm Session 1 (Continued): Public Health Illness Surveillance
12:00 – 1:00 pm Lunch
1:00 – 3:00 pm  Session 2: Frontline Management: Data Needs of State and 
Local Government
 Led by:  Rob Blake, DeKalb County Board of Health, Georgia 
Dale Morse, New York State Department of Health
State and local government agencies are on the food safety frontline in 
detecting and investigating individual cases and outbreaks, preparing for 
emerging problems (including intentional contamination), and implementing 
prevention and control measures . This session will explore opportunities to 
improve their access to the data they need by addressing these questions:
•	 	What	do	state	and	local	officials	see	as	their	key	unmet	data	needs	for	the	
detection, investigation, prevention and control of foodborne illnesses, 





regulatory, and agricultural agencies, and related laboratories, at the state 
and local levels? 
•	 	In	multi-jurisdictional	outbreak	situations,	what	particular	obstacles	to	data	
access and sharing arise? How can they be overcome?
3:00 – 3:15 pm Break
3:15 – 5:00 pm Session 3: Regulatory Data: Can It Have Utility for Other Purposes?
 Led by:  Paul Allwood, Minnesota Department of Health 
Margaret Glavin, Office of Regulatory Affairs, FDA 
Loren Lange, Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA
Federal, state, and local regulatory agencies collect substantial food safety data 
through their inspection, compliance, and monitoring programs that at least 
potentially could be useful to other stakeholders . The purpose of this session is 
to explore whether and how such regulatory data might have broader uses to 
improve food safety by addressing such questions as:
•	 	What	do	other	public	and	private	stakeholders	see	as	the	potential	utility	of	
regulatory food safety data for non-regulatory purposes?




local agencies, what efforts or changes in current practice would be needed 
to make regulatory data useful for other purposes? 
•	 	What	are	the	chief	constraints	(e.g.,	legal,	regulatory,	resource)	on	improving	




7:30 – 8:30 Breakfast
 Continental breakfast to be served outside of meeting room
8:30 – 10:00 am  Session 4: System-Wide Management: Meeting Data Needs for a Systems 
Approach to Food Safety
 Led by: Michael Batz, University of Maryland School of Medicine
Risk managers in the public and private sectors seek to understand the causes 
and opportunities for prevention of foodborne illness on a farm-to-table 
“systems” basis, whether to better allocate resources, target interventions, or 
manage supply chains . A systems approach requires data, however, that no 
one participant in the system may have incentive or capability to generate and 
share . This session will explore needs and opportunities for improving the 
public sector role in collection of and access to such data, by considering these 
questions: 
•	 	What	are	the	priority	needs	of	public	and	private	stakeholders	for	data	to	
support a systems approach to improving food safety?
•	 	In	general,	what	roles	and	responsibilities	is	it	reasonable	to	expect	federal	









to improving food safety? 
•	 	What	are	the	obstacles	and	opportunities	at	the	state	and	local	level	for	
generating and sharing such data? 
10:00 – 10:15 am Break
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10:15 – 10:30 am Discussion of Draft FSII Survey
Led by: Jan Powell, University of Maryland School of Medicine
10:30 – 12:00 pm Session 5: Standardization of Data Collection and Reporting
 Led by: Glenn Morris, University of Maryland School of Medicine
There is wide diversity among agencies at all levels of government in how food 
safety data are collected and reported, including differences in sampling pro-
tocols, testing technology and procedure, pathogen coding and other nomen-
clature issues, and reporting formats and systems . It is widely recognized that 
greater standardization in these areas is a foundational step toward improving 
data access and the utility of data for multiple purposes . The opportunity 
to make progress in this area will be explored in this session by asking such 
questions as: 
•	 	Why	pursue	standardization?	What	are	the	interests	and	realistic	goals	that	





nities for overcoming them?
12:00 – 1:00 pm Lunch
1:00 – 2:30 pm  Concluding Discussion: Key Opportunities for Improving Public Data 
Collection, Access and Sharing
 Led by: Mike Taylor, University of Maryland School of Medicine
This concluding discussion will produce an inventory of opportunities for 
improving the public sector role in the FSII, including “outside the box” ideas 
for addressing issues and taking advantage of opportunities identified in the 
workshop and a realistic appraisal of productive next steps . 
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Workshop 1 Participant List
Federal Government
Yvette Alonso
Coordinator, Food Safety Information Center
National Agricultural Library
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Sean Altekruse
Deputy Executive Associate
Office of Policy, Program, and Employee Development
Food Safety and Inspection Service
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Fredrick Angulo
Chief, FoodNet/NARMS Unit
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Tracy Ayers
 Surveillance Epidemiologist, Outbreak Response 
and Surveillance Unit
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Richard Barnes
Director, Division of Federal-State Relations
Office of Regulatory Affairs
Food and Drug Administration
Susan Bernard
Associate Director for Regulations
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
Food and Drug Administration
Chris Braden
Chief, Outbreak Response and Surveillance Unit
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Gary Dykstra
Regional Food and Drug Director, Atlanta
Food and Drug Administration
Laurie Farmer
Special Assistant to the RFDD/Atlanta
Food and Drug Administration
Peter Gerner-Smidt
Chief, Enteric Laboratory Response Branch*
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Kelley Hise 
PulseNet Database Team Leader
Enteric Laboratory Response Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Kristin Holt
FSIS Liaison to CDC
Food Safety and Inspection Service
U .S . Department of Agriculture
William Jordan
Senior Policy Advisor




Office of Public Health and Science
Food Safety and Inspection Service
U .S . Department of Agriculture
John Martin
Food and Agriculture Sector Specialist
U .S . Department of Homeland Security
Ellen Olson
Division of Field Science
Office of Regulatory Affairs
Food and Drug Administration
Mary Patrick
Senior Project Coordinator, FoodNet 
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Morrie Potter
Lead Scientist for Epidemiology
And CFSAN Liaison to CDC
Food and Drug Administration
Elaine Scallan
Chief, FoodNet
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Donald J. Sharp
Acting Director, Food Safety Office
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Robert Tauxe
Acting Deputy Division Director
Division of Foodborne Bacterial and Mycotic Disease* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Kathryn Teates
Senior Analytical Epidemiologist, FoodNet 
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Rachel Woodruff
Surveillance Epidemiologist, Outbreak Response and 
Surveillance Unit
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch* 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention




Public Health Law Program
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Don Zink
Senior Food Scientist
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
Food and Drug Administration 
* proposed branch name
State Government
Marion Aller
Director, Division of Food Safety




Minnesota Department of Health
Becky Dawson
Director, Environmental Health Services
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
Frances Downes
Laboratory Director
Michigan Department of Community Health
Yvonne Hale
Chief, Bureau of Food Laboratories
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
Timothy Jones
Deputy State Epidemiologist
Tennessee Department of Health
William Krueger
Director, Laboratory Services Division
Minnesota State Department of Agriculture
J.P. Lofgren
State Epidemiologist
Alabama Department of Public Health
Dale Morse
Director, Office of Science and Public Health 
New York State Department of Health
Local Government
Robert Blake
Director, Division of Environmental Health 
DeKalb County (Ga .) Board of Health 
Michelle Chuk 
Senior Advisor for Environmental Health
National Association of County & City Health Officials 
Michele Samarya-Timm 
Public Health Educator
Franklin County Township (N .J .) Health Department
Industry
Mike Robach
Vice President, Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affairs 
Cargill
Jenny Scott
Vice President, Food Safety Programs
Grocery Manufacturers Association


























Consumer Federation of America
Dave Ross
Director
Public Health Informatics Institute
Juliana Ruzante
Western Institute for Food Safety and Security 








Director, Food Safety Policy Center
Michigan State University
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Workshop 2: Industry Interests and Issues
December 13, 2006
Washington, DC
Meeting Goals and Agenda
The FSII Workshop on Food Industry Interests and Issues is being organized in collaboration with the 
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) and will examine the role of the food industry in the food 
safety information infrastructure . The workshop goals are to:
Understand how food industry data needs can be better met through interaction within the private •	
sector and among industry, government, and academic institutions; and
Understand whether and how industry-generated food safety data might be useful to and could be •	
shared with other stakeholders, public and private, to improve food safety .
To facilitate discussion, this invitation-only workshop will be limited to 30 participants, with the 
majority drawn from the food production, processing, and retail industries, and the balance from 
government, academia, public health, and consumer organizations . 
8:30-9:00 Introductions and Background 
(led by Craig Henry and Mike Taylor)
Welcome and introductions of participants
Brief background on and status of the FSII project
Review of agenda and goals for the workshop 
9:00-10:30 Industry Data Collection, Data Needs, and Perspectives 
(led by Randy Huffman and Jenny Scott)
This 90-minute session will include three brief presentations that provide 
background on food industry data collection and data needs and industry 
perspectives on opportunities to improve the food safety information 
infrastructure .
•	 	Current	practices	in	food	safety	data	collection,	including	types	and	





10:45- 12:15 Opportunities to Better Meet Food Industry Data Needs
(led by Bill Sveum and Tim Freier)
This is a discussion session that is intended to elicit ideas from all participants 
about how food industry data needs can be better met . Questions for 
discussion include:
•	 	What	are	the	food	industry’s	highest	priority,	unmet	food	safety	data	needs?
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•	 	What	sources	or	combination	of	sources—industry,	government,	or	
academia—are best suited to meet these needs?
•	 	How	specifically	could	industry	data	needs	be	better	met	through	improving	
practices and interactions involving:
 Industry colleagues and groups?
 Government surveillance, research, and regulatory agencies at all levels?
 Academic researchers and institutions? 
12:15-1:15 Lunch
1:15-3:00 Opportunities for Wider Sharing of Food Industry Data 
(led by Craig Henry and Catherine Woteki)
This discussion is intended to assess whether and under what circumstances 
industry-generated food safety data could be shared within industry and 
with other food safety stakeholders for purposes of improving food safety . 




etc .) on industry sharing of food safety data?
•	 	For	what	purposes	and	under	what	conditions	might	food	industry	sharing	
of data be possible?
3:00-3:15 Coffee Break
3:15-4:30 Synthesis and Possible Next Steps
(led by Pat Verduin and Mike Taylor)
The purpose of this session is to distill as many concrete ideas as possible for 
practical steps that could be taken to improve how the food industry interacts 
with the food safety information infrastructure to improve food safety . 
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Consumer Federation of America
Government
Paul Allwood
Minnesota Department of Health
Sean Altekruse 
Food Safety and Inspection Service
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Richard Barnes
Office of Regulatory Affairs
U .S . Food and Drug Administration
Susan Bernard
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
U .S . Food and Drug Administration
Bob Buchanan
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
U .S . Food and Drug Administration
Loren Lange
Food Safety and Inspection Service
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Ellen Olson 
Office of Regulatory Affairs
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Workshop 3: Research Community Role in Collection, 
Access and Sharing of Food Safety Information
February 1, 2007
Baltimore, MD
Meeting Goals and Agenda
This workshop will bring together members of the academic, government, and private sector research 
community and other stakeholders to discuss the important role of the research community in gen-
erating, making accessible, and actively sharing data for the purpose of improving food safety . The 
goals of the workshop are to: (1) discuss research roles and agenda setting, (2) identify data needs 
within the research community, (3) discuss issues related to making data generated through research 
accessible and timely, and (4) identify realistic opportunities to enhance how research data are col-
lected, made accessible, and actively shared to improve food safety . 
7:30-8:30 am Breakfast
8:30-9:00 am Introduction and Background




9:00-10:30 am   The food safety research agenda: What is the role of the research community in the 
food safety information infrastructure?
 Led by:  Bob Buchanan, Food and Drug Administration 
Dave Gombas, United Fresh Produce Association 
John Sofos, Colorado State University
The food safety research community is comprised of diverse public and private 
institutions that necessarily respond to diverse incentives and mandates . The 
purpose of this session is to review the roles of these institutions, understand 
how their research priorities and agendas are set, and discuss strengths and 
weaknesses in how current food safety research contributes to the goal of 
improving food safety . Three brief presentations will provide background on 
food safety research in academia, government, and the private sector .
Questions for discussion:
•	 	What	are	the	distinct	roles	of	each	research	sector	in	the	generation,	use	and	




of the research community?
appendix a: workshop agendas and participant lists
| 100 |
•	 	What	are	the	key	constraints	on	improving	the	quantity	and	quality	of	food	
safety data generated by the food safety research community?
•	 	What	are	the	key	opportunities	for	improvement?
10:30-10:45 am Coffee Break
10:45-12:15 pm  Data needs of the food safety research community
 Led by:  Julie Caswell, University of Massachusetts 
 Jan Singleton, Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension 
 Service/USDA 
 Chris Wozniak, Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension 
 Service/USDA
Each research sector or institution often needs data generated by other research 
institutions or non-research generators of food safety data, such as regulatory 
agencies and the private sector, to fulfill their food safety agenda . This requires 
an awareness of and ready access to potential data sources . The purpose of 
this session is to discuss the food safety research community’s data needs and 







information it needs? 
•	 	What	are	there	realistic	opportunities	to	improve	the	research	commu-
nity’s awareness of and access to data collected by the government, other 
researchers, and the private sector? 
12:15-1:15 pm Lunch
1:15-3:00 pm  Accessibility and timeliness of data generated by the research community
 Led by:  Linda Harris, University of California, Davis 
Tim Jones, Tennessee Department of Health 
John Sofos, Colorado State University 
The purpose of this session is to discuss how food safety information generated 
by the research community is made available to stakeholders . 
Questions for discussion:
•	 	What	 are	 the	 strengths	 and	weaknesses	 of	 current	 approaches	 to	 dissemi-
nating food safety data generated by the research community?
•	 	What	are	the	constraints	for	improving	the	timeliness	and	accessibility	of	data	
generated by the research community?
•	 	What	are	the	opportunities	for	improving	the	timeliness	of	and	access	to	data	
generated by the research community? 
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3:00-3:15 pm Coffee Break
3:15-4:30 pm Synthesis and Possible Next Steps
 Led by: Mike Taylor, UMB
 Jan Powell, UMB
 Michael Batz, UMB
The goal of this session is to review critical issues identified by the research community with respect 
to generation, use and sharing of food safety information, and to create a list of realistic opportunities 
to enhance the role of research in improving food safety .
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Workshop 3 Participant List
Academia and Research
Michael Batz
University of Maryland School of Medicine 
Christine Bruhn










University of Maryland School of Medicine 
Jan Powell
University of Maryland School of Medicine 
Mike Taylor





Food Safety and Inspection Service/USDA 
Bob Buchanan
Food and Drug Administration
Loren Lange 




 Cooperative State Research, Education and 
Extension Service/USDA 
Tara Smith
National Agricultural Library/ USDA
Chris Wozniak
Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension 
Service/USDA
State and Local Government
Tim Jones
Tennessee Department of Health 
Consumer
Farida Bhuiya
Center for Science in the Public Interest
Donna Rosenbaum
Safe Tables Our Priority (S .T .O .P .)
Industry
Dave Gombas
United Fresh Produce Association
Craig Henry
Grocery Manufacturers Association 
Marie Latulippe
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Workshop 4: Mechanisms for Improved  
Food Safety Data Access and Sharing
March 2, 2007
Washington, DC
Meeting Goals and Agenda
This small invite-only workshop will bring together members of the food safety community to discuss 
possible improvements in the means by which food safety information is shared or made accessible . 
We hope for around 30 participants and presenters, including representatives of federal, state, and 
local government agencies, the private sector, the research community, and consumers .
The first three workshops in the FSII project focused on the major parties collecting and sharing 
data—federal, state, and local agencies in the public sector, firms and associations in the private 
sector, and academics and others in the research community—whereas this workshop will focus on 
the “mechanisms” that facilitate the sharing of data among these and other parties . The “mechanisms” 
are often technological in nature, such as data networks or Web sites, but are reliant on agreements 
and understandings between institutions or organizations that are inherently non-technological . 
Thus, the workshop will discuss not only the possibilities and limitations of technological solutions 
for data sharing, but also the underlying conditions that will work to enable or preclude their devel-
opment and/or success . The workshop is focused around a small number of concrete examples 
of current mechanisms to ensure a practical discussion of the issues . The first two sessions of the 
workshop are focused on discussing aspects of seven mechanisms for information sharing and access . 
A third session furthers these discussions, while a fourth session focuses on the institutional roles and 
resource needs with respect to developing and maintaining such mechanisms . The ultimate goal of the 
workshop is to develop specific, realistic ideas for how information systems and other mechanisms 
can be further developed to improve data access and information sharing . 
7:30 – 8:30 am Breakfast
8:30 – 9:00 am Introduction and Background
Welcome and introductions of participants
Brief background on and status of the FSII project
Review of agenda and goals for the workshop 
9:00 – 10:15 am   Databases and electronic networks: Information systems for 
improved food safety
Presentations:
eLEXNET (Electronic Laboratory Exchange Network) 
—Ellen Olson, Office of Regulatory Affairs, FDA
eFORS (Electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System)  
—Tracy Ayers, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
ComBase (Combined Database for Food Microbiology) & PMP (Pathogen 
Modeling Program)  
—Vijay Juneja, Agricultural Research Service, USDA
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This session will focus on how information systems—such as databases and 
electronic networks—foster information sharing and access . Put simply, infor-
mation systems are means for recording, storing, and integrating information 
in a single place . They may connect different kinds of data, or the same data 
type collected in different places, by different parties, or over time . The goal of 
the session is to use three examples to learn some practical lessons applicable 
to the broader FSII, such as when certain approaches are likely to be useful, 





opment and subsequent use of the mechanism? How have they been 
overcome?
•	 	What	factors	(legal,	policy,	business,	technical,	resources,	etc)	most	













10:15 – 10:30 am Break
10:30 – 12:00 pm  Food Safety Web Sites and Listservs: Using the Internet to Share and 
Disseminate Information
Presentations: 
Foodrisk.org (formerly the JIFSAN Food Safety Risk Analysis Clearinghouse)  
—Steven Gendel, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA
Food Safety Information at the National Agricultural Laboratory  
—Yvette Alonso, National Agricultural Library, USDA
International Food Safety Network  
—Doug Powell, Kansas State University
FoodSHIELD 
—William Krueger, Minnesota Department of Agriculture
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This session will focus on the use of Web sites to foster the sharing of and 
access to information . Whereas the first session will target databases and 
electronic networks, the purpose here is to discuss the use of the Web in a 
broader context . Web sites can be used in a number of ways: as repositories for 
data, as gateways or hubs to track information, to filter news and information 
related to food safety, or to improve avenues of communication . The goal of 
the session is to use four examples to learn some practical lessons applicable 
to the broader FSII, such as when certain approaches are likely to be useful, 





opment and subsequent use of the mechanism? How have they been 
overcome?
•	 	What	factors	(legal,	policy,	business,	technical,	resources,	etc)	most	













12:00 – 12:45 pm Lunch
12:45 – 1:30 pm Discussion: Databases, Electronic Networks, and Food Safety Web Sites
 Led by: Mike Batz
This session is intended to continue the conversations begun in the morning . 
The goal is to broaden the discussion beyond the seven example mechanisms . 
Central questions to be discussed in this session include:
•	 	What	is	the	current	and	potential	utility	of	databases,	electronic	networks,	
Web sites, and other information systems for improving food safety?
•	 	What	are	the	key	factors	(legal,	policy,	business,	technical,	resources,	etc)	
limiting the utility of such mechanisms, both inherently and as seen in 
current practice? 
•	 	What	does	experience	to	date	suggest	about	how	these	mechanisms	can	be	
more useful in the future?
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1:30 – 2:45 pm  Institutional roles and resource needs: Who will build mechanisms, and how 
will they be funded?
 Led by: Mike Taylor
This session will focus on the real challenges of institutional roles and resource 
constraints in moving forward to improve the food safety information infra-
structure . Databases, electronic networks, Web sites, public-use data sets, 
and other mechanisms may be the technological means by which data are 
shared, but their success is reliant upon solid agreements between parties, 
incentives among participants to ensure their active use, and commitments 
for the resources necessary to develop and maintain them . This is a par-
ticularly difficult problem given the number of stakeholders and institutions 
involved across the public, private, research, and consumer sectors, and the 
diversity of missions and funding realities among these institutions . Likewise, 
improvements to the system may be in numerous parties’ interest, but it is 
unclear who can, could, or should take the lead in making improvements, or 







what institution(s) should take the lead in developing mechanisms?
•	 	What	role	can	third	parties—namely	institutions	or	agencies	other	than	
those responsible for data collection—play in improving broader sharing of 
these data?
•	 	What	opportunities	and	obstacles	exist	for	funding	of	improvements	to	the	
food safety information infrastructure?
2:45 – 3:00 pm Break
3:00 – 3:45 pm Synthesis and Next Steps 
 Led by: Mike Taylor and Mike Batz
The goals of this final session are to (1) identify the most critical issues 
affecting the use of technological and non-technological mechanisms for food 
safety data access and sharing, and (2) create a list of realistic opportunities on 
which further effort may be fruitful .
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Workshop 4 Participant List
Federal Government
Yvette Alonso
Coordinator, Food Safety Information Center
National Agricultural Library
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Tracy Ayers
Analytic Epidemiologist
 Enteric Diseases Epidemiology Branch 
 (proposed branch name) 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Bob Buchanan
Director, Office of Science
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
U .S . Food and Drug Administration
Steven Gendel
Knowledge Manager, FoodRisk .org
Interdisciplinary Scientist
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
U .S . Food and Drug Administration
Vijay Juneja
Lead Scientist, Microbial Food Safety Research Unit
Eastern Regional Research Center
Agricultural Research Service 
U .S . Department of Agriculture
David LaBarre
Risk Analyst
Office of Public Health Science
Food Safety and Inspection Service  
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Jimmy Liu
Food Safety Information Specialist
National Agricultural Library
U .S . Department of Agriculture
John Luchansky
Research Leader, Microbial Food Safety Research Unit
Eastern Regional Research Center
Agricultural Research Service 
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Cristina McLaughlin
Economist
Office of Regulations and Policy
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
U .S . Food and Drug Administration
Ellen Olson
Scientific Coordinator, Division of Field Science
Office of Regulatory Affairs 
U .S . Food and Drug Administration
Elaine Scallan
Chief, FoodNet
Enteric Disease Epidemiology Branch 
 (proposed branch name)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Tara Smith
Food Safety Information Specialist
National Agricultural Library 
U .S . Department of Agriculture
Alice Thaler
Senior Director for Program Services
Office of Public Health Science
Food Safety and Inspection Service 
U .S . Department of Agriculture
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State and Local Government
Becky Smullin Dawson
Director, Environmental Health Policy
 Association of State and Territorial Health 
 Officials (ASTHO)
David Gifford 
 Section Manager, Office of Environmental Health 
 and Safety
Division of Environmental Health
Washington State Department of Health 
Heather Green
Food Safety Program Manager
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL)
Roberta Hammond
Coordinator, Food and Waterborne Disease 
Bureau of Community Environmental Health 
Florida Department of Health
William Krueger
Director, Laboratory Services Division
Minnesota State Department of Agriculture
George Zameska 
 Food Program Manager, Bureau of Community 
 Hygiene
Food Safety & Hygiene Inspection Services
Washington D .C . Department of Health
Academic Research Community
Michael Batz
Executive Director, Food Safety Research Consortium
Health Program Director
University of Maryland School of Medicine
Michael Doyle
Director, Center for Food Safety




Resources for the Future
Doug Powell





University of Maryland School of Medicine
Dave Ross
Director
Public Health Informatics Institute
Marin Schweizer
Graduate Student
University of Maryland School of Medicine
Mike Taylor
Chair, Food Safety Research Consortium
Professor
University of Maryland School of Medicine
Ewen Todd









Center for Science in the Public Interest
Sarah Klein
Staff Attorney, Food Safety Program
Center for Science in the Public Interest
Morris Rodenstein
Executive Director
Safe Tables Our Priority (S .T .O .P .)
Donna Rosenbaum
Co-Founder and Board Member
Safe Tables Our Priority (S .T .O .P .) 
Chris Waldrop
Director, Food Policy Institute
Consumer Federation of America 
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 a p p e n d i x  b : 
t y p e s  o f  f o o d  s a f e t y  i n f o r m a t i o n
To illustrate the universe of food safety information that is collected and used by the many insti-
tutions of the FSII, we have created a two-tier typology, as shown in Table B .1 . This typology, which 
includes 32 specific types of information in eight broad categories, is intended to give a sense of the 
diversity of information generated through data collection, research and analysis . The typology does 
not capture the broader approaches used to convey the information, such as educational outreach or 
guidance documents, but focuses on the data upon which such efforts are based. Furthermore, it is far 
from exhaustive and oversimplifies the many methodological approaches and scientific disciplines that 
underlie an effective food safety system. 
In this appendix, we provide further explanation of the eight broad categories of food safety infor-
mation—including which institutions tend to gather them–and present descriptions and examples of 
the 32 more narrowly defined types of information that encompass these categories .
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Table B.1—Food Safety Information Typology
















Hazard Identification Pathogen Subtyping 
Pathogen Biology
Food Toxicology




Trade and Industry Facilities and Processes 






Consumers and Workers Food Consumption 
Consumer & Worker Behavior
Risk Perception/Communication 
Population and Demographics
Food and Environment Food Composition & Characteristics Environmental Characteristics
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Human Health 
The primary goal of the food safety system is to protect human health . Information on human health 
outcomes, therefore, is one of the most important categories of information required to ensure food 
safety . We describe five types of human health information in Table B .2 . 
Table B.2—Types of Information on Human Health
1.  Illness Surveillance Surveillance of human illnesses, including those from outbreaks or sporadic 
cases, adverse event reporting data, laboratory-confirmed testing data, patient 
characteristics (age, gender), basic patient outcomes (hospitalization, death), 
including underreporting information
2. Medical/Clinical Details on illness beyond incidence, including percent who have certain 
conditions, treatment options, etc, such as symptoms, severities, outcomes, 
durations, drug treatments, etc
3. Host Factors Characteristics of persons that affect whether or not they may become 
ill—age, gender, race, diet, immunocompromised (e.g. AIDS), existing medical 
conditions
4. Attribution Connecting human illnesses with sources of illness (beyond etiology) such 
as food vehicles or animal reservoirs (food attribution), contributing factors, 
location of food preparation and consumption, or other risk factors.
5. Health Valuation Valuing illness in monetary or HRQL (Health Related Quality of Life) measures. 
Economic data include medical costs, productivity losses, & willingness-to-pay, 
while HRQL include QALYs, DALYs, etc
Human data are collected primarily by local and state health departments, through passive or active 
surveillance and outbreak investigations, with CDC providing support to this data collection and 
compiling information on a national basis . Follow-up case-control studies by federal agencies or 
academia provide a further method of increasing the richness of human health information collected 
after sporadic illnesses or outbreaks . Human health data provide information on the incidence and 
severity of foodborne illness, attribution of illnesses to particular pathogens and foods, the economic 
costs of illness and the valuation of health outcomes in dollars or QALYs . Human health information 
permits both government and private sector risk managers to target their food safety efforts on the 
most significant illnesses, food vehicles and risk factors . They can also be used to follow disease trends 
over time, which may help determine the public health efficacy of food safety interventions . 
Measurements of Contamination
Of increasing importance to preventive efforts in food safety are measurements of contamination of 
food, animals, plants, and the near-environment throughout the farm-to-Table Bontinuum . These 
types of information include testing for microbial, chemical or other hazards in the pre- and post-
harvest stages of food processing, in terms of prevalence or levels . Four types of measurements of 
contamination are shown in Table B .3 . 
Table B.3—Types of Information on Measurements of Contamination
6.  Microbial 
Contamination
Prevalence or levels (counts) of pathogens measured on live food animals or 
plants (e.g. measurements taken from flocks of animals, or on the vegetable 
farm prior to processing), on animals post-slaughter or plants post-harvest (e.g. 
during processing, packaging, transportation, retail, in the kitchen), or from 
the environment (e.g. in public water, the air, in animal feed, on processor 
equipment, on cutting board)
7.  Chemical 
Contamination
Prevalence or levels of chemical residues (antibiotics, pesticides, sulfon-
amides, etc) on live food animals or plants (e.g. measurements taken from 
flocks of animals, or on the vegetable farm), animals post-slaughter or plants 
post-harvest (e.g. processing, packaging, retail, in preparation), or from 
the environment (e.g. in public water, the air, in animal feed, on processor 
equipment, on cutting board)
8. Other Contamination Prevalence or levels on post-slaughter animals or post-harvest plants of 
contaminants other than pathogens or chemicals, such as naturally occurring 
contaminants, metals, physical objects, rodent excreta, insect parts, radionu-
clides, etc.
9.  Contamination of 
imports
Prevalence or levels of pathogens or chemical residues (antibiotics, pesticides, 
etc) measured on imported food or at point of production or processing in 
source countries
Contamination data are collected by local, state and federal agencies as a routine part of their 
inspection and compliance activities, as well as through planned surveys or studies to determine 
baseline prevalence of pathogens or chemicals in particular foods and measure trends over time . Food 
producers and processors also collect chemical and microbial contamination data for their own food 
safety management purposes, to meet regulatory requirements, or satisfy customer requirements 
and third-party audits . For government, industry and researchers, contamination data are critical 
to understanding the hazards that must be addressed in particular commodities or production and 
processing systems, determining changes in prevalence of pathogens or chemicals over time, and 
assessing the effectiveness of interventions .
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Indicators of Contamination 
Certain observations made and actions taken by government agencies can serve as indirect indi-
cators or signals of contamination problems, either in combination with or in the absence of direct 
measurements of contamination made through testing . Three broad types of indicators are shown in 
Table B .4 .
Table B.4—Types of Information on Indicators of Contamination
10.  Animal Health/
Disposition
Information on animal illnesses—animal diseases and health issues including 
reports of when animals are condemned as unfit for human consumption (ante 
mortem or post mortem).
11.  Recalls and 
Violations
Information on foods recalled due to pathogen or chemical contamination, 
or data on firm violations of regulatory standards for pathogens or chemical 
residues
12.  Sanitation and 
Inspection
Combination of environmental data and sanitation behavior throughout 
food production, processing, storage, and preparation, including retail 
establishments and restaurants
These indirect indicators provide an additional source of food safety information both government and 
industry can use to understand potential hazards and plan interventions . For example, animal health 
and disposition data, which are collected as part of federal meat and poultry slaughter inspection, in 
addition to observations made during sanitation inspections conducted at retail and in processing 
establishments, can help identify conditions and practices that may relate to potential food safety 
problems .
Similarly, it may be possible to learn from information gathered from voluntary food recalls or other 
violations of regulatory standards . One might be able to draw from these information trends or 
patterns that can improve understanding of food safety problems and solutions .
Information on process controls (such as time/temperature data) may also serve to indicate a 
potential hazard, as can “systems” models using predictive microbiology . These types of information 
are described later .
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Hazard Identification 
The ability to detect and understand characteristics of foodborne hazards is crucial for both gov-
ernment and industry in designing effective prevention and control measures, and considerable effort 
is invested by government, industry and academic scientists to develop tools and generate data for 
this purpose . Three broad types of such tools and information are described in Table B .5 .
Table B.5—Types of Information on Hazard Identification
13.  Detection Methods Research into methods for the detection and quantification of pathogens, 
toxins, and chemical residues on foods, animals, or in environments, including 
information on test sensitivity and specificity.
14.  Pathogen 
Subtyping
Microbial fingerprinting for detailed identification of isolates, including pheno-
typing and genotyping: serology, phage typing, PFGE, etc. Method is used in 
prevalence testing, for source attribution, etc.
15.  Pathogen Biology Understanding pathogen characteristics, namely factors influencing pathogen 
survival, growth, virulence traits, and emergence (e.g. microbial genetics, 
microbial ecology, epidemiology), including information on antimicrobial 
resistance.
16. Food Toxicology Understanding toxicological makeup of foods, including the factors during 
production, processing, and preparation of food that influence the generation 
or elimination of toxins in the consumed product.
Improved detection methods are in demand by both government and industry . The purpose of 
developing new and improved detection methodologies is to increase the sensitivity (ability to detect 
small amounts) and specificity (accurately identifying specific chemical or microbial contaminants) 
of tests, as well as increase the volume of testing a laboratory can conduct (throughput), and decrease 
the time and expense associated with running tests . Government efforts also focus on standardization 
of sampling and laboratory methodologies, which allows for the comparison of similarly collected test 
results obtained by different laboratories .
Molecular fingerprinting of pathogens (i .e ., determining pathogen subtypes) is instrumental in 
outbreak investigations . Investigators may use subtyping of clinical isolates to identify and group the 
victims of a specific contamination event, especially in national or multi-state outbreak situations, as 
has been done using PFGE patterns through CDC’s PulseNet . When two individuals become ill due to 
the same specific strain at the same time, it is highly probably that they share a common cause . 
Similarly, microbial fingerprinting can be used to confirm the food vehicle when the clinical subtype 
is the same as the subtype found on a tested food . For certain pathogens and strains, subtyping can 
be used to identify the animal reservoir for that strain, which can be used in attribution analysis . Sub-
typing is also important for determining the incidence and prevalence of very specifically identified 
groups of organisms and tracking them in the environment and within human populations .
The study of pathogen biology is principally carried out by government and academia to provide 
information on how pathogens cause harm and function and survive in the environment . This 
information is critical to understanding foodborne hazards . It is used in predictive models used by 
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industry to manage food safety controls and in risk assessments produced by government to evaluate 
public health impacts or define performance standards . It is also used in the development of new 
intervention strategies for both preventing and treating foodborne illness . Chemical toxicity testing 
and toxicology research are important activities of government, industry and academia and provide 
information critical to safety assessments of chemicals in food .
Modeling
Increasingly, computer modeling is an important tool for food safety . Risk assessments are used by 
government to evaluate the predicted public health benefits associated with regulatory policies (such 
as process performance standards or the allocation of inspection resources) . Likewise, industry may 
use models that incorporate predictive microbiology and information on process controls to manage 
their systems . We use the generic term “modeling” to encompass the breadth of analyses that can be 
used to predict hazard behavior in an environment or to assess risk to human health of such hazards . 
Four broad types of analyses are described in Table B .6 .
Table B.6—Types of Information on Modeling
17.  Predictive 
Microbiology
Quantitative modeling of pathogens in various food environments used to 
estimate bacterial growth, decline, or inactivation under various conditions, 
namely those relevant to food production, processing, distribution, and storage; 
based largely upon pathogen biology studies described previously
18.  Hazard 
Characterization
(Dose-Response Modeling) The qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation of the 
nature of the adverse health effects associated with biological, chemical and 
physical agents which may be present in food.* May be based upon laboratory 
or epidemiologic studies. 
19.  Exposure 
Assessment
The qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation of the likely intake of biological, 
chemical, and physical agents via food or other sources.* These may be based 
upon “systems” models that incorporate predictive microbiology, environ-
mental conditions, contamination data, food consumption patterns and other 
information. 
20.  Risk Assessment The qualitative and/or quantitative estimation of the probability of occurrence 
and severity of known or potential adverse health effects in a given population, 
based upon hazard identification, hazard characterization, and exposure 
assessment.*
* Note: This is the definition provided by Codex Alimentarius Commission70 
Predictive microbiology is used by industry and others to estimate how pathogens may behave in a 
particular food or processing environment . Such models depend heavily on the types of pathogen 
biology studies described previously . Examples of predictive models can be found in the ARS Pre-
70   Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme . Codex Alimentarius Commission . Procedural Manual . 12th ed . Rome: Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations : World Health Organization, 2001 . Available online at: http://www .fao .org/
DOCREP/005/Y2200E/y2200e00 .htm (Last viewed 3/28/2008) .
71  http://portal .arserrc .gov/PMIPHome .aspx (last viewed 3/28/2008)
72  http://www .combase .cc/ (last viewed 3/28/2008)
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dictive Microbiology Information Portal (PMIP),71 which was developed to assist small firms use such 
information, and the affiliated ComBase, a Web-based tool that is the result of collaboration between 
ARS and food safety institutes in the United Kingdom and Australia .72 
The information needed for hazard characterization (dose-response), exposure assessments and risk 
assessment comes from many sources and is frequently collected for other purposes . It includes the 
raw data itself, as well as the analyses that build upon these data to create new information .
One major type of modeling information is that resulting from studies that attempt to measure the 
relationship between exposure to a specified level of a microbial or chemical hazard and the corre-
sponding acute and chronic health outcomes due to this exposure . These dose-response and concen-
tration-response studies are critical to estimating the public health impacts in risk assessments .
Human health data (epidemiology) generated by state and local health departments and CDC is used 
in modeling, as is information on contamination rates and levels of hazards in foods that has been col-
lected by government regulatory agencies and private firms . Additional types of data used in modeling 
include pathogen biology, chemical toxicity, food consumption, food composition and environmental 
characteristics, most of which are generated by government and academic researchers . 
These kinds of information are then integrated into analyses to assess exposure to a chemical or 
microbial hazard and to perform risk assessments using dose-response models . Risk assessments are 
developed primarily by federal agencies, non-governmental organizations and academic researchers . 
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Trade and Industry
Information on the food industry and its activities that are important for efforts to ensure food safety 
range from general information on food production and processing practices to data on HACCP 
and other food safety management programs, the effectiveness and cost of food safety interventions, 
and the economic impact of food safety problems and solutions . These types of information relate to 
systems from food production through to preparation in food service environments . Seven types of 
information on trade and industry are described in Table B .7 .
Table B.7—Types of Information on Trade and Industry
21.  Food Safety 
System 
Management
Information regarding performance and nature of food safety management 
practices and systems (e.g. HACCP), including process control data 
(e.g. temperature control data, pH), as well as information on pathogen 
transfer (e.g. cross-contamination) throughout the farm-to-Table Bontinuum.
22.  Traceback Information that allows foods found to be contaminated to be traced back 
through the food system to the farm or processing facility. 
23.  Intervention 
Efficacy
Effectiveness of interventions, such as specific new technologies, equipment 
improvements, process changes, and regulatory actions, as well as uninten-
tional consequences of interventions.
24.  Intervention Costs Direct costs of specific intervention technologies, process changes, or changes 
to food safety system management.
25.  Economic impacts Direct costs to a firm or firms due to a food safety intervention, as well as 
analyses of impacts on the economy due to food safety regulations, inter-
ventions, management practices, or contamination events (intentional or 
unintentional), including indirect costs such as market loss.
26  International Trade Quantities and locations of food imports and exports, and other related infor-
mation necessary to measure impact of contaminated imports and exports
The food industry, government and academia all collect such information for a wide variety of 
purposes . The industry collects and uses some types of this information simply for business purposes 
but also to support their own food safety management systems, though the extent of information 
collection depends significantly on the industry sector, company size, the commodity in question, 
and food safety risk . Information on the feasibility, effectiveness and cost of food safety interventions 
is vital for both public and private purposes and is generated by the industry, government agencies 
and the academic and scientific research communities . Local, state and federal governments need a 
wide variety of industry-related information to design, implement and evaluate regulatory and public 
health programs .
appendix b: types of food safety information
| 118 |
Consumers and Workers
Human behavior is a key component of the food safety system . Consumers, in particular, are both 
beneficiaries of and participants in efforts to ensure food safety . Information on consumer behaviors 
and perceptions is important to estimating food safety risks to the population, identifying and eval-
uating interventions, and ensuring consumers have the knowledge to handle food safely . In addition 
to consumers, however, information on the behaviors, perceptions and knowledge of food workers 
throughout the system is important, from food service employees of restaurants and caterers back to 
those involved in on-farm production . Four types of information on behavior and consumption are 
shown in Table B .8 .
Table B.8—Types of Information on Consumers and Workers
27.  Food Consumption Quantities of food consumed, produced, sold, etc, for different populations and 
consumption environments (e.g., home vs. restaurant)
28.  Consumer & 
Worker Behavior
Characterizing consumer and food worker activities such as food storage, 
handling, preparation, etc, as well as consumer sensitivity to price, shopping 
patterns, and market behavior
29.  Risk Perception/
Communication
Characterizing consumer and worker perceptions, preferences, and beliefs 
about foodborne risks, including food safety knowledge, risk aversion, and 
research or educational activities communicating risks to consumers.
30.  Population and 
Demographics
Information about population and demographics such as age, gender, race, 
income, immunocompromised status, etc
For example, information on food consumption patterns and population demographics contribute 
directly to risk assessment and identification of at-risk populations . Knowledge about consumer 
practices and perceptions are essential to the development of educational initiatives and risk com-
munication activities aimed at improving consumer food safety practices . 
Information in this broad category is collected by government, industry and academia, though, as a 
general rule, population-level data on consumption patterns and demographics are collected largely 
by or on behalf of the federal government . 
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Food and Environment
Information on food characteristics and composition, such as nutrient content, and on environmental 
characteristics, such as weather, is collected primarily for purposes outside of food safety, but may be 
used in conjunction with other data to inform an understanding of food safety risks . For example, 
nutrient content or other aspects of food composition may affect bacterial growth or host suscepti-
bility, and information on flooding may indicate pathways for upstream runoff that can contaminate 
produce . These two types of food and environment information are shown in Table A-9 .
Table B.9—Types of Information on Food and Environment
31.  Food Composition 
and Characteristics
Chemical properties of foods such as nutrients, acidity, water content and 
other characteristics that may be related to food safety (e.g. characteristics 
that may mitigate or increase risk)
32.  Environmental 
Characteristics
Measurements of temperature, humidity, pH, etc—may be taken from public 
environment (i.e., oceans, soil, air) or private environment (i.e.,  on the farm, 
in the plant) 
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 a p p e n d i x  c : 
m e c h a n i s m s f o r  f o o d  s a f e t y  i n f o r m a t i o n s h a r i n g
This is a basic (and incomplete) listing of existing mechanisms for sharing or accessing food safety 
information, including current databases, reporting systems, electronic networks, Web sites, infor-
mation repositories, and other information systems . Most of those listed are national in scope, 
and many are managed by federal agencies . These mechanisms are organized by the type of infor-
mation they contain, though many systems have multiple or overlapping functions . This list is not 
exhaustive .
1. Information Gateways






FoodRisk .org (formerly the JIFSAN Food Safety Risk Analysis Clearinghouse)
http://www.foodrisk.org
Gateway to Government Food Safety Information
http://www.foodsafety.gov/ 
2. Directories of Activities
Health and Human Services Data Resources
http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/datadir/
USDA/ARS/NAL/Food Safety Research Information Office (FSRIO) Web site
http://fsrio.nal.usda.gov/index.php
USDA/CSREES Current Research Information System (CRIS)
http://cris.csrees.usda.gov/
USDA/CSREES National Integrated Food Safety Initiative (NIFSI) Accomplishment 
Reporting System
http://www.idea.iastate.edu/foodsafety/project_directory.asp
appendix c: mechanisms for food safety information sharing
| 122 |




Not available online to the public 
USDA AMS Microbiological Data Program (MDP)
http://www.ams.usda.gov/science/MPO/Download.htm
USDA FSIS Microbiological Baseline Data
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Baseline_Data/index.asp
USDA FSIS Microbiological Results of Raw Ground Beef Products Analyzed for E. coli O157:H7 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/ecoli_o157_summary_tables/index.asp
USDA FSIS E. coli O157:H7 Contamination Summary
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/2006_Ecoli_Positive_Results/index.asp
USDA- FSIS Salmonella Serotype Analysis
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Serotypes_Profile_Salmonella_Isolates/index.asp, http://www.fsis.
usda.gov/PDF/Serotypes_Profile_Salmonella_Tables_&_Figures.pdf
USDA Microbiological and Residues Contamination Information System (MARCIS)
Not available online
USDA Pathogen Reduction Enforcement Program (PREP)
Not available online 
GenBank
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=Nucleotide
NIH- NIAID- National Microbial Pathogen Data Resource Center (NMPDR)
http://www.nmpdr.org/
DHS National Bio-Surveillance Integration System (NBIS)
Not available online
4. Chemical Contamination (Food, Plants or Animals)
eLEXNET
see Microbial Contamination section
FERN Methods Repository
see Microbial Contamination section
The Food Animal Residue Avoidance Databank (FARAD):
http://www.farad.org/
FDA Pesticide Program Residue Monitoring Database
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/pesrpts.html
FAO and WHO’s Acrylamide in Food Network
http://www.acrylamide-food.org/
NERL Human Exposure Database System (HEDS)
Not available online to the public




USDA NASS Agricultural Chemical Use Database
http://www.pestmanagement.info/nass/
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EPA Pesticide Fate Database
http://cfpub.epa.gov/pfate/home.cfm
EPA National Pesticide Information Retrieval System 
http://aboutnpirs.ceris.purdue.edu/
EPA Pesticide Products Database 
http://ppis.ceris.purdue.edu/htbin/ppisprod.com
EPA EXtension TOXicology NETwork (ETOXNET)
http://extoxnet.orst.edu/
CDC ATSDR Toxicological Profiles
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxpro2.html
GMA Database on Pesticide Residues and Food Consumption 
Not available online
FDA-CSFAN Total Diet Study
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/tds-toc.html
EFSA Database on Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH)
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/data_collection/pah.html
5. Pathogen Characteristics and Predictive Microbiology
ComBase (Combined Database for Predictive Microbiology)
http://www.combase.cc/




6. Public Health Surveillance






CDC Electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS)
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/us_outb.htm
CDC Foodborne Outbreak Response and Surveillance Unit Web site
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/index.htm








CDC National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS)
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/netss.htm
CDC National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS)
http://www.cdc.gov/nedss/
CDC Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS)
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/phlisdata/default.htm
CDC Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X)
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/epix/epix.html#ancMenu
CDC Sentinel Counties Study of Viral Hepatitis
Not available online
CDC Viral Hepatitis Surveillance Program
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/hepatitis/resource/index.htm
CDC Vibrio Surveillance System
Not available online
CDC Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance System
Not available online; information at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/datadir/cdc4.htm#cjd
CFSAN Adverse Reaction Monitoring System (ARMS)
Not available online
Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) Outbreak Alert
http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/outbreak_report.html 
Florida Department of Health EpiCom
https://www.epicomfl.net/




7. Risk Assessment and Risk Analysis
Foodrisk .org (formerly known as the Food Safety Risk Analysis Clearinghouse)
http://www.foodrisk.org/databases.cfm




EPA Integrated Risk Information Surveillance System (IRIS)
http://www.epa.gov/iris
Cumulative and Aggregate Risk Evaluation System (CARES) 
http://www.infoscientific.com/software_main.htm#cares
73   Sokolow L, Grady N, Walker D, et al . Deciphering data anomalies in BioSense . In: Syndromic surveillance: reports from a 
national conference, 2004 . MMWR 2005;54(Suppl):133--9 . Available from: http://www .cdc .gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
su5401a21 .htm (Last viewed 3/28/2008)
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8. Food Consumption
NHANES Dietary Survey: What We Eat In America (WWEIA)
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhanes/faqs.htm
USDA ERS Food Availability
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/foodconsumption/FoodAvailIndex.htm
EPA/USDA-ARS Food Commodity Intake Database (FCID)
Available on CD ROM
USDA ERS Nutrient Availability
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/foodconsumption/NutrientAvailIndex.htm
USDA ERS Food Guide Pyramid Servings
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/foodconsumption/FoodGuideIndex.htm
9. Inspections
FDA Bioresearch Monitoring (BIMO) program
State and local restaurant inspection listings
http://www.spiesonline.net/restaurant-inspection.shtml
State Web site examples
Florida restaurant disciplinary activity reports
 http://www.myflorida.com/dbpr/hr/rdars/index.shtml 
South Carolina restaurant scores
 http://www.scdhec.net/health/envhlth/food_protection/scores.htm
Tennessee statewide restaurant inspection scores
 http://tn.state.gegov.com/tennessee/
County Web site examples
DeKalb County, GA, restaurant scores (requires registration)
 http://atlanta.digitalhealthdepartment.com/dekalb/
King County (Seattle), WA searchable database of restaurant inspections
 http://www.decadeonline.com/main.phtml?agency=skc
Washoe County (Reno), NV searchable database of restaurant inspections
 http://www.rgj.com/rails/inspections/
City and locality Web site examples
Austin, TX, restaurant inspection scores
 http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/health/restaurant/search.cfm
Boston, MA, searchable database of restaurant inspections
 http://www.cityofboston.gov/isd/health/mfc/search.asp
New York City, NY, restaurant inspection results (requires registration)
 http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/rii/index.shtml
USDA FSIS Eligible Foreign Establishment List
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Regulations_&_Policies/Eligible_Foreign_Establishments/index.asp
National Advisory Committee on Meat and Poultry Inspection Reports
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Regulations_&_Policies/National_Advisory_Committee_on_Meat_&_
Poultry 
DHS - Customs and Border Protection Databases
http://www.cbp.gov
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10. Recalls, Violations and Advisories
USDA FSIS Recalls
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fsis_Recalls/index.asp
Open Federal Case Listings
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fsis_Recalls/Open_Federal_Cases/index.asp
USDA FSIS Open Retail Recall Cases
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fsis_Recalls/Open_Retail_Recall_Cases/index.asp
USDA FSIS Recall Case Archive
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fsis_Recalls/Recall_Case_Archive/index.asp
USDA FSIS The Meat, Poultry and Egg Product Inspection Directory
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Regulations_&_Policies/Meat_Poultry_Egg_Inspection_Directory
USDA FSIS Residue Violator Alert List
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Residue_Violators_List.pdf
FSIS Residue Violation Information System (RVIS) 
Not available online
EPA National Listing of Fish Consumption Advisories: 
http://epa.gov/waterscience/fish/advisories/index.html
11. Animal Health/Disposition
USDA FSIS Animal Disposition Reporting System
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Animal_Disposition_Reporting_System/index.asp
USDA- APHIS National Animal Disease Program Surveillance
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/surveillance/
USDA National Animal Health Laboratory Network
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/ag_biosecurity/in_focus/apb_if_healthlab.html
12. Economics
USDA Economics and Statistics System
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/
University of Connecticut Food Marketing Policy Center (FMPC)
http://www.fmpc.uconn.edu/publications/
USDA-ERS Foodborne Illness Cost Calculator
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodBorneIllness/
13. Consumer and Worker Behavior
USDA-ERS Hamburger Doneness and Consumer Preferences
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/hamburger/
FDA- CFSAN Health and Diet Survey
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/crnutri.html
Audits International/FDA Cold Temperature Evaluation Interactive Database
http://www.foodrisk.org/exclusives/audits/Temperature/index.html
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14. Food Safety System Management
USDA-ERS Food Safety Technologies and HACCP Compliance Survey
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/HACCPSurvey/
FDA National Seafood HACCP Database
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/seaeval2.html
EHNIS – Environmental Health Specialists Network (EHS-Net)/ Environmental Health Specialists 
Network Information System (EHNIS)
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/EHSNet/
15. Agricultural and Food Production Practices
USDA ERS Crop Production Practices
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/ARMS/CropOverview.htm
USDA NASS Census of Agriculture
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Census_of_Agriculture/index.asp
USDA NASS Slaughter Totals
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/livestock/pls-bb/2006/lstk0206.pdf
16. Directories of Publications or Web Sites
The FDA Publications Database
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/RIS/RISWEB.ISA 





NCFST C . Botulinum Bibliography Database
http://www.ncfst.iit.edu/search/search_our_database.html
http://www.ncfst.iit.edu/CBOT/cbotbibl.html
UC Davis WIFSS E. coli- Lettuce Research Database
http://wifss.ucdavis.edu/pathogens_toxins.html
Union of Concerned Scientists Genetic Engineering Links
http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_environment/genetic_engineering/genetic-engineering-links.html
Union of Concerned Scientists Antibiotics and Food Links
http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_environment/antibiotics_and_food/antibiotic-resistance-links.html
17. Repositories of Standards, Guidelines and Practices
AOAC International Standardized Methods Guidelines
http://www.aoac.org 
The Codex Alimentarius 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/standard_list.do?lang=en
CIFOR Food Safety Clearinghouse 
http://www.cifor.us/clearinghouse/index.cfm
CSTE State Viral Hepatitis Plans
http://www.cste.org/HepatitisPlans/HepatitisPlanspage.htm
The International Portal on Food Safety, Animal and Plant Health
http://www.ipfsaph.org/En/default.jsp
The Food Safety Research Consortium is a multidisciplinary collaboration between eight 
research institutions to improve the U .S . food safety system . The Consortium is developing new 
analytical approaches to make food safety decision making more science- and risk-based, including 
tools for allocating resources, setting priorities, and devising interventions .
www.thefsrc.org
The School of Public Health and Health Services at The George Washington University advances the health 
of the populations of our local, national, and global communities by developing tomorrow’s leaders, creating 
innovative educational opportunities, translating science into policies, programs and interventions, and 
fostering multidisciplinary collaboration in research, education, and service .
www.gwumc.edu/sphhs
Additional copies of this report may be requested from:
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c/o Emerging Pathogens Institute
University of Florida
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